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This thesis explores variation in public policy with a focus on the provision of social grants 
(social cash transfers) for families with children. The thesis investigates how and why three 
middle-income countries (South Africa, Namibia and Botswana) and a low-income country 
(Zimbabwe) in Southern Africa provide for children in different ways. In-depth interviews and 
desktop research established that ‘child welfare regimes’ (CWRs) (a combination of programmes 
affecting the welfare of children, primarily cash transfers, feeding programmes, health and 
education fee waivers) are similar in providing some form of social grants, directly and/or 
indirectly to children or families with children. But there are significant variations between the 
CWRs. The CWRs primarily vary across two dimensions: first, the coverage of programmes; and 
secondly, their targeting, specifically whether they are targeted on poverty or on perceived 
‘family breakdown’. I present a taxonomy of CWRs with four distinct types: a pro-poor 
(poverty-targeted) CWR (as in South Africa), a familialist CWR (targeted on ‘broken’ families) 
(as in Botswana), a mixed (pro-poor-familial targeted) CWR (as in Namibia) and an agrarian 
(family-targeted) one (as in Zimbabwe). A pro-poor CWR is distinguished by high coverage and 
generous transfers. A familial CWR provides medium coverage with overall generosity but with 
parsimonious cash benefits. A mixed CWR has low coverage and modest generosity while an 
agrarian CWR has low coverage and ungenerous benefits. This taxonomy emphasises variation 
in targeting form, an important but underestimated dimension in identifying and explaining 
CWRs particularly in Southern Africa. In explaining the variation, the factors that were 
especially important include colonial antecedents, need or structural factors (particularly AIDS-
related health shocks, demographic changes and family breakdown), international influence by 
international organisations, particularly UNICEF, the level of democracy but all these factors and 
the choice for a CWR reflect domestic politics (party politics and civil society organisations). 
These findings extend the Power Resource Theory beyond developed countries but also reveal 
new influential factors, within the theory, that have been overlooked but significant in explaining 




CHAPTER 1   
Introduction: The logic of comparison 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Many states in Southern Africa now provide one or more form of non-contributory social grants 
(social transfers) to children or families with children. This state social provision varies cross-
nationally. Variation includes the design, coverage, scope and cost of social transfer schemes 
(ILO, 2017; 2014; Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012).  
This thesis investigates variation between Child Welfare Regimes (CWRs) in Southern Africa. I 
use the term CWR to refer to the combination of programmes affecting the welfare of children 
directly (child-specific) or indirectly (child-oriented) — primarily cash transfer and feeding 
programmes, health and education fee waivers. A CWR envisaged here incorporates some 
general non-contributory welfare programmes that are usually meant to benefit the household as 
a whole (i.e. adults and children), (for example, farm input subsidies or subsidized housing) or 
even adults specifically (for example, old age pensions and disability grants). Though not 
explicitly oriented towards children, such schemes improve a household’s ability to care for 
children (ILO, 2013). This definition encompasses the kinds of programmes elsewhere called 
‘child benefits’ (Bradshaw, 2012), ‘family allowances’, ‘child sensitive social protection’ (social 
transfers that are sensitive to children’s rights) (Roelen & Sabates-Wheeler, 2012; Department of 
International Development et al., 2009) or ‘social protection for children’ (Handa et al., 2011) 
i.e. a wide range of universal or targeted, conditional or unconditional, cash or in-kind social 
assistance (non-contributory) and social insurance (contributory) programmes that benefit 
children and families. In Southern Africa, however, CWRs (and associated proposed reforms and 
debates) revolve primarily around government-funded (i.e. public) unconditional, targeted, non-
contributory social cash transfers. 
 
This definition is different from the broader view of social protection as a set of universal or 
targeted public policies, programmes and systems put in place to help members of the society (as 
individuals or households) to cope with risk and vulnerabilities, particularly poverty (Barrientos, 
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2011:40-41; Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; 2009; Barrientos, Hulme, and Shepherd, 2005:11-13; 
Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2007; 2004:3-5; Devereux, 2001; Norton, Conway, and Foster, 
2001:21-24).  
 
Cash transfer programmes for children and families in the global South have continued during 
recent years, and in some countries, have even accelerated, whether in order to cushion the 
impact of the global crisis on children and families or with a more general objective of reducing 
poverty (ILO, 2014; Garcia & Moore, 2012; Slater, 2011). Two famous income transfer 
examples of child grant programmes in Latin America are Brazil’s Bolsa Familia (which 
replaced Bolsa Escola in 2004) and Mexico’s Prospera (previously Oportunidades) which were 
granted to poor households on the condition that children attend school (McCord, 2010; Soares, 
Ribas & Osório, 2010; Barrientos & Hulme, 2008).  
 
Evidence suggests that social grants for families with children affect the wellbeing of children in 
various ways. Social grants not only tackle income poverty, they may also provide effective 
support for broader developmental objectives (Barrientos et al., 2014). For example, social 
protection can be used to improve access to education and health, areas that are critically 
important for socio-economic development (Ellis, Devereux & White, 2009). These 
interventions alleviate child poverty (Pascall, 1997:220) and subsequent social vulnerability as a 
result of an increasing number of children living in a family environment aggravated by chronic 
poverty the region is experiencing (Barrientos et al., 2013; Ellis, Devereux & White, 2009; 
Barrientos & Hulme, 2008). Other benefits include helping the poor and marginalized claim their 
rights and boosting investment in human capital of the poorest children. They also have the 
potential to break intergenerational poverty (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2011). Cash transfer 
benefits also include improvements in birth registration and reduced use of child labour (Holmes, 
2009:1). 
 
There has also been a remarkable increase in cash transfers to poor families with children in 
Southern Africa since the early 2000s. In some parts of Southern Africa social grants in the form 
of child support grants, child maintenance grants, foster care grants, orphan care grants, 
conditional and unconditional cash transfers were introduced to poor households to reduce 
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poverty and vulnerability (Seekings & Moore, 2013; Ellis, Devereux & White, 2009; Barrientos 
& Hulme, 2008; Devereux, 2006b). Using national child poverty lines, approximately 78% of all 
children lived in poverty in Zimbabwe in 2012 (ZIMSTAT, 2013), 63% of in South Africa in 
2014 (Delany, Jehoma & Lake, 2016:34), 46% in Botswana in 2015 (World Bank, 2015:6) and 
33% in Namibia in 2010 (NSA, 2012a:5). Regarding general poverty, World Development 
Indicators for August 2017 show that poverty rates (using the $1.90/day/person) in Southern 
Africa are highest in Zimbabwe with 72% followed by Zambia and Malawi with 61 and 51% 
respectively. Botswana has the lowest rate with 19%, South Africa has 23% and Namibia has 
29% (World Bank, 2017). Figure 1.1 shows general poverty rates at national poverty lines as a 
percentage of the population in the four cases.  
Figure 1.1: General poverty rates, 1990- 2015 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
Comparable time series child poverty data were not available hence general poverty may be used 
as a proxy for child poverty. The available data, however, shows that in 2015 children 



















Botswana Namibia South	Africa Zimbabwe
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Table 1.1: Proportion of children, 2015 
	




Proportion of child 
population (%) 
Botswana 2.3 0.8 35 
Namibia 2.5 0.96 38 
South Africa 54 18.6 35 
Zimbabwe 15.6 6.9 44 
Source: United Nations Human Development Reports www.hdr.undp.org/en/data  
Southern African countries are faced with overstretched traditional family and community 
support mechanisms, relatively high numbers of poor families with vulnerable children and high 
demand for social protection yet there are noticeable spotty policy and programme developments 
for the same.  South Africa paid monthly child support grants for more than 12 million children 
by December 2017 (South Africa Social Security Agency (SASSA), 2017), pays foster care 
grants for children who have been adopted formally, and has considered a dedicated orphan grant 
(Proudlock, 2011). Botswana, Namibia, Malawi and Zimbabwe have dedicated 
grants for orphaned and other vulnerable children (OVCs).1 The World Bank and the ILO has 
encouraged countries to consider expanded social protection for children, possibly including 
conditional2 cash transfers. There are, however, striking differences in the provision of social 
grants with some countries already having elaborate and comprehensive social protection 
systems (ILO, 2014). South Africa spends 3.5 to 4% of GDP on all the grants whilst Lesotho 
dedicates 1.4% of GDP (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012:12). 
The development and increasing attention to these social grants in some Southern African 
countries is grounded in international covenants such as the Universal Declaration of Human 








Rights and Welfare of the Child as well as some regional agreements such as the 2004 African 
Union Summit which noted the lack of social protection and called for its enhanced effectiveness 
and coverage; the 2006 signing of the Livingstone Accord where participant countries gave 
official recognition to social protection as a basic human right and encourages governments to 
come up with plans and budgets for their own national social protection plans; and the 2007 
European Union and Africa Joint Strategic Partnership Agreement (UNICEF, 2008a). Even with 
international and regional agreements that seem to increase social grants recognition as a key 
strategy in reducing poverty, there is evidence that provision of these grants by some countries 
who signed the agreements vary cross-nationally.  
This preliminary chapter sets out the logic of comparison, drawing theoretical lessons from the 
global North (i.e. the industrialized capitalist democracies including the United States and United 
Kingdom) and the global South or developing world (including Southern Africa).  
1.2 How does state social provision differ?  
How and why do some countries provide social grants differently from others? Regime types are 
less understood and researched in Southern Africa. To contribute to this growing field of CWRs, 
this thesis investigates the causes of variation in the design of cash transfers for families with 
children in four Southern African countries – South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.  
The overarching research question answered in this thesis is how and why three middle-income 
countries (South Africa, Namibia and Botswana) and a low-income country (Zimbabwe) in 
Southern Africa provide for children in different ways?  
 
Specific questions: 
• What are the distinctive characteristics of the child welfare regime in each country?  
• How did the child welfare regime evolve over time in each country?  
• Why did the child welfare regime evolve in this way?  
The critical analysis of how social protection policy decisions are made in the four case studies 
in this thesis widens our understanding of public policy making in Southern Africa. The 
alternative explanations provided assist us in understanding the significance of assimilating child 
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poverty reduction and recognition of children’s rights into the macroeconomic policy agendas 
geared towards equitable and sustainable development. 
Scholars have been grappling with the question of how and why social provision differs since the 
1980s (Kamerman & Kahn, 1981, Bradshaw, 2012). Hicks and Esping-Andersen (2005:510) ask, 
‘How do we explain the vast differences in the welfare states of today?’ Kaufmann is equally 
concerned, ‘How can one describe and explain the divergent historical development toward the 
welfare state in different countries?’ (2013:28). Explanations of variation are inconclusive. This 
section reviews related literature on variation between CWRs from the global and Southern 
African perspectives. A large literature exists on variation in general welfare regimes. By 
contrast, there is limited literature specifically on variation between CWRs especially in 
developing countries. In view of this, the general literature on welfare regimes will be reviewed 
when it is directly or indirectly relevant to understanding CWRs specifically.  
1.2.1 International literature perspective 
 
Welfare states provide social protection to families with children in different ways. Child welfare 
regimes vary by overall expenditure, the generosity of the benefits, the form and extent of 
targeting, and whether the programmes are rooted in legislation (ILO, 2017; 2014; World Bank, 
2017; 2015). Overall expenditure is the most easily measured of these. The ILO’s World Social 
Protection Report, 2014/15 (ILO 2014) asserts that countries in Africa, together with countries in 
Asia and the Pacific, spend a far smaller share of GDP on child benefits (about 0.2 per cent) than 
countries in Western Europe (about 0.4 per cent of GDP). The recent (2017) ILO report 
maintained that Africa and Asia spend less than 0.7% of GDP whereas Europe and Central Asia 
spend more than 2% of GDP on child benefits (ILO, 2017:18). 
 
The World Bank Social Safety Nets report, Closing the Gap: The state of social safety nets 2017, 
shows that average spending on all social safety nets in Latin America and Caribbean  has 
increased from 0.3% of GDP in 2000 to more than 1.5% in 2015 (World Bank, 2017:1). The 
Bank reports that developing countries spend an average of 1.6% of GDP but there are regional 
variations with Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and Caribbean 
are currently at the forefront of the social safety nets spending, with an average of 2.2%, 1.6% 
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and 1.5% of GDP, respectively. Middle East and North Africa and South Asia spend 1.0% and 
0.8% respectively (World Bank, 2017:1). Most European countries offer generous benefits that 
are either universal or near universal, but there is considerable variation in the total volume 
(extensiveness) of transfers (Gauthier, 1996; Wennemo, 1992), targeting and generosity 
(Bradshaw, 2012; Daly & Clavero, 2002). 
 
The World Bank argues that increased spending on social safety nets has resulted in increased 
coverage. Examples are Tanzania’s Productive Safety Net programme that expanded from 2% of 
population in 2014 to 10% of population in 2016 and Senegal’s National Cash Transfer 
Programme that expanded from 3% in 2013 to 16% of population in 2016 (World Bank, 2017:3). 
The ILO (2017:) specifically reports on coverage of social protection for children observing that 
globally 35% of children receive social protection benefits but the ILO is quick to note that there 
are ‘significant regional disparities: while 87% of children in Europe and Central Asia and 66% 
in the Americas receive benefits, this is the case for only 28% of children in Asia and 16% in 
Africa’. In sub-Saharan Africa, the coverage rate for children is 13%, ‘substantially lower than 
the world average of about 35%.’ Coverage is higher in high income countries in Northern and 
Western Europe (above 95%), high in some high- and middle-income countries in Eastern and 
Southern Europe (above 85%) and Latin American countries (above 70% on average) but lower 
in Central America (29%). Coverage in Asia varies between 11% in Eastern Asia and 44% in 
Central Asia (ILO, 2017:16). The ILO concludes that some countries like Brazil and Mongolia 
are moving towards universal coverage but coverage in most countries remains limited. Thus, 
spending and coverage are important dimensions of variation in the provision of social protection 
for families with children.  
 
Earlier research showed that provision for children varied in these dimensions (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). Other scholars have argued that programme differences are either residual or 
institutionalised (marginal or comprehensive) (Sainsbury, 1991). The researchers seem not to 
agree on which dimensions are more important than other but authors select dimensions they 
deem especially important in constructing typologies. Building on this literature, this thesis 
shows that some of these dimensions are useful but argues that two dimensions – first, 
programmes’ coverage (understood as proportion of children reached by social cash transfers, 
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generosity and legal status) and second, their targeting (i.e. whether programmes are poverty-
targeted or targeted on the basis of family breakdown) – were especially important in 
distinguishing CWRs in Southern Africa (and possibly elsewhere also). Although spending is a 
widely measured dimension that could have been considered in this thesis, as shown later, it was 
disregarded because of the incompleteness of or absolute absence of spending data on child 
benefits in the case study countries except for South Africa. Most importantly, the universal-
targeted (targeting) dimension emphasised in much of the literature (possibly because social 
democracy has been associated with universal programmes) was less important and inapplicable 
in Southern Africa since almost all the programmes are targeted in one way or another. What is 
very important, as discussed in Chapter 6, is variation related to targeting based on poverty or 
perceived family breakdown. This is an important dimension especially in identifying the 
different types of CWRs within the taxonomy (i.e. an empirical classification of four country 
cases) in this thesis. 
 Research has shown that social provision for children varies in terms of the programmes, known 
as ‘child benefits’ or ‘child packages’ and the level of the packages (Kamerman & Kahn, 1981; 
Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Bradshaw, 2012; 2010; Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Kamerman et al, 
2010). Kamerman and Kahn’s ground-breaking comparative research explores the differences 
between family benefits for working parents in the United States, France, Sweden, Germany and 
Hungary (Kamerman & Kahn, 1981. Most of these child benefits are employment-based. This 
study builds upon this literature to identify the programmes for families with children but focuses 
on non-contributory social transfers. The thesis further explores other dimensions of variation 
that have not been fully explored, particularly the differences on which categories of children 
gets what (targeting). The findings are critical in improving our ideas on regional and global 
perspectives on both variation and explaining variation between CWRs. It was also important to 
establish that the ways in which different direct and indirect social grants for families with 
children combine in each country is a crucial characteristic of variation that has not been fully 
explored in existing comparative welfare policy literature.  
Esping-Andersen’s seminal work on welfare regimes shows that state provision differs in terms 
of ‘regime types’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999). Welfare states are qualitatively different 
arrangements of institutions - state, market and the family - and distributive outcomes having 
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been shaped by different historical actors. Esping-Andersen argues that welfare regimes cannot 
be categorised on the basis of the single dimension of expenditure because regimes vary along 
multiple dimensions that are only weakly related to expenditure. Countries with very different 
regimes may end up spending much the same as each other (Esping-Andersen, 1990:26-28). 
Esping-Andersen clusters welfare states into three categories - social democratic (Nordic 
countries such as Sweden), conservative or corporatist (continental Europe such as Germany and 
France) and liberal states (Anglo-American like the United States and Canada) (Esping-
Andersen, 1990:26-29). Citizenship based generous and universal income support for children 
meant to attain equality is provided in social democratic states. By contrast, conservative states 
provide encompassing and income-related child benefits emphasizing more on family support 
and negligible state provision. Liberal states provide mainly means tested transfers to poor 
families. The state plays a minimal role and the market is the primary provider for the employed 
breadwinners (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
A comparative review of Ireland, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK shows that policies and 
programmes for support for families with children vary in instruments including cash, provision 
of lone parents, childcare provision, reconciling work and family, children’s rights and provision 
of care for the elderly (Daly & Clavero, 2002). Approaches used to support for families with 
children differed but fell into three categories: universal support (Sweden); support tied to 
father’s employment (UK); and along family-types and financially and morally deserving 
families (Ireland). Generosity of support differs with some countries extending more generous 
benefits while others are ‘laggards’ with consistently low and selective (not universal) 
programmes. The degree of diversity of family support is the second variant where countries fit 
within the less to more diverse equation depending on the number of income programmes for 
families with children being offered. The nature of service provision is another disparity where 
state provision of service was either popular or unpopular for families or in general. This 
underdeveloped service provision could be a result of lack of relevant support service 
infrastructure culminating in few family services being provided to needy families.  
1.2.2 A focus on Southern Africa 
The regimes discussed thus far have been adapted in different settings to show variation in 
welfare provision. Seekings (2005) adapts Esping-Andersen's analytical framework in the 
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‘South’ but argues that it is inadequate as it neglects ‘ways in which states influence distribution 
through shaping the development or economic growth path’. Seekings offers an alternative 
typology of income support that distinguishes between agrarian, inegalitarian corporatist and 
redistributive regimes (Seekings, 2005:16). In 2012 Niño-Zarazúa et al sketched typologies of 
cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa that distinguished between the ‘Southern Africa’ and the 
‘Middle Africa’ models. In this analysis social protection programmes in sub-Saharan Africa 
differ in structure and scope across countries (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012:12).  In the same year 
Garcia and Moore came up with almost similar distinctions that grouped cash transfer 
programmes into	 ‘middle-income’ (corresponding to the Southern Model) and the ‘low-income 
or fragile’ (similar to middle Africa model) considering the relationship between welfare 
provision and income level (following World Bank ranking). Many of these classifications 
resemble Esping-Andersen’s categories in one way or another. These regimes focus on general 
welfare but show how social provision in Southern Africa differs, pointing important dimensions 
including targeting, spending, and a review of the programmes in each country. This thesis 
builds upon these regimes to construct a taxonomy of CWRs and argue that the CWRs in the 
four case-studies constitute four distinct types. In two of these cases (Botswana and Zimbabwe), 
the character of the CWR conforms with the character of the general welfare regimes. In the two 
others (Namibia and South Africa), the CWR does not easily fit into the existing overall welfare 
regime.   
The existing single or comparative studies on social cash transfers show the impact of different 
cash transfer programmes. In a recent 8-country comparative study of ‘the story of cash 
transfers’ for children, Davis and colleagues document ‘the accumulated evidence of the broad 
reaching impacts of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa’ (Davis et al., 2016:1). 
Handa’s latest contribution to social protection for children examines the impact of cash transfers 
on child nutrition (Groot et al., 2017). In most of these studies, Handa and colleagues show 
programme impact in comparative perspective (see Handa et al, 2016; Handa et al., 2015; Handa 
et al., 2009). Handa et al., (2011:31-67) assess ‘mechanisms for targeting poor and vulnerable 
children in selected ESA [East and Southern African] countries.’  
Handa and others investigate Social Protection for Africa’s Children (Handa et al.,, 2011). The 
collection reviews the impact of social cash transfers on children in East and Southern Africa 
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(South Africa, Malawi and Ethiopia). The authors conclude that social protection is an important 
tool for child well-being. Their work in both Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Handa et al., 2006) make a compelling case for expansion of social protection for children. This 
literature sets out the key characteristics of programmes in different countries and regions, 
pointing to similarities and differences in coverage, legislation and value of transfers. This thesis 
builds upon and advances this literature to construct a taxonomy of CWRs in Southern Africa.  
Some studies evaluate the impact of cash transfers in East and Southern Africa showing how 
different programmes impact child wellbeing including their education and nutrition (Kilburn et 
al., 2017; Davis et al., 2016; Handa et al., 2016; Handa et al., 2015; Handa et al., 2011; Handa et 
al., 2009). The focus in these studies is on making better policies, but scholars also review 
programmes existing in different countries showing the variation in programmes. The 
researchers, however, say little about design, or at least about the reasons why design 
varies. This thesis builds upon this literature, adopting the comparative methodology, to focus on 
the design of cash transfer and investigate explanations for the variation. While Handa and others 
primarily focus on direct cash transfers, this research expands the focus to examine the reforms 
of direct and indirect programmes that affect the wellbeing of children. This is a major 
contribution to the existing knowledge on CWRs that underscores the significance of considering 
both direct and indirect social cash transfers when designing child social protection programmes. 
In South Africa, previous literature on social provision shows that there are child grants directly 
targeting children (Tshoose, 2016; Zembe-Mkabile, 2015; Wright et al., 2015). Grants are 
primarily poverty-targeted as they are means tested to exclude the rich (Lund, 2008, Ferguson, 
2007). Grants are targeted at different categories of children hence caregivers for children 
experiencing different conditions including disability and orphanhood receive grants specifically 
to help improve the quality of care (Mokomane, 2013).  
Many studies focus on a single programme particularly the CSG in South Africa (e.g. Aguero et 
al.,  2006; Lund, 2008; Lund et al., 2009; AIR, 2013; Budlender et al., 2005). Francie Lund, a 
renowned South African academic and social policy specialist who played a critical role in South 
Africa’s welfare reforms during the transition from apartheid to democratisation, has done 
considerable work on child social protection in South Africa Lund, 2011; 2008; Lund et al., 
2009; Budlender and Lund, 2011; Case et al., 2003). This work is important in helping us 
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understand the South African CWR better in terms of the introduction and reforms in social 
grants for families with children. For instance, Lund provides a detailed account of the post-
apartheid social transfer programmes and the policy processes and the factors that led to the 
disbanding of the State Maintenance Grant and adoption of the CSG (Lund, 1993; 2008).  
Lund and others also investigate the reach of the CSG in one province – KwaZulu-Natal - in 
South Africa and conclude that the grant reached 36% of eligible children (under the age of 7) in 
the selected district (Case et al., 2003). But the focus on the CSG only (underplaying the role of 
other child grants in child well-being or how they were adopted and have transformed over time) 
and on South Africa (Lund, 2011; 2003; Lund et al., 2009) without comparing it to other similar 
processes and grants in the region limits our view of CWRs in Southern Africa, Africa and 
globally. This thesis builds upon Lund’s analysis of the CSG to include other child grants like 
the Care Dependency Grant and Foster Care Grant. The thesis also considers the conditions that 
could have led to introduction of these child grants, how they differ with almost similar 
programmes in other countries and what factors help us explain the differences. This is an 
important contribution that widens our understanding of CWRs both from a single-country and 
comparative perspective. 
Building on this literature, the focus in this thesis is to identify the distinctive features of the 
South African CWR. I argue that South Africa originally had a primarily familial system (under 
apartheid), aimed at single mothers and their children, and orphans (albeit restricted to white, 
coloured and Indian people), but this was transformed into a distinctively pro-poor CWR through 
the Child Support Grant (CSG). Not only do child grants have a wider coverage but the 
expansive programmes for other population groups further increase the total coverage. Social 
grants are also legislated. My assessment of the value of benefits concurs with the existing 
literature showing that individual grant amounts fall below the Food Poverty Line, but I provide 
evidence that the combined value is generous.   
Generally, Namibia's CWR (and broadly the general welfare regime) is one of the least 
researched in Southern Africa, possibly because Namibia has a small population and there have 
been few reforms of its CWR since programmes were introduced under South African rule. The 
limited existing literature usefully discusses the provision of Child Welfare Grants and to some 
limited extent the effect of indirect programmes on the child welfare regime (Chiripanhura & 
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Niño-Zarazúa, 2013; Levine, 2011; Subbarao, 2008; GRN, 2010; Barrientos et al., 2010). The 
literature also characterises the Child Welfare Grants, describing programmes coverage and 
generosity. The literature shows the limited coverage of child grants specifically (Levine, 
2011:45) and of the overall welfare regime (Devereux, 2001) without examining the proportion 
of children covered by the combined programmes (child grants and other indirect schemes). It 
pays little attention to generosity. Authors discuss targeting, showing that the child grants are 
categorically, targeted at specific groups of children, especially different categories of orphans. 
This thesis builds upon and advances this literature to analyse the distinctive characteristics of 
the CWR arguing that individual grants coverage might be low compared to other middle-
income countries but the combination of Child Welfare Grants with other indirect programmes 
modestly increase total coverage. I show that generosity is one of the key distinguishing features 
arguing that Namibia is the least generous country of the four cases. The literature identifies the 
CWR type in Namibia as orphan-targeted but I show that the CWR is mixed, encompassing both 
familial and poverty targeting aspects. I argue that Namibia is a variant of the South African 
system, but it was not transformed through a CSG when South Africa’s CWR was reformed. 
Only recently have pro-poor grants been introduced, pushing Namibia in the mixed CWR 
direction.  
In Botswana, as in much of Southern Africa, researchers extensively discuss the general welfare 
regime with limited or no focus on the CWR. The general welfare regime has been variously 
described as ‘minimalist’ (Good & Taylor, 2008), doing little, among other things, to promote 
‘access to social support’ (Kaboyakgosi & Marata, 2012), or as conservative (Seekings, 2016a). 
It is more appropriate to identify the regime as conservative in view of the continued familialist 
characteristics, resistance to proposals for reforms, the central role played by the family with the 
state and the market playing minimum roles. The literature does not identify the CWR type in 
Botswana, particularly the combined effect of direct and indirect social transfers in defining the 
CWR’s characteristics. 
Scholars describe characteristics of social cash transfers in Botswana including coverage, 
benefits and targeting. Researchers generally agree that the general welfare regime is 
conservative with parsimonious benefits that are primarily in-kind (Ulriksen, 2017; Seleka et al., 
2007; Seekings, 2017; 2016a; Ntseane & Solo, 2007) but there is no consensus on coverage. 
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Seleka et al., Ntseane and Solo and Ulriksen agree that coverage is low. Seekings argues that 
coverage is quite broad, especially taking into account feeding programmes. Ulriksen (2017:75) 
posits that, ‘Social transfers are minimal and perceived by the political leadership as only 
supplementary support to those categorised as needy.’ The disagreement depends on how 
scholars define social protection and how they define coverage. Other studies concur that 
transfers target the poorest or ‘destitutes’ (Seleka et al., 2007, Ntseane & Solo, 2007). In her 
argument, Ulriksen asserts that the transfers are targeted at the needy families, what she terms 
‘income insecure families’ (2017:76). She is correct to identify this target group in relation to the 
general welfare regime but this is not entirely correct in relation to key CWR programmes. As 
discussed later, the CWR transfers, particularly the Orphan Care Programme but also the school 
feeding programme, primarily target orphans (and all school going age children) without 
applying a means test. This research shows that the CWR also primarily provides familial in-
kind benefits but they are relatively generous and coverage is high in comparison to other 
middle-income countries in Southern Africa. 
In Zimbabwe, scholars do not explicitly describe the welfare regime as agrarian but their 
analyses of the characteristics of public policy in general suggest an agrarian regime (Moyo, 
2013, Scoones, 2014). Researchers on social provision for families with children indicate that 
most programmes are familial but target the poorest families particularly in rural areas (Kaseke, 
2011, Siampondo, 2015). The social protection system in Zimbabwe is agrarian because ZANU-
PF governments (pre- and post-Government of National Unity) emphasised drought relief, land 
reform and farm input distribution (Munemo, 2012, Moyo, 2013) primarily targeted at poor 
peasant farmers. This approach, enduring since independence in 1980, is pro-agriculture. 
Zimbabwe experienced a partial shift from an agrarian regime to experiment with poverty-
targeted cash transfers during the Government of National Unity (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016). 
During the Government of National Unity, ZANU-PF continued to run its agro-based social 
assistance, providing farm inputs to small farmers. Other researchers demonstrate that cash 
transfers target OVCs are mainly implemented by Non-Governmental Organisations (Crea et al., 
2013; Mushunje & Mafico, 2010), suggesting that the state delegated the role of social protection 
to non-state actors.  
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The literature on social transfers in Zimbabwe indicates the familial and agrarian aspects of 
social provision but it does not identify the type of CWR in Zimbabwe and little is known about 
the combined effect of the familial transfers on programmes’ coverage and generosity. It is also 
not clear whether the CWR is similar or different to the general welfare regime or whether the 
factors that influenced the general regime are important in explaining CWR reforms. This thesis 
explores these gaps arguing that the CWR is agrarian. Key characteristics of the agrarian CWR 
regime are identified, showing the limited coverage, ungenerous transfers and promotion of 
familial provision through peasant farming.  
This research builds upon and advances this existing knowledge to examine differences in key 
characteristics between the case studies and construct a taxonomy of CWRs in Southern Africa. 
This analysis demonstrates the heterogeneity of child social protection even in regions perceived 
to be 'similar' in their welfare provisions. Table 1.2 illustrates the variation in programmes 
coverage and generosity- the overall value of the transfers), distinguishing between programmes 
that directly and indirectly benefit families with children (the CWR). 
Table 1.2: Differences in child and child-oriented social grants programmes 
  
 South Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe 
Programmes 
Direct programmes  
Cash transfers   
Child grants 
(direct cash to 
caregivers) 
Child Support 
Grant; Foster Care 
Grant; Care 





Foster Care Grant 










universal Present in selected 
districts and schools 
School fee waivers Most school; also 
poor students in fee-
paying schools 
Free up to high 
school 
Needy students only Selected OVCs in 
all schools 
Health fee waivers National-free 
primary health care 
National-free 
primary health care 
National-free 
primary health care 





Old Age Pensions √ √	 √	 × 
Disability grants √	 √	 ×	 ×	
Housing  √	 ×	 ×	 ×	
Veteran grants √	 √	 √	 √	
Farm inputs √	 ×	 √	 √	
Feeding 
programmes 
√	 √	 √	 √	
 Total Coverage (proportion of children benefiting from all programmes) 
 95% 67% 85% 24% 
 Generosity 




Source: Coverage data from country ministries responsible for grants  
These programmes differ significantly in terms of targeting, an important dimension which has 
been overlooked in existing literature but explored in detain this thesis. All the four countries 
have social transfers for families with children but some programmes target families or children 
on the basis of both household structure (whether a family has no father, no mother, or does not 
have both mother and father) and poverty levels (extreme poor).  
 
Variation in individual programmes targeting is represented in Figure 1.2 (the overall categories 
of CWRs is presented in Figure 1.3). Figure 1.2 shows programme reforms over time as 
indicated by the arrows. Zimbabwe and other low-income countries primarily target families but 
moved slightly towards poverty targeting through introducing Social Cash Transfers for poor and 
labour constrained households. Botswana has an orphan grant (categorically targeting children 
more on the basis of their perceived family breakdown than on poverty lines). Namibia differs 
from Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana since it has means tested child maintenance grants, 
possibly equally influenced by both household structure and the need to address poverty. 
Namibia recently introduced a poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant with striking differences to 
South Africa’s poverty-targeted CSG. As argued in the Namibian case study (see Chapter 3), 
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Namibia imposes a strict means test for poor or vulnerable children than South Africa. The 
Vulnerable Grant is also largely covering urban areas unlike the CSG. In effect, the grant has a 
limited reach in comparison to the CSG. Finally, the CSG in South Africa is more of a poverty 
reduction strategy and is less directed towards addressing ‘family breakdown’ (also see attached 
Appendix 1 Table 2 for scale and scope of these schemes). 
 





Figure 1.2 only shows direct state social provision for children through various social grant 
programmes excluding the indirect programmes that benefit children. Such indirect programmes 
include housing (for example, Reconstruction and Development Programme houses in South 
Africa, Old Age Grants, food relief, public employment programmes). As discussed in Chapter 
6, these indirect programmes significantly define the key characteristics of each CWR, 
particularly coverage. South Africa, for instance, has a more expansive CWR than Zimbabwe 
perhaps because other than the poverty-targeted CSG and other two programmes directly 
benefitting children (Care Dependency Grant and Foster Care Grant), children indirectly benefit 




The programmes shown in figure 1.2 and other child grants (see also Appendix 1) are extensively 
described (Handa, Devereux & Webb, 2011; Barrientos & Hulme, 2010; Barrientos & Hulme, 
2009; Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; Devereux, 2006a; Schubert & Slater, 2006; Devereux, 2005:8-
19). They are evaluated in many largely single-country case studies (Barrientos et al.,  2013; 
Kalusopa, Dicks & Osei-Boateng, 2012; Chopak et al., 2012; Davis et al., 2012; Ellis, 2012; 
Handa, Devereux & Webb, 2011; Proudlock, 2011; Miller, Tsoka & Reichert, 2011; Hagen-
Zanker, Morgan & Meth, 2011; Bryant, 2009; Gandure, 2009; Holmes, 2009; Mirugi-Mukundi, 
2009; Samson et al., 2008; Devereux, 2005; Das, Do & Özler, 2005; Rawlings & Rubio, 2005).  
The literature establishes that countries provide similar and different cash transfer programmes 
that differ in spending, coverage, legislation, generosity and targeting (categories of children or 
families benefiting).  
The dimensions discussed in this literature provided the basis on which the variation between the 
four case studies was investigated. Differences in programme coverage (scale), scope (varieties) 
and national social protection expenditure on child benefits as a percentage of GDP in the case 
studies were established (see Table 2 in Appendix 1). The differences indicate that South Africa 
and Botswana have more comprehensive programmes, Namibia has limited programmes and 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi have almost nothing (Table 2).  
Based on the variation in programmes (figure 1.2, including other indirect programmes discussed 





























Figure 1.3 (building on Figure 1.2 that focuses on individual programmes) categorises the overall 
CWRs and show that the four case study countries form four different models of state provision. 
This taxonomy suggests that agrarian regimes (in the bottom-left ‘quadrant’-Zimbabwe) provide 
little direct coverage for either poor or orphaned children, that Botswana is a case of a CWR that 
moved into the more familialist ‘quadrant’, South Africa moved into the more poverty-focused 
‘quadrant’, and Namibia is a hybrid of the two (familial and poverty regime). A detailed analysis 
of these four regimes constitute Chapters 2-5, with particular focus on their distinctive 
characteristics, the evolution of the programmes and the possible explanations to their 
distinctiveness. 
 
The CWRs evolved differently at different times. The historical evolution of the four CWRs 
demonstrate that despite the differences in the years of transition to democracy, the key moments 
of change became apparent in the 1990s (see Table 1.3). The four countries differ not only in 

















Table 1.3: Historical evolution of child welfare regimes, 1990-2017 
	
Year South Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe 
1990s SMG to CSG (1998) 
Child Maintenance Grant 





























Proposals & rejections 
of orphan targeting 
 
Destitute persons 
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CSG expansion to 
U18yr olds (2008) 
Small farmer support 
(2008) 
2009 Conditions rejected 







rejection poverty grant 
(2010) 
Proposal/rejection of 
poverty grant (2010) 
Harmonized Social 

























Adoption of poverty 
targeting 
2016 
Payments to orphan 





1.3 Why does state social provision differ? Comparative theoretical perspectives 
1.3.1 Industrialised capitalist democracies  
Variation in social provision has been widely researched in the developed countries. This section 
first reviews the broad theories explaining variation in social provision. These theories do not 
directly explain child welfare regimes (CWRs) but they have been variously applied in the North 
to explain CWRs. The second part of the review will focus on the comparative cases of CWRs 
that have broadly applied the conventional theories.  
Existing theories on explaining variation between states vary from the logic of industrialism-
economic growth, power resources, state-centric approach (centrality of state bureaucracy and 
political elites in development of welfare policy formulation and programmes) to cultural 
influences which are well documented in literature (Aidukaite, 2009; Beblavý, 2008; Wood & 
Gough, 2006:1701; Gauthier, 2002:454-456; Myles & Quadagno, 2002).  
The industrialism-economic growth approach as propounded by modernisation theorists 
(Wilensky, 1975; Cutright, 1965) argues that the origins, general development of the welfare 
state and cross-national social provision differences in post-industrial societies are economic. 
Contemporary welfare states are to be understood in terms of industrialization and economic 
growth where social spending is correlated with levels of economic growth (Hicks & Esping-
Andersen, 2005). Strong economies produce strong welfare states (Pierson, 1996). This theory 
does not fully account for the differences between CWRs in either Europe or Southern Africa 
because it does not account for differences between countries with almost equal level of growth. 
Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are all upper middle-income countries but there is 
substantial variation in social grants for children. 
The ‘logic of industrialism’ lost centrality in comparative welfare state literature on the 
realization that even with the same level of economic growth, welfare provision among some 
post- industrialist states still varied (Rothstein, Samanni & Teorell, 2012; Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Wilensky, 1975). Also, the size of social expenditure says little about the connection 
between social problems and their solutions (Kaufmann, 2013). These weaknesses gave rise to a 




The Power Resource Theory argues that differences in size and coverage of welfare states in 
industrialised capitalist market economies is primarily a function of working class political 
mobilization (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983). According to this 
theory, welfare state development is a function of the historical strength of the political left, 
mediated by alliances with the middle classes. The Power Resources Theory, therefore, suggests 
that cross national variation is more an outcome of differences in power of actors or classes in 
influencing public policy than the level of economic growth (Pierson, 1996). Korpi argues that, 
‘because of differences in the ways that socio-economic class is related to types of power 
resources controlled by citizens as well as to patterns of life-course risks among individuals 
differently positioned within socioeconomic structures, welfare state development is likely to 
reflect class-related distributive conflict and partisan politics’ (2006:68). 
 
The Power Resource Theory posits that variation in welfare regimes reflects class differences 
over who benefits from welfare reforms. In the 1980s, Korpi (1983) suggested that welfare 
reforms are more likely to be promoted by the working class (represented in parties on the left) 
and opposed by high income groups. Later advocates of the theory in developed capitalist 
democracies argue that differences in class-coalitions or class power balances of different 
organised interests, including power relations between labour and capital or coalitions between 
classes such as the middle class and farmer organisations in promoting their interests, explain 
variation in welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008). Coalition 
politics is central in explaining variation in redistribution between democracies in this literature 
(Iversen & Soskice, 2006; Iversen & Stephens, 2008). The Power Resource Theory, therefore, 
stresses that welfare state development is a function of the historical strength of the political left, 
mediated by alliances with the middle classes. An analysis of European welfare capitalism in the 
21st century argues for a ‘development of a new political economy of European welfare 
capitalism – a political economy grounded in the analysis of the past yet sensitive to the 
contingency of current trends, a political economy which shows the continued centrality of the 





Power resource theorists focusing on the global North, therefore, emphasise the importance of 
political mobilization based on social class in explaining variation between welfare regimes. 
Constellations of political power and ideological influences reflected in variously pronounced 
legal entitlements of different social groups are more emphasized in this approach (Kaufmann, 
2013:30). History also matters in explaining divergences under this theory as the correlation of 
‘working class mobilisation’ and public policy seem period-sensitive (Hicks & Esping-Andersen, 
2005:515-516). Accordingly, the welfare state is influenced by labour organizations, social 
movements and political parties to expand social programmes yet it may become less dependent 
on them with the advent of ‘new politics’ such as powerful groups surrounding the same social 
programmes that could support new political strategies (Pierson, 1996:144). Consequently, 
variation in social provision is caused by differences in the roles played by different actors. 
Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) focused on three sectors: the welfare state, the market and the 
family. A fourth sector was added by subsequent critics: the volunteer sector or the community 
(Soma, Yamashita & Chan, 2011:11) which is also identified as non-governmental organisations 
(Seekings & Moore, 2013).  
 
The Power Resource Theory, as applied in the global North (Korpi & Palme, 2003), rightly 
proclaims that ‘a strong labour movement is responsible for expanding welfare programmes’ 
(Rudra, 2015:468). By contrast, studies in developing regions, East Asia and Latin America 
specifically, show that labour unions tend to be decentralized, often compete with one another, 
adopt contrasting positions on social policy and represent more privileged labour groups and 
embrace welfare policies that benefit those groups at the cost of the poor (McGuire, 1999). 
Furthermore, labour movements oppose welfare retrenchment only in programmes that benefit 
the more privileged groups (López-Cariboni & Cao, 2015). The extent to which labour 
movements (or the middle class and farmer organisations) use their power resource to advocate 
for the expansion of cash transfers for families with children in Southern Africa is not 
immediately clear. Labour movements in Southern Africa, and much of Africa, tend to promote 
social insurance programmes with limited interest in non-contributory social assistance, hence 
they have a marginal effect on shaping social provision of cash transfers for families with 
children. Working class political mobilization, therefore, as argued later, hardly explains 
variation between the taxonomy of four child welfare regimes in this study. Variation between 
24	
	
the four child welfare regimes, as discussed later, reflects, consistent with previous research on 
welfare regimes in the global South, political economy i.e. the politics of social protection, a 
variant of the Power Resource Theory. 
 
The evident question arising from this literature is how the Power Resource Theory might apply 
in semi-industrialised but still heavily agrarian societies such as Southern Africa, especially in 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The Power Resource Theory provides the 
theoretical framework on which this thesis is based. Theoretical ideas about partisan politics, 
coalitions and power balances of different interest groups embedded in this theory explain 
usefully the variation between child welfare regimes in this thesis. Different political actors, 
including political elites (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014), as 
discussed later, played fundamental roles in shaping distinct social protection trajectories 
assumed by the case study countries to form a taxonomy of four child welfare regimes.  
 
Findings in this study, however, underplay working class political mobilization but assert the 
centrality of political power (politics), as contended by the Power Resource Theory, in 
explaining welfare regimes. Working class mobilization in Southern Africa, as shown later, is 
not responsible for the expansion and variation in child welfare regimes, as emphasised by the 
Power Resource Theory in the North. Differences between the global North and South abound in 
levels of industrialisation and the use of the power resource by labour and the left in supporting 
welfare expansion. Whereas the left and labour wield more political power in influencing social 
policy, particularly social insurance programmes, in the North, and modest power in 
industrialising regions such as Latin America and East Asia, working class political mobilization 
in support of social assistance appears inconsequential in Africa because Africa is largely semi-
industrialised and still heavily agrarian. Instead, coalition politics between a diversity of actors, 
overlooked in the North but underlined in other regions - East Asia, Latin America and Africa - 
as discussed later, including bureaucrats, individuals within government, domestic civil society 
organisations, United Nations agencies and international organisations (transnational actors) 
actively promoted distinct types of social provision for families with children apparent in 
Southern Africa.  
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While class-based research explains welfare reforms in Latin America (Dion, 2010) and Europe 
(Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983), class analysis, as discussed later, appear less important 
in Africa, specifically Southern Africa, because societies in this region are heavily agrarian and 
semi-industrialised. Furthermore, business, middle class, farmer organisations, labour unions and 
social movements appear less organised in Africa and less interested in social assistance, 
especially in the four case studies in this thesis, hence these actors do not help us understand 
variation between child welfare regimes in study.  
 
While the political economy approach, as espoused in the Power Resource Theory, remains valid 
in explaining variation in welfare state development in the global South, possibly by borrowing 
the political economy approach, previous research has cautioned against blindly using class 
analysis in developing countries ‘as it is less straightforward to identify the traditional classes 
and related political parties than it is in the West (even ideological party labels may be 
misleading) (Sandbrook et al., 2007: 19). Other scholars have argued that in some developing 
countries, most notably in Africa, capitalism is mixed with pre-capitalist modes of production, 
and industrialisation has not developed as it did in the West. Therefore, class structures are very 
different – one can hardly speak of a proletariat, the middle class is often insignificant, and the 
elite is a rather heterogeneous group as sources of domination are not only related to economic 
resources, but also to positions in society (Thomson, 2004, Ulriksen, 2010:44). Ulriksen 
compares welfare expansion in Botswana and Mauritius and argues that ‘A class analysis of 
developing countries may then turn out rather illusionary with the researcher identifying classes 
which either barely exist or with substantial different features than their Western counterparts’ 
(2010:44).  
 
Class analysis, however, might be extended to developing, especially more industrialising 
countries in East Asia and Latin America (Huber &Stephens, 2012; Rudra, 2008). Class analysis 
appears to apply in East Asia more clearly possibly because welfare institutions in affluent 
economies in East Asian countries resemble and were modelled on those found in Western 
welfare states (Walker & Wong, 2004:99). East Asia class structures, more similar to the West, 
appear to consist of political elites, capital (business), large class of workers, non-working poor 
and the middle class (Rudra, 2008). By contrast, the class structure in Latin America consists of 
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‘a significant class of large landlords, a large class of poor peasants and rural workers, a smaller 
urban working class, and a larger class of informal workers’ (Huber & Stephens, 2012:4). 
Similar classes, except for large landlords (in Latin America) or a distinctive middle-class (both 
in Asia and Latin America), are less clear in African countries, and less clearer in Southern 
Africa, because the region is semi-industrialised and still heavily agrarian. Where such classes 
exist in Southern Africa, dominated by large peasantry, poor and unemployed groups, they 
appear to lack interest and political power to press for welfare reforms, specifically for families 
with children, because they are disorganised and, as Rudra (2015:468) argues, the poor face 
mobilisation problems ‘because of geographical diffusion, lack of access to information, and 
coordination challenges’. 
 
Previous studies in Southern Africa, however, suggest that various groups of organised interests - 
economic elites (capitalists), political elites, middle classes (urban and rural), urban workers and 
rural labourers (such as agricultural workers) - exist and seek to influence welfare policy-making 
(Ulriksen, 2010:46). Consistent with previous research (Ulriksen, 2010), this study finds 
constellations of political power between various ‘interest groups’ or ‘individuals’ i.e. political 
elites, Civil Society Organisations, political parties, transnational actors and bureaucrats as 
important in reforms of social cash transfers for families with children. The political economy (a 
variant of the Power Resource Theory), therefore, is valid in understanding differences between 
child welfare regimes in semi-industrialised and still heavily agrarian countries such as 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
 
A third explanation is the state-centred approach which emphasises institutional factors. 
Institutional theorists (Skocpol, 1995; Weir, Orloff & Skocpol, 1988; Skocpol, 1985) argue that 
post-1945 American social provision cannot be explained through the Power Resource Theory 
(Pierson, 1996:152). According to institutionalists, politics matters most as expansion of social 
programmes is generally a process of political credit claiming expected to contribute greatly to 
both state building projects and the popularity of reform-minded politicians (Pierson, 1996:144). 
In Africa,, unlike the USA, ‘politics has not been accorded a significant role in thinking and 




The fourth and last school of thought explains variation in social provision in terms of cultural 
differences (van Oorschot, 2007; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Chamberlayne et al., 1999). The theory 
posits that there is a relationship between culture and welfare policies and cultural differences 
exert determining influence on differences in the latter (Pfau-Effinger, 2005:6). Culture is more 
likely to affect welfare policy than some other areas of public policy because people tend to hold 
stronger normative beliefs about who should get (or who deserves) what and why. 
This thesis assesses the relevance of these theories in Africa. The Power Resource Theory, as 
shown later, appears relevant in understanding variation between CWRs in Southern Africa. I 
further argue that the theory underestimates the role of other actors who were not important in 
the North but crucial in Africa. I show that international agencies and donors and domestic Civil 
Society Organisations matter. Overall, the socio-economic and political differences between the 
North and the South, as well as regional differences within the South i.e. Latin America, East 
Asia and Africa, make it difficult to apply the Power Resource Theory in Africa, specifically 
Southern Africa, without modifications. This thesis ultimately emphasises, consistent with 
previous research on general welfare regimes in the global South, the political economy of the 
welfare state, a variant of the Power Resource Theory, in explaining variation between child 
welfare regimes in Southern Africa. 
The four theories have been tested in various comparative cases to explain variation between 
CWRs. Pedersen (1993) conducted a historical study of emergence of state policies towards 
families in France and Britain during the inter-war period of 1914-1945 to establish why the two 
countries took different trajectories. Pederson, who is a known critic of Esping-Andersen’s 
underestimation of gender, argue that Britain developed along gendered lines, in that labour and 
social policies were premised on a normative vision in which men were presumed to be the 
principal breadwinners and dependence was considered a normal destiny for wives. By contrast, 
France followed family-type (parental policies seeking to equalize income across families 
regardless of parental occupation, marital status or class) welfare distributive policies.  
 
Pedersen explains the ‘different lines’ between France and Britain to a number of related factors 
which largely show the significance of the power of social institutions. Pedersen further argues 
that views or attitudes about allowances were crucial. In France, parental logic (the role of 
28	
	
family) was supported across the political spectrum and popular within society as a whole 
whereas family allowances through the male breadwinner logic based on male wage earners in 
Britain was still a subordinate and contested part of the welfare system. The push for children’s 
entitlements failed to win ‘British public affection’. Unlike in Britain, French family policy 
principle of equalising living standards irrespective of social class and between the childless and 
those with children was widely understood and supported (Pedersen, 1993:415-416). 
Conclusively, France had a ‘far more effective system of family allowance’ for families with 
dependent children than Britain. Accordingly, variation in British and French family allowances 
is explained by differences in influence of political actors (feminist campaigners and 
pronatalists). Pederson concludes that the differences in the perceived gender roles explain the 
variation between British and French family policies. This study assessed the effect of gender in 
explaining variation in provision for children in the Southern African context and argues that it 
was not an important factor but the role of different political actors is relevant in Southern 
Africa. The campaign for the expansion of the CSG in South Africa partly shows the relevance 
of Pedersen’s conclusions. 
 
Gauthier (1998)’s study demonstrates the influential power of institutionalised politics in a 
historical comparative analysis of governments’ family policies which were overtly meant to 
affect families in 22 countries (17 European countries, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United 
States and Japan) from 1870s to the 1990s. Variations between these cases show country-specific 
differences in historical circumstances and or political regimes and ideologies (Gauthier, 1998). 
Yet it is argued that values, interests and political processes not considered here could have been 
important in explaining family policy formation (Glenn, 1997:730).  
In their comparison of family policies in Ireland, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, 
Daly and Clavero argue that the depth of absence or manifestation of moral debates regarding 
family support influences differences in state provisions. Countries having deeper pressure to 
support families are more likely to extend more support than others where the debate is either not 
initiated or is less vigorous. Lastly, differences in concerns and interests of influential actors in 
the policy making process may also lead to policy and programme discrepancies across countries 
(Daly & Clavero, 2002:40-42).  
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This thesis builds upon this literature to provide supporting evidence to the role of political 
factors in explaining variation. For instance, historically, at its independence in 1994 South 
Africa inherited a social welfare system that provided more for white families than blacks as far 
as the State Maintenance Grant was concerned and to redress such inequalities the grant which 
was politically transformed into the CSG was universalised (Lund, 1998). These developments 
can be contrasted to Zimbabwe’s experiences which did not inherit any social programme 
specifically targeting children in 1980 (save for the old age pension scheme which favoured the 
white population that was abolished at independence) and did not introduce any such programme 
until 2011 when a marginal donor-funded pilot social cash transfer was introduced. In essence, 
differences between South Africa and Zimbabwe may not only be explained by variation in 
historical processes but the role of domestic politics. 
Lack of reforms or lack of expansion of social provision for families with children also strongly 
reflect political elites’ conservative arguments about welfare dependency i.e. households relying 
on government welfare benefits for a prolonged period of time. There is a long standing 
argument that welfare policies create dependency. Welfare dependency has historically been 
criticised by politicians of diverse views in the United States (Fraser & Gordon, 1994).  Fraser 
and Gordon show that while liberals blame the poor less for their dependency, they are surely 
concerned about welfare dependency. Certain politicians believe that welfare dependency is 
normal for a child but abnormal for adults (Democratic Senator Daniel P. Moynihan quoted in 
Fraser & Gordon, 1994:309). Policy experts from major political parties, further argue Fraser and 
Gordon, broadly agree that welfare dependency undermines people’s motivation to support 
themselves.  
A gendered perspective of welfare dependency believing in the male breadwinner model of 
independent wage earners claims that poverty has a woman’s face and women, especially 
unmarried poor women with children, depend on welfare because they did not participate in paid 
labour force (Fraser & Gordon, 1994:311; Kittay, 1998; Mink, 1998; Solinger, 1998). Reducing 
welfare dependency entails making women participate in the labour market. The United States 
federal welfare responsibilities were rolled back in the comprehensive 1996 reforms (and earlier 
reforms) that sought to reduce welfare benefits to poor families, in part, on the premises that a 
‘too generous welfare system’ led ‘women to shun work in favour of habitual idleness and 
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dependency’ and that welfare ‘undermined sexual and family morality’ (Piven, 1998:67). Fraser 
and Gordon conclude that ‘welfare dependency evokes the image of the welfare mother, often 
figured as a young, unmarried black woman…of uncontrolled sexuality (1994:311). Welfare 
dependency is, therefore, stigmatized and gendered and this was important in welfare reforms in 
the United States. 
 There is a large literature state social provision suggesting that certain political elites do not 
support the expansion of social transfers because it ostensibly fosters welfare dependency. As 
early as the mid-1980s, social policy scholars had started showing that concerns about welfare 
dependency are vital in shaping welfare policy development in developed capitalist democracies 
particularly the United States. Albeit with less effect on child poverty and welfare dependency, 
earlier United States child support enforcement policies, including the traditional approach to 
increase the employment of the mother and the collection of child support from absent fathers, 
were prompted by concerns about welfare dependency of poor female-headed households (Hu, 
1999; Robins, 1986). Subsequent studies argued that United States policymakers battle with 
appropriate reforms of state social provision to avert intergenerational transmission of welfare 
dependency supposedly a consequence of rational choice, culture of poverty or child-care 
responsibilities (Harris, 1996; Kimenyi, 1991). These welfare dependency discourses and the 
ideology of workfare programmes might explain why the United States is curiously one of the 
First World countries without a universal child benefit (Bradshaw, 2012). Child welfare regimes 
in Southern Africa, as discussed later, were variously shaped by these welfare dependency 
discourses. 
1.3.2 Global South and Southern Africa perspectives 
 Despite the focus on the core explanatory factor in the Power Resource theory in the North i.e. 
‘balance of domestic class power and party-political power’ (Huber & Stephens, 2012:4), there is 
an extended discussion of the Power Resource Theory in the global South – Latin America, East 
Asia and Africa. Contemporary literature on welfare state variation argues that ‘more recent 
stud[ies] of countries across the global South has been influenced most strongly by the power 
resources approach focused on the political economy’ (Hickey et al., 2018:5). Scholars attribute 
variation between social protection systems, focusing on differences in general welfare regimes, 
to political economy (revised Power Resource Theory) (Bangura, 2007; Brooks, 2015; Haggard 
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& Kaufman, 2008; Hickey et al., 2018; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Kwon, 2004; Lavers & Hickey, 
2016; Rudra, 2015; 2008; Ulriksen, 2017; 2012; Walker & Wong, 2004; Yang, 2017).  
 
Haggard and Kaufman (2008) attribute cross-regional differences in pensions, education and 
health care (measures of development), between Latin America, East Asia and Central and 
Eastern Europe, to political economy factors including dissimilarities in periods of critical 
realignments, the choice of development strategies and regime type. Critical realignments 
involve ‘the composition of the political elite and in the political and legal status of labour and 
peasant organisations and mass political parties’ (2008:45). Haggard and Kaufman further argue 
that between the 1980s and the early 2000s, electoral competition prompted new demands for 
social protection driven by ‘political entrepreneurs and newly organised interests [who] pressed 
for the defense of existing social entitlements and the expansion of social insurance and services 
to previously excluded or undeserved groups’ (2008:181). Comparably, Huber and Stephens 
(2012) investigate the link between partisan politics and redistribution in Latin America. 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay are identified as welfare leaders, possibly 
because of strong left parties that propelled expansion of the welfare state in these countries. 
Huber and Stephens contend that the rise of left parties reduced poverty and inequality in Latin 
America and the variation between the countries is explained by differences in the strength of the 
left-party i.e. ‘the strength of parties to the left of centre’ (2012:240). Huber and Stephens assert 
that ‘politics can make a big difference for the distribution of life chances’. 
 
Dion (2010) employs a comparative historical analysis to investigate the politics of welfare 
provisions in Mexico in Latin America. In the 1940s when Mexico was primarily agrarian, the 
regime created welfare institutions that benefited a small number of industrial workers. In the 
1990s, despite having complete control over labour, the dominant political party could not 
advance all pension and health insurance reforms favoured during this period. Dion employs the 
Power Resource Theory i.e. the role played by organised workers and cross-class coalitions 
(similar to the evolution of welfare states in the North) to explain these puzzles. More recent 
studies in Latin America argue that electoral competition and organised actors (business and 
social movements) explain the unexpected expansion of social policy and progressive tax 
reforms under right-wing governments (Fairfield & Garay, 2017). According to Fairfield and 
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Garay, focusing on Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, ‘electoral competition, business actors, 
and social movements play key roles in encouraging or discouraging redistributive initiatives’ 
(2017:7).  
 
In East and South Asia, the political economy proved useful in understanding differences 
between welfare regimes, particularly general welfare regimes. In East Asia, the political 
economy has been used to explain differences between Indian states (Tillin et al., 2015; Jenkins 
& Manor, 2017). The political economy explains post-economic crisis expansion of the welfare 
state in Korea (Kwon, 2004; Kwon & Holliday, 2007) or the small state in South Korea (Yang, 
2007). Comparative studies of East and South Asia distinguish protective welfare states (India) 
and productive welfare states (South Korea) by differences between a political economy that 
‘historically eschewed emphasis on international markets and ultimately focused government 
efforts on insulating domestic firms from international competition’ and one that prioritises 
‘commodification, and evolved initially from systems that actively encouraged participation in 
export markets’ respectively (Rudra, 2008:86 & 87). Rudra’s application of political economy is 
not important for comparative welfare policies between regions i.e. East and South Asia only, 
but helps us understand the evolution of welfare provision within a country. Rudra argues, for 
example, that institutional factors – organisation of the political economy, the nature of policy 
interactions between government and labour and the fragmented character of labour 
organisations – explain the minimal change in India’s welfare regime despite globalisation-
induced pressures (2008:120). Rudra further contends that institutional continuity in India can be 
traced to the protective welfare state that aggregates interests and structures access to the 
political arena, government-labour relationship that enables only selected labour groups to have 
privileged access to politicians and welfare benefits and fragmented labour movements that are 
neither able to encourage a transition to a more universalistic welfare state nor to block welfare 
retrenchment (2008:124-5). This thesis borrows this approach to trace the evolution of social 
provision within each country and to explain the differences between countries. 
 
Notably, in this literature, albeit the strong influence on social insurance programmes, the 
political power of labour and the left to influence social assistance (that is more expansive in the 
global South and the focus of this study) appears to reduce as we move down South within the 
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global South i.e. from Latin America, East Asia and Africa, respectively. Countries in the global 
South have not industrialised to similar levels hence the differences in working class 
mobilisation to pressure governments systematically to reform welfare policies to benefit the 
working class and the poor. Besides, the poor who should benefit from these reforms in 
industrialising democracies ‘face tremendous mobilisation problems because of their 
geographical diffusion, lack of access to information, and coordination challenges’ (Rudra, 2015: 
468). As a result of differences in industrialisation and working class mobilisation, the political 
power of labour and the left to shape social assistance is more pronounced in capitalist 
democracies, less so in East Asia and Latin America and imperceptible in Africa. 
 
Whilst working class mobilisation in support of expanding welfare programmes, especially 
social assistance programmes, appears limited in the global South, political power wielded by 
different political actors, however, does not disappear completely. Evidence suggests that the 
political power approach is relevant in the global South also but, whereas working class 
mobilization is problematic due to semi-industrialisation and prominence of agrarian societies in 
this same region, there is an emergency of new influential political actors shaping social 
provision. Global South researchers have emphasised the importance of domestic actors (Brooks, 
2015), transnational actors (Hickey et al., 2018; Kwon, 2004; Lavers & Hickey, 2016) or 
domestic politics (Kwon, 2004; Ulriksen, 2017; 2012) in shaping social protection programmes, 
predominantly social cash transfers. Much of this literature, focusing on general welfare regimes, 
underlines global actors, such as the International Labour Organisation, as the ‘primary and most 
consistent advocates of social protection’ (Schmitt et al., 2015; also see Cichon, 2013; Rudra, 
2015).Despite policy disagreements, overlapping and competing mandates between themselves 
(Deacon, 2013), and presenting as evangelical and self-righteous organisations fervently 
promoting cash transfers (Peck & Theodore, 2015), global actors such as the International 
Labour Organisation, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been influential 
in promoting the expansion of social protection at global level. The World Bank, for example, 
was instrumental in the reforms of conditional cash transfers in Mexico in the 1990s (Peck & 
Theodore, 2015). Huber and Stephens argue that ‘transnational structures of power’ were more 
important in shaping social policy in Latin America primarily because global actors i.e. the 
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World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, employed ‘powerful negative (conditionality) 
and positive (loans) inducements at their disposal’ to press for social policy reforms (2012:5). 
 
This wide-ranging extension of political economy to comparative and individual country case 
studies in the global South, specifically in Southern Africa, nonetheless, primarily focuses on 
general welfare programmes and pays less attention to child welfare regimes. There is limited 
attention to the applicability of the political economy in understanding differences between child 
welfare regimes. This thesis extends the political economy to analysing child welfare regimes in 
Southern Africa from a comparative perspective. This study, as shown later, marshals a range of 
evidence to reinforce the centrality of political economy. 
 
In the context of Southern Africa, except for South Africa, which also focuses on one 
programme, the Child Support Grant, there is limited literature specifically on variation between 
Child Welfare Regimes. This literature review draws from the available extensive general 
welfare regime literature and the limited, mostly single-case studies, on CWRs to comparatively 
investigate the politics of cash transfers for families with children in Southern Africa.  
Midgley and Piachaud (2011) compiled a comparative volume on ‘colonialism and welfare’ 
showing that the current social policies in most Anglophone countries reflect British colonialism. 
An extensive body of literature on the politics of social protection, despite focusing on general 
welfare, argue that electoral competition, change of governments and domestic politics are 
important in reforms of cash transfers in Southern Africa (Seekings, 2017a; 2016a; Hamer, 
2016a, Hamer & Seekings, 2017; Siachiwena, 2016; 2017). This thesis provides supporting 
evidence for the argument that different factors were more important in some countries than 
others leading to different CWRs. 
Researchers have attributed the rise in Social Cash Transfers in Southern Africa to various 
factors. Harland argues that, ‘This rise coincides with deep concern around entrenched food 
insecurity, the profound challenges brought about by HIV and AIDS, and persistent high levels 
of poverty and vulnerability’ (2014:375). UNICEF (2008b) argues that cash transfers in East and 
Southern Africa may be determined by the magnitude of the need, the strength of national 
political commitment, donor interests and domestic economic and social conditions. 
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Scholars show the role of international donors and agencies in adoption and expansion of social 
transfers. International organisations including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
and ILO supported social safety nets and have been pushing for poverty targeting in the 1990s 
and a developmentalist approach to poverty-reduction (pushed by the World Bank and then 
various donors including United Kingdom Department of International Development) in the 
2000s. Other researchers argue that donors like the United Kingdom Department of International 
Development, European Union and UNICEF influenced social cash transfers through providing 
technically and financially especially in low-income countries like Malawi, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012). UNICEF, on the other hand, has promoted a social 
agenda focused on families, their breakdown, and what these mean for children and that 
resonated with African familialism. Some country cases demonstrate the limits and successes of 
these organisations and donors. Donors were important in setting the agenda social protection 
agenda in Uganda (Grebe, 2014). The United Kingdom Department of International 
Development influenced the introduction of cash transfers in Zambia but the finance minister 
resisted the expansion of the programme (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016). UNICEF was important 
in the introduction of child grants for Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Lesotho and Kenya 
(Granvik, 2015; Handa et al., 2012). This study builds upon this literature to analyse the role of 
these international organisations particularly UNICEF, an organisation mandated to champion 
children’s rights. I argue that UNICEF was more important in Namibia, partially in Zimbabwe 
and less important in Botswana and South Africa. The next paragraphs review literature specific 
to the four case study countries in this thesis. 
 
The variation between the four case studies could be a result of differences in the size of the 
economies. The size of the economies (comparative value of money), measured by the GDP per 
capita in United States Dollars based on Purchasing Power Parity (US$ PPP), also differ between 
the four case studies. It was hypothesised that countries with bigger economies had high 
economic resources and will have more expansive CWRs. Figure 1.4 shows variation in GDP per 
capita (US$ PPP) for the four case studies between 1990 and 2016. South Africa had the biggest 
economy between 1990 and 1996, followed by Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe respectively. 
Between 1997 and 2016, Botswana’s GDP (US$ PPP) surpassed all the other three cases. South 
Africa’s GDP remained second during this period. Botswana’s coverage, however, continued 
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below South Africa, but above Namibia and Zimbabwe respectively. But it appears there is no 
relationship between the size of the economy and either social grants coverage and the type of 
CWR. The adoption of the four different CWRs could not be explained by variation in the size of 
the economy. As discussed in Chapter 6, the research findings suggest different important 
explanatory factors. 
 
Figure 1.4: GDP per capita (US$ PPP) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 1990-2016 
 
Differences in the level of democracy3 between the four case studies seem to matter. Figure 1.5 
shows polity scores for the four case study countries between 1990 and 2017. Using the polity 
scale4, a measure of democracy, Zimbabwe is an anocracy (part democracy and part dictatorship) 
while South Africa, Botswana and Namibia are all democracies. South Africa polity scores, 
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As discussed later in Chapter 6, there appears to be a positive relationship between the level of 
democracy and social policy reforms related to social grants. In terms of programme coverage, 
the more democratic countries have more expansive coverage. 
 
Figure 1.5: Democracy scores for case studies, 1990-2017 
	
 
Source: Polity Annual Time Series, 1990-2017 
In South Africa, the existing literature on child grants reforms has emphasised the importance of 
colonialism (and its successor, apartheid). At independence, the new ANC-led government 
inherited an extensive system of social grants, suggesting that path dependence might be 
significant. Two years before democratic rule in South Africa, Patel asserted that ‘Both 
colonialism and apartheid shaped the evolution of the nature, form and content of social welfare 
policy in South Africa’ (1992:34). Later, Patel assessed the effect of colonialism on the 
development of South Africa’s welfare state including child grants (Patel, 2011).  
Some authors argue that the reforms of the CSG, especially the expansion to reach all poor 
children under the age of 18 reflect a strong civil society and the role of individuals within 
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that the civil society organised themselves and influenced important CSG reforms. The child 
support grants, which became the foundation of poverty reduction and equity in South Africa, 
were largely driven by domestic political processes and political elites (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 
2012:16).  
 
Patel and colleagues’ researches are useful in highlighting the role of colonial history in shaping 
the current social policies, the impact of child social protection programmes in South Africa (the 
CSG in this case) and the nexus between child social grants and gender relations. But these 
studies shed very little light on how South Africa’s CWR is different from other CWRs in 
Southern Africa. Patel and colleagues do not even attempt to explain the factors that account for 
the wide coverage of the CSG in comparison to other child grants such as the Child Maintenance 
Grant in Namibia. Patel’s studies are significant in showing the effect of the CSG on gender 
transformation examining whether gender was a factor in other countries in Southern Africa. 
While Patel et al., (2013) show the benefits of the CSG on child well-being and women 
empowerment, they do not investigate whether gender was a determining factor in the adoption 
and expansion of the CSG as child sensitive social protection tool in South Africa and how this 
compares with similar child social grants in other developing countries. This was the departing 
point of this thesis.  
This thesis analyses South Africa’s CWR from a comparative perspective to establish that gender 
plays a marginal role in shaping CWRs in South Africa and between the four case studies. Patel 
argues that gender is crucial in the design of poverty reducing child grants, especially the CSG. 
When received by women caregivers, the CSG is more likely to empower women and enhance 
the well-being of children (Patel, 2012b; Patel & Hochfeld, 2011; Patel et al., 2013). This is an 
important finding that challenges the existing explanations (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Pedersen, 
1993) emphasising gender in explaining variation between CWRs. 
This thesis builds upon previous research in South Africa to investigate why South Africa shifted 
from a familial to a pro-poor CWR through the introduction and later expansion of the CSG. The 
thesis provides evidence on the role of Civil Society Organisations, individuals within 
government and party politics (shifting ideologies within the ruling party) in the extraordinary 
expansion of child grants in South Africa. I argue that path dependence strongly shaped the 
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trajectory taken by South Africa post-apartheid. I further argue that Civil Society Organisations 
activism combines with the role of individuals explain both the reforms of individual grants (the 
CSG) and the reforms of the pro-poor CWR broadly. In comparing the most influential factors, 
the research underlines the importance of legislation guiding the provision of grants since the 
Civil Society Organisations had to rely on courts to urge the state to honour its constitutional 
mandate to provide social to all children. 
In Namibia, there is limited literature on the fast-growing area of the politics of social protection. 
Authors have investigated the politics of proposals for a Basic Income Grant, showing the 
limited role of Civil Society Organisations that influenced the introduction but failed to 
successfully advocate for its expansion due to affordability concerns by government (Osterkamp, 
2013; Haarmann, 2009; Haarmann & Haarmann, 2007). The push for the Basic Income Grant 
also shows the importance of individuals within Civil Society Organisations, especially Bishop 
Zephania Kameeta, then chair of the Basic Income Grant coalition.  
Previous research on child welfare grants in Namibia argues that colonial history was important 
in the adoption of Child Welfare Grants after South African rule in 1994 (Ulriksen, 2013:45; 
Levine, 2011:39). There is, however, a limited interrogation of why there were limited reforms in 
Namibia in comparison to South Africa yet the two countries inherited similar grants at 
independence. While emphasising inheritance, the role of international pressure is 
underestimated. It is not clear from the existing literature why Child Welfare Grants were orphan 
targeted for such a long period and what factors were important during the transition to poverty 
targeting.  
This thesis builds upon this literature to investigate why Namibia, a variant of South Africa, did 
not follow South Africa’s lead in introducing a CSG, only expanding pro-poor provision later 
and more slowly. The findings concur that inheritance was important but l further argue that 
individuals within government, weak Civil Society Organisations and lack of electoral 
competition account for limited reforms that have promoted primarily targeting of broken 
families, modest coverage and relatively generous grants. Some individuals, Kameeta in 
particular, might have been important in pushing for the Basic Income Grant but played a limited 
role in the reforms of the mixed CWR. The lack of reforms, from independence up to 2012, 
strongly reflects the influence of Angula who was very powerful in cabinet and could have 
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influenced other political elites to reject proposals for expansion of Child Welfare Grants. 
Angula’s departure from the powerful office of Prime Minister was followed by the appointment 
of Geingob. The major reforms of Child Welfare Grants happened during Geingob’s time as 
Prime Minister up to his presidency in 2015. It is likely that Pohamba annointed Geingob as his 
successor because they were both reformists. It is further argued that the recent reforms -
 provision of general support to poor families with children - reflect the role of international 
pressure, particularly individuals in United Nations agencies (UNICEF) and international 
organisations (the ILO) but this role was constrained by party politics (the dominant one-party 
system and ambivalence to cash transfers by influential individuals [political elites] within 
government). 
Comparatively, three factors mattered most in explaining the mixed CWR reforms - colonial 
history explains inheritance of South Africa-like Child Welfare Grants, UNICEF pressure 
accounts for the introduction of poverty targeting and domestic politics (SWAPO seeking to 
secure political legitimacy during the 2015 elections; supportive individuals within government 
especially Sioka, the minister responsible for child grants who, with support from UNICEF, 
became a strong advocate for the expansion of grants to poor children; and ambivalence by 
influential individuals within government, especially Angula ). 
There is limited literature explaining the CWR in Botswana. Researchers on the general welfare 
regime emphasise structural (AIDS, drought and the economy) factors (Dahl, 2014; Selolwane, 
2012; Mupedziswa &Ntseane, 2012; Nthomang, 2007). Botswana recorded one of the highest 
HIV prevalence rates in Southern Africa since the 1990s (see Figure 1.6) leading to family 
breakdown (high mortality rate and increasing AIDS orphans). The AIDS shock necessitated the 
















Figure 1.6: HIV prevalence rates (15-49 yrs.), 1990-2016 
	
	
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), 1990-2016 *These statistics are different from the ones 
reported by UNAIDS that uses pregnant mothers 15-49 as a proxy for national prevalence 
Other scholars argue that ideology, domestic politics (political elites, electoral competition, 
politics of patronage) or cultural factors explain reforms of the conservative welfare regime 
(Seekings, 2017a:3; 2016a &b; Hamer, 2016a; Ulriksen, 2017; 2011; Selolwane, 2012; 
Botlhomilwe & Sebudubudu, 2011). According to Ulriksen (2017), political elites limit 
redistribution and the poor receive minimum social transfers to buy their loyalty. Political elites’ 
negative attitudes towards social welfare, in contrast with self-help and self-reliance, were also 
important (Makgala, 2013). Elites in Botswana revere work and rebuke overdependence on the 
state.  
Building upon this literature to investigate the CWR regime in Botswana specifically, I 
investigate the politics of reforms of the CWR in Botswana to identify the factors that explain 
why Botswana has not shifted from a familial system, its distinctive characteristics and 
discussing the most important factors that explain the reforms in comparative perspectives. It is 
argued that structural, cultural, ideological and political factors broadly explain the fairly wide 
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comparison to the other three cases, structural factors (AIDS and the associated demographic 
changes), the ruling Botswana Democratic Party’s conservative ideology and political factors 
(electoral competition and patronage) are the most important factors in the reforms of the 
familial CWR. 
The literature on social transfers in Zimbabwe, like in many countries in Southern Africa, 
focuses on the general welfare regime (Seidenfeld et al., 2016; Chikova, 2013; Chitambara, 
2012; Kaseke, 2011; 1988; Mtetwa & Muchacha, 2013; Munemo, 2012; World Bank, 2014). The 
literature suggests that the agrarian regime reflects patronage politics by the ruling ZANU-PF 
and political competition from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Moyo, 2013, 
Scoones, 2014, Bratton, 2014). The limited literature pays little attention to other factors that 
were especially important in explaining the enduring agrarian regime. There is limited discussion 
of the CWR.  
Building upon this literature, this study provides new evidence supporting that patronage and 
electoral competition are the most important factors in the reforms of the agrarian CWR. I argue 
that other factors - international pressure and structure/need (AIDS and the poor economy) - 
were consequential especially in reforms that happened during the Government of National 
Unity. The literature underestimates the role of individuals. Individuals within government, 
supported by international actors (UNICEF), were crucial in the adoption of the Harmonised 
Social Cash Transfer that promoted poverty-targeting. 
An important factor that has shaped state social provision of cash transfers to families with 
children in the global South is the notion of welfare dependency. Welfare dependency has had a 
lasting effect on welfare reforms in the global North, as discussed, but it is not inimitable to 
industrialised democracies. Case studies in Africa, including Southern Africa, illustrate that 
political elites’ conservative arguments and attitudes about welfare dependency have also 
constrained the expansion of social cash transfers (Ferguson, 2015; Hickey et al., 2018; Kalebe-
Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014; Seekings, 2017a; 2016c).  Findings from a research programme on 






Cape Town in South Africa suggest that social protection (particularly social cash transfers) 
reforms have been introduced in some countries but not in others, in part, because of political 
elites’ concerns about dependency (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016; Hamer & Seekings, 2017; 
Kabandula & Seekings, 2014; Seekings, 2017a; 2016c). 
An almost similar research programme on ‘The political economy of social protection expansion 
in Africa’6 focusing on Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia by the University of 
Manchester (in the United Kingdom) based researchers demonstrates the effects of political elites 
fears on the expansion of cash transfer programmes to poor households (Hickey & Bukenya, 
2016; Lavers, 2016a & b; Pruce & Hickey, 2017). The case studies show that social protection is 
more advanced in Ethiopia, Rwanda and Kenya in contrast with the slow progress in Uganda and 
Zambia but the expansion of cash transfers was underpinned by elite ideas about ‘dependency 
and deservingness’ in all cases. It is notable that the researchers at the University of Cape Town 
and the University of Manchester focus on the general welfare regimes notwithstanding that 
some beneficiary households have children. Building on this literature, this thesis focuses on 
child welfare regimes to provide new empirical evidence on the political impact of political 
elites’ claims that social protection (welfare) causes dependency and that workfare programmes 
provide the remedy. 
Previous literature, both in Southern Africa and globally, is important in forming the basis of my 
analysis of CWRs but it is insufficient in explaining variation between CWRs in Southern 
Africa. Related literatures reviewed show that there is limited focus on types of CWRs and the 
causes of variation between CWRs in Southern Africa are not immediately clear. This study 
builds upon this inconclusive literature to examine the variation between CWRs and construct a 
taxonomy of CWRs using four case studies. The thesis identifies the CWRs’ key characteristics, 
the evolution of the programmes and suggests possible explanations to the variation. The 
empirical cases (Chapters 2-5) show that there are four regime types (each country representing a 
different CWR) that vary across two dimensions. As detailed in Chapter 6, I argue that different 
combinations of factors were important in the reforms of each regime. The factors include 





demographic changes and family breakdown), international influence from international 
organisations, particularly UNICEF, domestic politics (party politics and civil society 
organisations) and the differences in the level of democracy. 
1.4 Research methodology and design 
The study is qualitative (Fossey et al., 2002; Ambert et al., 1995; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) using 
a comparative qualitative methodology (Hakim, 2000). The comparative approach allowed for 
‘detailed treatments of individual countries’ (Kennett, 2004; Mabbett & Bolderson, 1999:10-22; 
Øyen, 1990). This thesis identifies and explains variation in social grant provision to families 
with children in four countries in Southern Africa using a comparative qualitative case study 
approach. Considering the analytical objectives of this study, a qualitative research approach was 
appropriate to describe social grants policy and programmes, noting the differences before 
suggesting some explanations. The research does not use quantitative analysis because only 
South Africa has publicly available data for social grants collected through General Household 
Surveys (GHS) that specifically ask whether households receive social grants especially since 
2003. Household surveys contacted in Zimbabwe (Poverty, Income, Consumption and 
Expenditure Surveys [latest in 2013]; Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey [latest in 
2015]), Botswana (Botswana AIDS Impact Survey [BAIS], the last wave was in 2013; Botswana 
Demographic Survey) and Namibia (Namibia Household Income & Expenditure Survey [latest 
in 2015/6]; Namibia Demographic and Health Survey, the latest was in 2013) either do not ask 
specific questions on social grants especially for families with children or ask the main source of 
income for the household. 
1.4.1 Research design 
In this research a multiple-case study design (De Vaus, 2001:226-229) is preferred to a two-7 
country case study or a large-n study. A large-n study, as discussed (see 1.4), was not possible 
because of absence of quantitative data and the need for insights into the political processes that 








case design enables a researcher to explore differences within and between cases (Yin, 2013). It 
was possible to explore differences in each case study and between the case studies i.e. 
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, using the multiple-case design. These multiple 
cases enable comparison of both the ‘holistic’ (whole) and ‘embedded’ (various components) 
units (Yin, 2003:40; De Vaus, 2001:220) constituting differences in welfare provision among the 
countries. The use of a multiple-case design to draw comparisons allows the researcher to predict 
similar or contrasting results based on a theory (Yin, 2013). In this study, the researcher used 
theory to predict the cause of variation in child welfare regimes between the cases using a 
multiple-case design, allowing analysis of causes of variation within and across cases. 
 
A single-case design would have represented ‘the critical case [one unique case] in testing a 
well-formulated theory’ (Yin, 2013:40) but the objective in this study is to compare child welfare 
regimes between cases. A multiple-case design is appropriate for examining similarities and 
differences between cases therefore it was deemed suitable to examine similarities and 
differences between child welfare regimes in four cases. A multiple-case design is richly 
descriptive and grounded in deep and varied sources of information (Hancock & Algozzine, 
2016:16) hence it allowed the researcher to provide a rich comparative description of child 
welfare regimes based on various relevant data sources and to create robust and reliable 
evidence. The case study approach also allowed the researcher to tell a country-specific story to 
escape the problem of operationalising concepts in a uniform way across countries (usually by 
attaching numbers to them) (Mabbett & Bolderson, 1999:31-32). 
 
The comparative methodology adopted was more useful in analysing the variation between the 
CWRs. Comparative literature has shown that ‘comparative analyses make it possible to learn a 
great deal about one’s own country by analysing it in contrast with other countries’ (Greve, 
1996:13). The comparative framework allowed the researcher to first understand the driving 
factors to the adoption of the different social grants and to investigate the most important factors 
explaining the models comparatively. 
 
A desktop review was conducted to establish existing social grant programmes, policy 
frameworks, implementation mechanisms as well as document policy and programme reforms. 
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Data from the desktop analysis was used to document in detail the characteristics, evolution of 
cash transfers and establish the factors explaining the characteristics in Chapters 2 -5. The thesis 
is largely a comparative qualitative desk research but three of the four countries were visited for 
a minimum two months fieldwork involving 91 in-person interviews with key informants. The 
researcher obtained a list of key stakeholders involved in social grants policy-making processes 
and implementation from the responsible government ministry of each selected country. Non-
random qualitative sampling - purposive sampling (on the basis of knowledge of social grants) - 
was used to determine the information-rich key informants.  
To investigate the differences and the causes of CWRs, a combination of desk review of relevant 
documents (government and the media) and semi-structured interviews were deemed more 
helpful (than ethnographic methods like observations involving following policymakers like 
ministers) in understanding the politics of designing welfare policies. Table 1.4 shows the data 
collection methods, data sources as well as the type of data collected from the different sources.  
 
Table 1.4: Data collection methods and sources 
Method Type of 
data 












Policy environment related to social 
grants programmes: process: actors, 
roles, influence; programme 
objectives; verification of data from 
reviewed documents; factors that 
influenced social grants introduction 
and permitting/impeding scale up 
Stakeholder/Key Informants/policy makers 
in social grant policy processes: 
Parliamentarians; Ministry of social 
development/ social services top officials; 
donor/NGOs officials 








Current social grants programmes; 
legal and policy frameworks 
governing or affecting programmes; 
programme differences; social 
protection expenditure and beneficiary 
(coverage) statistics  
Government/ ministerial publications 
(social policy legislation and policies); 
newspaper articles; programme reports; 
national budget statements; party election 
manifestos; parliamentary debates; UN 
agencies (ILO; IMF; World Bank- social 
protection cross-national data bases; 
UNICEF- Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys (MICS))  
Source: Author 
A desk review of existing social protection policies guiding social grant provision in different 
countries was conducted. The review considered other related documents such as child welfare 
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guidelines and national constitutions to have a country-specific as well as a regional 
understanding of the politics involved in social protection policy-making. The review aimed to 
understand how politics affect welfare reforms. Relevant programme documents reviewed 
include social protection policies and evaluation reports. The review assisted the researcher to 
gain knowledge on key characteristics, evolution and factors that could explain why social grants 
evolved in similar or different ways in the case-study countries. 
To collect qualitative data on social policy-making in the four case studies, Key Informant 
Interviews (KIIs) were conducted with 91 purposively selected policy-making stakeholders in 
the three countries (see list of key informants in Appendix 6.1). I did not draw on interviews in 
South Africa because, unlike in the other three cases, it has considerable existing secondary 
literature. Country-specific stakeholders included ministers, parliamentarians or legislators, 
government ministries and department representatives such as the Department of Social Services 
or Social Development. Key informants were also from policy-planning organizations, 
government bureaucracies, state legislatures, and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
Policy experts from each organization with relevant knowledge and experience of social grants 
programmes in their countries were purposively selected. 
Qualitative data were, in part, collected through participant observation. I attended three 
government-donor organised social protection policy meetings in Zimbabwe, a social policy 
dialogue and an international conference on social protection in Namibia, social policy position 
paper development in Botswana and two civil society organised child grants reform meetings in 
South Africa. Participation was important in understanding the politics of policy-making 
especially current policy discussions, including the different interest groups and their policy 
agendas, and discussions on the proposed policy options. Participant observer status enabled the 
researcher to engage in discussions with policy makers and allowed me to probe them in areas 
that needed further clarifications. 
Data were captured through extensive note taking and recording. To avoid communication 
barriers through the different local languages spoken in the case study countries, all in-depth 
interviews were conducted in English. Given the sensitivity of the politics of policy-making, 
interviewees’ preferences for recorded or unrecorded interviews were respected. The 
interviewees are identified by their real names except for those who chose anonymity. Only 
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notes were taken during interviews with participants who declined to be recorded. Recorded 
interviews were transcribed to facilitate content analysis of the statements of individual 
responses and to arrive at key messages after compressing the data according to the major 
themes emerging from the respondents’ statements (Fossey et al., 2002).  
The research was conducted in four purposively selected Anglophone countries - South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Social provision in all the countries is somehow similar but 
sufficiently different to merit explanation. The cases share substantial similar colonial settler 
histories, culture, predominantly Christian nations, all have or had peasant sectors and mineral-
based economic development conditions. All the countries are parties to international 
conventions such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child especially Article 26 which 
guarantees the right to benefit from social security for every child. They also have national 
strategies and policies that incorporate an unconcealed focus on Orphaned and Vulnerable 
Children (OVCs). In these countries, various factors including unstable macroeconomic policy 
environments and inconsistent rates of economic growth contributed to the marginalisation of 
vulnerable and poor members of their societies including children. Almost similar experiences of 
natural disasters like droughts and HIV and AIDS have weakened family support systems. 
Support systems have already stretched thin by extreme poverty. All the case-study countries 
generally experience high child poverty rates. General poverty is also high across the case 
studies (see Figure 1.1 for general poverty rates). 
Despite the similarities, there was enough variation to warrant explanation. Appendix 1.1 shows 
variation in social grants provision in six Southern African countries- Botswana, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, South Africa, Malawi and Zambia. These countries vary according to key 
characteristics including policy frameworks, (Table 1, Appendix 1.1) scale and scope (Table 2, 
Appendix 1.1). The scale and scope of social grants in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia is very 
similar with little variation hence one country, Zimbabwe, was selected. The selected four 
countries (Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) have distinct CWRs, warranting an 
investigation into the key differences and possible explanations.  
1.4.2 Study delimitation 
Four case studies in this thesis are not representative of Africa because some (other) countries 
provide both social insurance and social assistance related child benefits. Most countries in 
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Francophone Africa historically considered employment-related family allowances since the 
1930s (Cooper, 1996; SSA, 2017; 2005). Since 2005, the United States Social Security 
Administration (SSA) has reported in the Social Security Programs Throughout the World 
publications reported the prevalence of contributory social programmes for children in 
Francophone Africa. The administration reported that since 1931, the Ministry of Social 
Security, National Solidarity and Environment and Sustainable Development in Mauritius 
provided an ‘orphan’s pension’ to children if either of the deceased parents had paid 
contributions. (2005:118-122). Orphan’s pension is part of the Work Injury social insurance 
programme. Similarly, Algeria, like Senegal since 1932, has been implementing a survivor’s 
benefits programme for orphans in the absence of a surviving spouse to claim disability pension 
or old-age pension administered by the National Social Insurance Fund since 1949 (2005:27-31).  
In addition, since 1941 Algeria has been administering employment-related family allowances. 
Cooper (1996) observes that France extended family allowances to all formally-employed 
workers in its colonies in 1952. In Senegal, for instance, a family received 4,800 francs ‘for the 
birth of each of its first three children’ (Cooper, 2006:318). In addition to social assistance 
programmes like the school feeding, educational assistance to vulnerable children and cash 
transfers in support of child nutrition programmes in Senegal (World Bank, 2013:27), 
contributory orphan’s pensions and family allowances are provided in most of the other 
Francophone countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Tunisia and Morocco (SSA, 2005; 2017). In Benin, the contributory family allowance 
benefits include family allowances (monthly cash transfers) and school allowances (school fees) 
for children above the age of six (SSA, 2005:32-36). Therefore, Francophone Africa generally 
has a workerist model to child welfare provision which none of the four Anglophone cases in this 
thesis depict hence Francophone countries were not selected. 
This thesis is broadly centred on the idea of child welfare and how states choose to address this 
with specific focus on social protection and public policy measures. Child protection policies and 
services ‘provided to abused, neglected, or exploited children including early detection and 
response, policy enforcement and case management’ (Adato & Bassett, 2008:169, also see 
Gilbert et al., 2011; Hart et al., 2011:972) are very closely aligned with both child welfare 
regimes, and with specific groups such as Orphaned and other Vulnerable Children (OVCs) that 
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play centre stage in this study. The parallel and sometimes interrelated system of child protection 
is also an important part of child welfare that need investigation but is beyond the scope of this 
thesis for at least three reasons: (1) My thesis engages primarily with the comparative literature 
on welfare regimes, which focuses on cash transfer programmes and pays little attention to 
programmes such as child protection (2) Whilst there might be similarities in processes that 
shape child protection and child welfare regimes (such as civil society advocacy in South Africa 
or UNICEF pressure to universalise child grants across Southern Africa), the similarities or 
differences are not immediately clear and would require very substantial further research. It is 
also not clear how examining such processes may help in explaining differences in child welfare 
regimes. Similarities in processes shaping child welfare regimes and child protection policies 
may not lead to similarities or differences in the choice of social grants across countries. There is 
need to investigate the parallel and sometimes interrelated system of child protection that seems 
an important part of child welfare but that is beyond the scope of this thesis (3) An in-depth 
analysis of child protection would entail discussing the impact of social grants on child welfare 
related to child protection. The focus is not in evaluating the impact of social transfers e.g. on 
child poverty or child protection issues like child labour, violence, neglect or abuse (see 
Barrientos et al., 2014) but on explaining government choices for identified forms of social 
provision between countries.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
 
This thesis is on how and why three middle-income countries (South Africa, Namibia and 
Botswana) and one low-income country (Zimbabwe) in Southern Africa provide for children in 
different ways.  
 
Chapters 2 to 5 examine the CWRs in South Africa (Pro-poor CWR), Namibia (Mixed CWR), 
Botswana (Familial CWR) and Zimbabwe (Agrarian CWR). To facilitate the argument within 
each chapter and the overall thesis argument, l use a standard structure that examines the 
distinctive characteristics, the evolution of the regime and the key explanatory factors of the 
CWR characteristics in each chapter. Each of the three major sections of the case studies help us 
understand each CWR by providing answers to three specific questions in this thesis. The case 
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studies provide the basis for comparison - showing how and why the cases differ from each other 
– that is developed in a subsequent chapter.  
 
Chapter 6 considers the overall pattern to variation between the four cases and locate the findings 
within a broader global perspective on CWRs. Evidence from desktop research and key 
informants reveal that CWRs between the cases vary on two dimensions: programmes coverage 
(proportion of children reached, programme legal status and generosity) and targeting form 
(whether poverty-targeted or family-breakdown targeted). The chapter identifies the most 
influential factors that explain the regime type in each country and comparatively. The factors 
identified include colonial inheritance, need or structural factors (health shocks, demographic 
changes and family breakdown), international influence by international organisations, 
particularly UNICEF, and domestic politics (party politics and civil society organisations). I 
argue that none of these factors individually explain the explicit models in each country. Rather, 
one combination of factors leads to one type of CWR and a different combination of factors 
leads to a different CWR. My findings extend the Power Resource Theory beyond developed 
countries but also reveal new influential factors within the theory that have been overlooked.           
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Appendix 1.1: Social Cash Transfers for Children in Southern Africa- Selected countries 
Table 1: Strategic Framework 
Strategy Country 




None -None  
-National Strategy for Poverty 
Reduction (2003) 
-National Policy on Needy& 
Vulnerable Families (Draft 2010) 
-None 
-White Paper on Social Welfare 
(1997)  
National Social 
Protection Policy (draft) 
National Social Transfers 
Policy Framework (draft, 
2011) 









on OVC (2004) 
-National Action 
Plan for OVC s 
in Namibia 2006-
2010 (2007) 
-National Policy on OVC (Draft 
2010) 
-National OVC Guidelines (2008) 
-National M&E Framework for OVC 
(2008) 
-Short Term Plan of Action on Care 
of Orphans (STPA 1999-2003)  
-NPA for OVC 2010-2016 (2010) 
-National Plan of Action for 
Children (1996) 
-The National Programme of 
Action: 2000 and Beyond (1999) 
-National Policy Framework for 
OVC (2005) 
-Policy Framework for Orphans 
and other Children Made 
Vulnerable by HIV &AIDS 
(2005) 
-NAP for OVC made Vulnerable 
by HIV &AIDS 2009-2012 
(2009) 
- NPA for Children in South 
Africa 2012-2017 (draft) 
-National Policy on 
Orphan Care (1996) 
-National Policy & 
OVC (2004) 
-NPA for OVC 2005-
2009 (2005) 
-Guidelines for the Care 
, Protection & Support 
of OVC (2006) 
-National Orphan Care 
Policy (1999) 
- NAP for OVC 2007-
2010(2004) 
-NAP for OVC 2011- 
2015 (2011) 
-Zimbabwe National 




-NPA for OVC 2007-2011( 2005) 
- NPA for OVC and Budget 
Recommendations for Year 1 (2005) 
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Table 2: Scale and Scope 8 








Foster Parent Allowance9 (MGECW): 
N$200 (US$ 26 /month for the first foster 
child plus N$100 = US$ 13 per month for 
every additional foster child; 8808 children 
in 2005; Expenditure: N$19,616 million 
(US$2,315,938.61) 
Maintenance grant: S$ 26 per month for 
first child plus US$ 13 per month for every 
additional child; Coverage 2005: 
N$34707; Expenditure: 348 million in 
2011/2012 (including maintenance and 
special maintenance); Maximum of 6 
children in total 
Special Maintenance Grant (Disability 
Grant for children) (SMG): 
N$200/month ($ 26) 
Place of Safety Allowance: N$10/ child/ 
day (US$ 1.30/month) 










orphans in 2007 
- Child Support Grant (CSG): pay 
R310/child/month (US$27) maximum 6 
children up to the age of 18 to the carer 
of the child living in income poor 
households; reached 85% of eligible 
children by 2012; 3.5% of GDP; started 
1998 Care dependency Grant: 
R1,140/ (US$98) month/child (2012) 
disabled children under 18; introduced 
2009; 2010 expend- R1,356 million 
(US$116,595) 
Foster Care Grant: R740 (US$64) 
/month/child (2011) care of children 
who are placed by Court in foster care 
ages of 0-18 years; R4,362 million 
2010 expenditure 
 
-Social cash transfer 
(pilot) MK550 
(US$9)/household/m
onth; extra funds 




Mchinji Social Cash 
Transfer Pilot covers 
9% of all households 
-7,480 children 
covered by April 
2007 
-Harmonised Social 
Cash Transfers (Pilot) 
2011; $8/month/child 
cover 13 districts (10% of 
vulnerable HH) 
 
- Social cash 
transfer (pilot) since 




/month+$2,50 for HH 
with children 
- child grant (2010) 
cover 3 districts 
(20000 HHs) as pilot; 
for under 5 children; 
US$ 11/month 












Introduced 1991.270000 beneficiaries in 












National School Nutrition prog (1993) Started 1996 WFP 
funded 
None  Home Grown School 
Feeding Prog (2011) 
covering 1million 
















Free primary education (Education for All 
(EFA prog)  
None  Free publicly compulsory basic 
education 
Free primary school 
education 
- Basic Education 
Assistance Module 
11(BEAM) 2001; provide 
tuition, levy and 
examination fees 
assistance; cover 10.6% 
of eligible children 2006; 
573 245 children 
(2009/10);$55/pri 
pupil/yr & $218/sec 
student/yr 
-free basic education 
































































CHAPTER 2   
Pro-poor child welfare regimes: The case of South Africa, 1994-2017 
 
2.1 Distinctive characteristics of South Africa’s child welfare regime 
 
South Africa originally had a primarily familial system (under apartheid), aimed at single 
mothers and their children, and orphans (albeit restricted to white, coloured and Indian people), 
but this was transformed into a distinctively pro-poor child welfare regime (CWR) through the 
Child Support Grant (CSG). Certain programmes partly continue to promote the familial 
component of the CWR. The Foster Care Grant, the second largest child-specific child grant in 
South Africa, for example, is not means tested and addresses a category of children defined by 
their family condition rather than the fact of their being poor. The Foster Care Grant, however, is 
used as a poverty alleviation grant for orphans living in kinship care to, in combination with 
targeted free schooling and free primary health care for children, promote a pro-poor child 
welfare regime.  
South Africa’s CWR is distinctive (compared to other middle and low-income countries in 
Southern Africa) in that the government spends more than 1% of GDP on child benefits, making 
it an outlier within Africa. Spending on child benefits is more compared to countries in North 
America, the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean that 
spend an average of 0.7% of GDP (ILO, 2014:13). The social grants are more generous, near 
universal and legislated. Social grants are means tested but the means test serves to exclude the 
rich, with all poor households with children being eligible for the grants. The CSG, for instance, 
is the most expansive child grant in Africa, offering a model CWR to low and middle-income 
countries. Globally, in comparison with other general welfare programmes, the CSG is number 
five, after Di-Bao (China), Bantuan Landsung Sementara Masyrakat (BLSM) (Indonesia), IG 
National Old Age Pension Scheme (India) and BRIM (Malaysia) in the ‘top five [unconditional] 






combine with other extensive indirect programmes to reach almost all children. There are about 
18 million children and about 54 million children in South Africa (see Table 1.1). This chapter 
investigates why the CWR in South Africa shifted from a familial system to a pro-poor one 
through the CSG. 
After the transition to democracy in 1994 ANC-led governments inherited social grants and 
expanded them massively. South Africa has three - Child Support Grant, Foster Care Grant and 
Care Dependency Grant - categorical cash transfers programmes for children (Guthrie, 2002:130; 
Barrientos & DeJong, 2004; Mturi et al., 2012; Mokomane, 2013; Seekings & Moore, 2014:9). 
A ‘foster care grant is for parents of foster children, a Care Dependency Grant for parents of a 
disabled child, and a child support grant paid to the primary caregiver for children’ (Ferguson, 
2007:77). In addition to child grants, the government implements targeted child-specific 
programmes including free or subsidised schooling, free health care and free school feeding. 
Children indirectly benefit from social grants targeted at other groups of people but still end up 
in the same household. ‘Aid is nominally targeted to individuals (based on age, disability, or 
parental status), but it is widely recognized that it ends up supporting not individuals, but rather 
large, multigenerational households’ (Ferguson, 2007:78). Ardington and Lund (1995:558) 
corroborate that pensions ‘are awarded to individuals but are to a large extent consumed by the 
household’. Such targeted programmes include the Old Age Grants, Disability Grants, Grant in 
Aid, National food relief Programme and Extended Public Works Programme. The expansion of 
the Old Age Grants coverage and benefits in the early 1990s (Devereux, 2007; Case, 2004; Case 
& Deaton, 1998) positively impacted on nutritious status for a third of African grandchildren 
living with pensions recipients, particularly granddaughters (Duflo, 2003; 2000). Children are the 
indirect ‘beneficiaries’ of intra-household redistribution of the Old Age Grant in South Africa 
(Bertrand et al., 2003; Burns, Keswell & Leibbrandt, 2005; Seekings & Moore, 2014:10). 
Children may also benefit from the temporary Social Relief of Distress that is ‘paid to certain 
vulnerable individuals’ or households in poverty but in need of immediate assistance (Martin, 
2010:29). Together, all these programmes expand the coverage of social grants for families with 




million in 1994 to more than 17 million in 201715 besides other social policies including housing, 
health care, school feeding schemes and public works benefits. 
While the ANC government has generally promoted redistribution and conservatively objected 
defamilialisation perceived to undermine the family (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015:136), it has 
defamilialised (state displacing family provision) and decommodified (state displacing market 
provision) social provision for poor families with children to establish an exceptional CWR in 
Africa. From the late 1990s, the government tended to limit cash transfers through imposing 
strict eligibility criteria. Under pressure from the civil society, the ANC government transformed 
child social protection from a ‘residual’ welfare regime (for blacks) during apartheid and the 
early years of democracy (Luiz, 1995:591 & 592; Patel, 2011). The provision of child grants 
since 2009 when it was announced that child grants would be extended to all children to the age 
of 18 with relatively generous benefits demonstrate the CWR’s inclination towards a social 
democratic approach (the means test notwithstanding). It is very generous to classify South 
Africa as social democratic because not all poor families with children receive social grants. The 
CSG, for instance, did not reach an estimated 18% of eligible children in 2016 perhaps due to 
low uptake by children under the age of one and children living in urban formal areas (SAHRC 
& UNICEF, 2016:6), and many children are not eligible because of the means test. The CSG and 
Care Dependency Grant (but not the Foster Care Grant) are means tested and not as generous as 
the apartheid era (but more generous than in other middle-income and low-income countries) 
reflecting liberalism (liberal regime characteristics) except that liberal regimes like the United 
States of America would usually target grants on the very poor, whereas the CSG is paid for 
most children. Nonetheless, when considering contributions of direct and indirect programmes, 
the CWR regime closely illustrates a social democratic regime. 
Some scholars investigate the politics of South Africa’s general social grant system (Lund, 1993; 
2009; Seekings & Nattrass, 2015). Other scholars extensively describe the different child grants 
programmes (coverage, legislation and generosity) and targeting (categories of children targeted) 
(Goldblatt, 2005; Woolard & Leibbrandt, 2010; Lund, 2008; Patel, 2012b; Proudlock, 2011; 






of these scholars provide a detailed analysis of the child grants impacts and rightly applaud the 
CSG as an extraordinary scheme with the widest coverage in Africa. Alternative explanations to 
the reforms of child grants are proffered with a focus on the politics of reforming the CSG 
(Seekings, 2016c; Seekings & Nattrass, 2015; 2016; Proudlock, 2011; Devereux, 2011; 
Budlender et al., 2008; RSA, 1997; Van der Berg, 1997). The extensive description of child 
grants, however, does not explicitly identify the type of CWR in South Africa. The literature also 
provides a limited account of the CWR’s distinctiveness and is silent on the effects of other child 
grants (other than the CSG) and social grants for other population groups on the CWR’s 
characteristics. The alternative explanations overlook the factors that were especially important 
in the pro-poor reforms of the CWR, not the CSG only.  
This chapter discusses the distinctive characteristics, evolution and suggests explanations to the 
reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa. Such an analysis widens our understanding of 
alternative explanations to South Africa’s CWR exceptionalism. I show that South Africa’s 
CWR is distinctively pro-poor (poverty-targeted) with outstanding programmes (near universal 
general social protection to poor families with children). Social grants for children, particularly 
the CSG, are internationally recognition for the outstanding wide coverage. As a result of the 
combination of child grants and other cash transfers targeted at other population groups but 
indirectly benefiting children, almost all children receive social cash transfers. I argue that 
colonial history explains path dependence but the pro-poor reforms since the late 1990s reflect 
domestic politics (a strong child sector civil society, supportive individuals within government 
and shifting political ideologies within the ruling party). In Chapter 6, I shall examine more fully 
how and why the CWR in South Africa is different from Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.   
2.1.1 Coverage 
 
South Africa’s CWR has comparatively the widest coverage. South Africa had a child population 
(i.e. under the age of 18) of 18,508,000 in 2014 (SSA, 2015a) and child grants reached 
12,665,840 children (68% of all children) in February 2017 (SASSA, 2017). The CSG alone 
contributed 65% (out of the 68%). The National School Nutrition Programme covered about 9,5 
million out of the 11,2 million school children in 2013 i.e. 85% of all school children and about 




contribute indirectly to children’s well-being include the Old Age Grants (reaching 3, 295,710 
elderly men and women), the Disability Grant (paid to 1,067,402 disabled adults) (SASSA, 
2017) and the Extended Public Works Programme, benefiting 350,068 people in 2013) (World 
Bank, 2015:114). Assuming (in the absence of disaggregated household survey data precisely on 
the proportion of children in all households receiving grants) that each grant represents a 
household and that average number of children per household is one, together, 51% of all 
children were reached indirectly. About 45% of all households reported receiving at least one 
grant in 2016 (SSA, 2016). By June 2017, 71% of all households that received grants had 
children (SSA, 2017), probably an underestimation because the number of children in 
households that received Disability Grant, Old Age Grants or War Veterans Grants is not 
reported. 
Given that all social grants (child grants and those for other groups of people excluding in-kind 
benefits like school feeding) reached 17,191,121 people in February 2017, and that almost all 
poor households receive a social grant, it is likely that many children benefited from a grant 
either directly or indirectly. In other countries like Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia, unlike in 
South Africa, the coverage of the child welfare regimes is expanded by a combination of direct 
child grants and other social protection programmes. South Africa shares the same welfare 
regime characteristic (as the coverage is further expanded by other indirect programmes) but it is 
unusual in that direct child grants, particularly the CSG, are more expansive than in other cases.  
South Africa, like Namibia but not Botswana and Zimbabwe, is one of the few countries in 
Africa where social cash transfers are based in legislation. The first social assistance laws were 
promulgated in 1921 (grants for children), 1928 (Old Age Grant), 1936 (blindness), 1946 
(disability grant) and 1992 (all social security programmes) during apartheid. The post-apartheid 
South Africa constitution (section 27(1)(c)) provides everyone ‘the right to have access to social 
security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate 
social assistance’ (RSA, 1996). The key legislation is the 2004 Social Assistance Act that 
provides for child and other grants. Other legislation including the Social Welfare Assistance Act 
(1994), Welfare Law Amendment Act, No. 106 of 1997, the Exemption of Parents from the 




protecting children’s right to social security. Social grants in South Africa are exceptional 
because they are legislated rights (Devereux, 2011).  
In terms of generosity, the transfers are relatively generous relative to GDP per capita at $5,724 
in 2015, the food poverty line and to other Southern African countries. South Africa uses three 
poverty lines: the Food Poverty Line below which people cannot purchase enough food; the 
Lower Bound Poverty Line below which people do not have enough money to purchase both 
adequate food items and non-food items, so they have to sacrifice food to pay for other non-food 
items; and the Upper Bound Poverty Line below which people are considered poor but generally 
‘able to purchase both food and non-food items’ (SSA, 2015b: 2).  
It is very likely that a poor household with children receives two social grants (either both child 
grants or a child grant and a social pension). In an average family of five people with two 
children and three adults, both children and one adult are likely to receive a grant, perhaps the 
CSG (R380 or US$30), and a high value social pension (R1, 510 or US$111), such as an Old 
Age Grant (or a disability grant). The combined transfer for such a household in December 2017 
was US$31/person/month (using 2016 prices adjusted for purchasing power parity, PPP), higher 
than the national Food Poverty Line (US$26/person/month) but lower than the Lower Bound 
Poverty Line (US$39/person/month) and less than half the Upper Bound Poverty Line 
(US$60/person/month). The combined transfer translated to US$0.98/person/day which is 
slightly above half of the global poverty line of US$1.90/person/day.  
Overall, the individual child grants are generous with the exception of the CSG (see Table 2.1). 
In December 2017, the CSG was US$30/person/month (or about  US$1/person/day) that is above 
the national Food Poverty Line but below the Lower Bound Poverty Line and Upper Bound 
Poverty Line and the international poverty line of US$1.90/person/day. By contrast, the Foster 
Care Grant (at US$74/person/month or about US$2.50/person/day) and the Care Dependency 
Grant (at US$129/person/month or about US$4/person/day) were very generous relative to all 
the three national poverty lines and the international poverty line of US$1.90/person/day but 










Table 2.1: Transfer value of grants per person (adjusted for PPP), December 2017 
	
Grant Monthly (US$) Daily (US$) 
CSG 30 0.99 
Foster Care Grant 74 2.44 
Care Dependency /Old Age /Disability 
/War Veteran  
129 4.01 
Source: Statistics South Africa 
These transfers exclude non-cash benefits including school feeding, free basic education and 
health care and other subsidized services (including housing, water and sanitation). South 
Africa’s CWR is distinguished by government’s provision of the ‘social wage’ – monetary and 
non-monetary poverty reduction mechanisms (SSA, 2014:8). 
2.1.2 Poverty-targeting 
Two major challenges facing post-apartheid South Africa are poverty and inequality (Tshoose, 
2016; Langa, 2012). High levels of child poverty persisted since independence (see figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1: Proportion of children living in poverty, 2003-2014 
 




Notably, the poverty lines (Upper Bound Poverty Line, Lower Bound Poverty Line and Food 
Poverty Line) used in South Africa are higher in comparison to the international Ultra Poverty 
Line and poverty lines in the other three cases. After transition to democracy in 1994, the 
government committed itself to ‘elimination of poverty and establishment of a reasonable, and 
widely acceptable, distribution of outcome’ (Tshoose, 2016:60). South Africa’s CWR is 
distinguished by its provision of general support to poor households with children particularly 
through the CSG. Cash transfers for poor children are targeted at poor households regardless of 
household arrangements such as the rising number of orphans, street children as well as child-
headed households (Case, Hosegood & Lund, 2005). The CSG, the most expansive in the 
country, was designed primarily to address poverty and malnutrition in low income households 
(Lund, 2008). The distinctive feature of the CSG, the largest social grant for children, is the 
concept of ‘follow the child’ meaning the benefit is supposedly paid to the caregiver irrespective 
of who the child live with. In Namibia, children must be living with caregivers other than their 
relatives to receive foster care grants, one parent to benefit from child maintenance grants or both 
parents to receive a Vulnerable Grant. 
Until 2014, South Africa was the only Anglophone African country with a cash transfer 
programme specifically for children in poor households. In 2015, Namibia introduced a poverty-
targeted Vulnerable Grant which is largely urban biased (see Chapter 3). Poverty-targeting in 
South Africa is different from Botswana with familial benefits for OVCs and Namibia primarily 
targeting orphans. Poverty targeting is almost similar to Zimbabwe, but South Africa targets all 
poor individual caregivers while social cash transfers in Zimbabwe are limited to the very 
poorest families with children in certain geographical areas. Child poverty and not orphanhood, 
was central in the form of targeting in South Africa. Studies in the Southern African region have 
shown that orphanhood per se is not the major determinant of child well-being. Instead, 
household poverty for all children regardless of their orphan status is more important (Campbell 
et al., 2008). Poverty targeting in South Africa, unlike the other cases, has been necessitated by 
the persistent high rate of unemployment, a chronic structural factor the country has grappled 




2.2 The evolution of South Africa’s child welfare regime: changes and choices, 1994-2017 
This section analyses the CWR evolution between 1994 and 2017, focusing on key moments of 
policy change and choice. I examine how reforms were effected and how these changes shaped 
the distinctive characteristics of the pro-poor CWR. 
South Africa inherited a familial social protection system after apartheid with child grants paid to 
poor single mother caregivers but biased towards the white population. Nonetheless, ANC 
presidents since independence sought to continue deracialising social grants through expanding 
the welfare state to reduce inequality and promote a pro-poor CWR. Since 1994, the CWR 
evolved over three key moments disaggregated in line with the presidential terms of the ANC 
administrations. The first phase is between 1994-1999 during Nelson Mandela’s leadership that 
was mostly concerned with elevating the historically disadvantaged children by deracialising 
welfare but opted to limit the expansion of child grants. Remarkable reforms including free and 
subsidised schooling, free health care and free school feeding were, however, implemented as 
part of the Reconstruction and Development Programme – ANC’s economic and development 
imprint. The second phase is between 1999-2008 under Thabo Mbeki who was also conservative 
to the idea of universalising child social grants but partially acceded to civil society pressure. The 
last phase is the period since 2009 under Jacob Zuma who took a populist approach to social 
policy and expanded child grants to all children by raising the age-limit for the CSG to age 18. 
Unlike his predecessors, Zuma recognized the extra burden of care for families with orphans by 
paying their caregivers an additional amount. Despite being less conservative, Zuma’s 
administration introduced social grants conditionalities that were turned down by the civil 
society. Kgalema Motlanthe’s short presidency between 25 September 2008 and 9 May 2009 is 
not considered in this analysis as his term was very short with no major child grants reforms. At 
different key moments in the CWR’s evolution, the reforms supported a poverty rather than 





Zimbabwe,	 orphans	 are	 broadly	 defined	 as	 children	whose	 parents	 have	 died.	 Social	 orphans	 i.e.	 children	with	
absent	parents	are	excluded	in	both	South	Africa	and	Zimbabwe.	Namibia	adopts	a	broader	definition	to	 include	
single,	double	and	social	orphans.	While	Botswana	recognises	social	orphans,	it	adopts	a	narrow	orphan	definition	




child grants coverage significantly. The regime maintained inflation-indexed cash benefits that 
were relatively high, kept above the Food Poverty Line but generally low relative to the Lower 
Bound Poverty Line and Upper Bound Poverty Line. Given ANC’s conservatism on expanding 
the welfare state, South Africa’s exceptional CWR, like the general welfare regime, was 
‘unexpected’ (Seekings, 2015: 13). 
2.2.1 Democracy and the dismantling of discriminatory apartheid social grants legacy 
under Nelson Mandela presidency, 1994-1999 
 
South Africa introduced a system of child grants in the first half of the twentieth century. The 
grants included family allowance, maintenance grant, introduced in 1937 and 1921 respectively, 
and foster care grant (Woolard, Harttgen & Klasen, 2011; Lund, 1993:9 & 11). Lund observes 
that these grants were ‘problematic for recipients to get access to’ (1993:12) because apartheid 
South Africa had an extensive welfare regime that largely provided for the white and not black 
South Africans (Nattrass & Seekings, 1997:457; Seekings & Nattrass, 2005; Patel, 2011).  
South Africa is a classic example of a CWR where major reforms happened after democracy. 
After independence in 1994, the ruling ANC had to overcome high poverty and redress the 
inequality (Ardington & Lund, 1995; Bhorat & Kanbur, 2006:12). The ANC sought to achieve 
equality, in part, through transforming the social welfare system (McGregor, 2014; Ferguson, 
2007). Democratisation and political change in 1994 stimulated the growth of social assistance in 
South Africa, bringing hope that the new government would address the apartheid-era 
segregation (Barrientos et al., 2013; Seekings, 2011). Mandela who had ‘always condemned all 
forms of racism’, ‘always sought to create “a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa”’ 
(Ojo-Ade, 1994: 523), focused on dismantling the legacy of apartheid by eliminating 
institutionalised racial provision of social grants. In the early years of democracy, the 
government did ‘not provide a general system of relief for poor families because they [were] 
only paid in unique circumstances’ (Luiz, 1995:588) yet ‘more than half of the black population’ 
was poor and poverty disproportionately high among women and children (Patel, 2011:71). 
Unemployment increased from 17% in 1995 to 24% 1999 (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2006:60). This 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			





contributed to high poverty levels among women and children especially in rural areas with 
limited access to the State Maintenance Grant.  
The State Maintenance Grant was introduced during apartheid in the 1930s to support children 
and caregivers (specifically mothers) in white households (Lund, 2008: 15; 2009). The ANC 
inherited the State Maintenance Grant (together with Old Age Pensions and Disability Grantss) 
at independence and sought to redress the racial inequalities of the apartheid era by reforming the 
grant. In 1997, the Nelson Mandela led ANC government adopted the White Paper for Social 
Welfare that ‘posited a new path for social welfare featuring a rights-based approach, equity in 
the distribution of resources and redress through increased access to social services and benefits 
to those who have been historically excluded’ (Patel, 2012a:603-4). An important reform 
towards the achievement of this goal was the replacement of the State Maintenance Grant by the 
CSG in 1998 following a 1996 Lund committee on alternatives of abolishing the State 
Maintenance Grant. In addition to the transition from racially discriminatory benefits under 
apartheid towards ‘racial parity’ (Kruger, 1998; Lund, 2003; 2008: 15), the ANC government 
eliminated racialized access to the State Maintenance Grant through refocusing it from poor 
single parents to include other poor households with children  
Nonetheless, the Lund Committee argued that equalizing the State Maintenance Grant was 
‘economically not possible’ and ‘socially inappropriate’ (RSA, 1996:22; Lund, 2006) hence it 
was replaced by the CSG that fitted the new economy and other social protection demands 
(Budlender et al., 2008:8). The Lund Committee recommended a small amount of R75 (US$5) 
per child for children up to nine years. Concerned with the age cut-off and small amount, the 
civil society, particularly the Black Sash, the Community Law Centre at the University of the 
Western Cape, the New Women's Movement, the Gender Advocacy Programme, the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Cape 
Flats Development Association and the South Africa Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition 
lobbied the ANC party and government to raise the grant amount to R135 (US$10) and age limit 
to 12 years (Budlender, 2008:10). The CSG was finally introduced in 1998, targeted at children 
up to 7 years and offering a modest amount of R100/child/month (US$7). This design attracted 
divided views within government with some viewing it ‘as a progressive first step’, yet others 




was seen as ‘progressive’ because it was not as discriminatory as the State Maintenance Grant as 
it was expanded to all poor households regardless of race. It might have appeared ‘retrogressive’ 
perhaps because of the reduced benefits and age-limit.   
The ANC was rather ‘conservative’ in reforming social transfers including the State Maintenance 
Grant, supporting family and market rather state provision. Mandela’s government was 
‘workerist’ (promoting welfare through work) and against ‘handouts’. The Department of Social 
Welfare ‘accepted the need for social grants’ but at the same time wanted to link social grants to 
employment to avoid creating a dependency syndrome (Seekings, 2015:13-14). The ANC opted 
to continue the grant but like under apartheid, limited it to a certain group of children, this time 
not on race but age. The CSG amount was significantly lower than the generous State 
Maintenance Grant (Seekings, 2002:3) and it was only paid for the child excluding the parent or 
caregiver as the previous State Maintenance Grant. Discourses about welfare dependency in 
South Africa show that dependency is not unique to developed countries. 
Furthermore, the ANC government’s development plans did not support a radical shift from the 
‘discriminatory' provision of social welfare but rather the maintenance of the ‘status quo’. The 
Reconstruction and Development Programme, for example, emphasised poverty reduction 
through service provision in preference to welfare (Pelham, 2007). ‘A 1995 draft White Paper for 
Social Welfare was rebuked for paying too little attention to social grants and the 1996 Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution Framework marked another shift in approach, towards 
neoliberal economic growth and job creation with a diminished place for welfare and grants’ 
(Pelham, 2007:17). ANC’s ‘neo-liberal macro-economic policy meant that social spending had 
to be limited’ (Goldblatt, 2005:241), which did not mean a reduction but limiting the rate of 
increasing social spending i.e. slowing down the growth rate of social spending. Successive ANC 
governments, as discussed later, tended to limit social transfers for poor families with children 
but expanded transfers only under pressure from domestic civil society. Despite the age-limit, the 
CSG significantly expanded the coverage of child grants from about 22,000 in 1999 to 1.1 
million in 2001 (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016:70). ANC was, 
therefore, somehow conservative in reforming child social grants during Mandela presidency but 
later shifted towards ‘social democracy’, raising the CSG age limit to 18 years, paying out about 




Despite being conservative, the ANC-led government appeared programmatic. One of the most 
expansive programmes reformed under Mandela presidency is the National School Nutrition 
Programme. The programme provides a cooked meal on each school day of the year to learners 
in quintile 1-3 schools i.e. poor schools mainly in farm, rural and informal settlements, and has 
been rightly identified as ‘the second largest state investment into alleviating the effects of child 
poverty, after the Child Support Grant’ (Graham et al., 2015:7). Contrary to previous research 
asserting that the programme was introduced after the transition to democracy in 1994 (Leatt et 
al., 2005; van Stuijvenberg, 2005), the school feeding programme in South Africa has been in 
existence since the apartheid era. Although the programme is said to have ‘originated from the 
White Paper on Reconstruction and Development in 1994 as a Presidential Project under the 
Department of Health’ (RSA, 2013: vii), the first democratic government inherited the the 
School Feeding Scheme at independence but renamed it to, initially, Primary School Nutrition 
Programme, because it covered primary schools only, and later to National School Nutrition 
Programme in 2004. The programme was extended to needy secondary schools in 2009. 
School feeding schemes were introduced as early as 1916, initially for poor white children in 
urban areas. South Africa had individual and community funded school feeding programmes as 
early as the late 1930s. The then ruling United Party officially introduced school feeding 
nationwide in 1943 for all primary learners regardless of their race. About one million children, 
half of them being black, benefited from the School Feeding Scheme between 1943 and 1944 
(Kallaway, 1996). At its inception in 1943, the School Feeding Scheme was funded by 
government through provinces but the national Department of Social Welfare was responsible 
for administering the programme (RSA, 2013:11). Subsidies for natives (blacks) were, however, 
removed in 1945 when programme administration moved from Social Welfare to the Department 
of Education. Subsidies were reintroduced after 1948 during apartheid but the feeding scheme 
for natives received less funding and was eventually discontinued in 1957/8 (Kallaway, 1996:9). 
Kallaway asserts that charity organisations including private enterprises, donors and non-
governmental organisations, however, continued to fund the scheme. Despite lack of government 
support for nationwide school feeding, the programme continued to exist with support from 




After independence in 1994, president Mandela reconfigured feeding programmes, which 
already existed during apartheid, under the Integrated Nutrition Programme (Brits et al., 
2017:214). Feeding programmes under the Integrated Nutrition Programme included the Primary 
School Nutrition Programme, community programmes and food parcels. The ANC made 
election promises to implement school feeding within 100 days after the 1994 election (RSA, 
2013:11). The post-Apartheid ANC government has invested significantly in the National School 
Nutrition Programme. School feeding was funded R477.8 million between 1994 and 1996 as part 
of the Integrated Nutrition Programme (RSA, 2013:12) and funded about R6 billion17 in 2016/7 
financial year.  
School feeding was implemented on a national scale at independence in 1994 as a poverty 
alleviation programme and an educational intervention. The school feeding programme, thus, 
together with poverty-targeted child grants and other child grants indirectly used for poverty 
alleviation such as the Foster Care Grant, promotes South Africa’s pro-poor child welfare 
regime. The focus on poor children is expressed in the objective to ‘enhance programmes for 
orphans and vulnerable children’ (RSA, 2013:12). Although the programme aims to alleviate 
short-term hunger and address micro-nutrient deficiencies among school learners (van 
Stuijvenberg, 2005:213), school feeding targets learners in schools in poor socio-economic areas 
i.e. poorly resourced schools in poor communities (quintile 1-3 schools). School feeding 
complements other school-based pro-poor programmes because quintile 1-3 schools are also 
non-fee-paying schools. School feeding is, therefore, implemented as a poverty alleviation 
programme and an educational intervention (Leatt et al., 2005:16). Targeting works in two ways: 
first, whole schools are selected for funding for the programme and secondly learners are 
selected by age, grade or some other criteria within the selected schools.  
The programme is expansive, reaching about 9,5 million out of the 11,2 million children of 
school-going age in 2017, i.e. about 85% of learners.18 It is the biggest school feeding 
programme in Africa. School feeding, however, is small in terms of value of transfer, cost and 







(US$0.38)/child/day in 2013 (RSA, 2013), translating to about R60 (US$6)/child/month. By 
contrast, the CSG transfer value was approximately five times higher than school feeding at 
R300 (US$28)/child/month in 2013. Notably, school learners receive meals for a maximum of 
195 school days per year and this negatively affects the average monthly transfer when compared 
to programmes that provide support for the whole year (such as the CSG).19 Figure 2.2 compares 
cost of the National School Nutrition Programme and the CSG over time. 
Figure 2.2: Cost of National School Nutrition Programme and CSG, 1998-2017 
	
 
Source: Government of South Africa annual budgets 
Figure 2.2 shows that the CSG costs much more than the school feeding programme, making it 
the most important child poverty alleviation strategy in South Africa. Whereas the cost of the 
CSG rose from about US$538 million in 2004/5 to more than US$4178 million in 2016/7, the 






















led government, therefore, might be supporting the expansive school feeding programme 
because it is not expensive. It is curious, however, that the ANC supports a huge and expensive 
programme like the CSG. Even if we compare programme reach, the CSG still proves more 
important than the school feeding programme (see figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.3: Reach of National School Nutrition Programme and CSG, 1998-2017 
  
 
Source: Republic of South Africa departmental annual reports and financial budget 
Figure 2.3 shows that the CSG reaches more children compared with the National School 
Nutrition Programme. CSG reach increased from 22000 children in 1998 to more than 12 million 
in 2017 while the National School Nutrition Programme benefitted about 5 million and 9,5 
million children respectively. The big difference in reach between the two programmes for the 
period 1998-2004 is, in part, because the CSG was still new and beneficiaries were gradually 
enrolled on to the programme. From the cost and reach perspectives, while the National School 
Nutrition Programme is expansive relative to similar programmes in Africa, the CSG proves to 
be the most important child social protection scheme in post-apartheid South Africa. Continued 
budget support, by the ANC-led government, for both programmes, suggests political 



















































































CSG reflects the ANC’s commitment to implement pro-poor social transfers for families with 
children. 
Post-apartheid reforms, specifically coverage (reach) and targeting, of the school feeding 
programme, show strong political interests by the Mandela-led government to address child 
malnutrition and redress unequal access to education that characterised apartheid. Targeting and 
coverage reforms, therefore, became part of the ANC government’s initial child social protection 
strategies to reduce child malnutrition and poverty for all children regardless of race and 
location. The primary concern of the ANC-led government was to ‘eliminate the unacceptable 
rate of child death due to insufficient nutrition intake’ (Graham et al., 2015:10), but it appears 
the school feeding programme was more than an educational, poverty and health intervention. 
What was the political motivation for president Mandela to reintroduce the programme as a 
‘Presidential Project’? Moreover, school feeding was later expanded to all learners in 2008 
against recommendations to reduce it to fewer schools because of infrastructural gaps (Louw et 
al., 2001; RSA, 2013:13; Saasa et al., 1997). While it is not clear whether the ANC used the 
school feeding programme as a tool to gain political support, it is likely that school feeding 
appealed to voters, particularly those in communities previously excluded from the programme 
i.e. people in farm areas, informal settlements and rural areas. From this perspective, the ANC 
had the political incentive to reform the school feeding programme after coming to power in 
1994.  
Children in public primary and secondary schools receive subsidised schooling or school fee 
exemptions. The South African Schools Act of 199620 allows for learners from poor families to 
be exempted from paying school fees. The Act requires the Minister of Basic Education to 
conduct a poverty ranking of schools. Schools are ranked between quintiles one and five, with 
quintile one being schools in a very poor area and quintile five being schools in a wealthier area. 
Schools in quintiles one to three are no-fee schools, and schools in quintiles four and five are fee-








subsidises schools in quintiles four and five. No-fee schools were introduced in 2007 where the 
No-fee Schools policy abolishes school fees in the poorest 40% of schools nationally for learners 
from Grade R to Grade 9 (Leatt et al., 2005:17). Both fee exemptions and free schooling are 
means-tested but they are automatically granted to orphans, learners in foster care and Child 
Support Grant beneficiaries. 
After 1994 the ANC-led government removed user fees for primary health care as a means to 
improve access to health care for children living in poverty (Leatt et al., 2005:19; Martin, 
2010:82). User fees were initially removed for children under the age of six and for pregnant 
women and later extended to include free primary health care for everyone in the public sector. 
More recent reforms entailed expanding health fee waivers for secondary and tertiary care for 
children living with disabilities (Leatt et al., 2005:19).  
The provision of targeted school feeding, subsidised and free schooling and free primary health 
care complements child grants, particularly the poverty-targeted CSG, to create a set of pro-poor 
policies. These targeted programmes were developed alongside cash transfers (although through 
different processes, with less pressure from the civil society) after democratisation to support a 
pro-poor child welfare regime in South Africa. 
2.2.2 ANC conservatism, civil society mobilisation, and social grants under Thabo Mbeki 
presidency, 1999-2008 
 
The success of ANC government in replacing the State Maintenance Grant during Mandela 
presidency allowed the ANC to expand child grants to previously excluded poor black families 
with children. The ANC might have seen the introduction of the CSG as a big achievement but 
the civil society was concerned with the continued exclusion of many orphaned and poor 
children due to the strict means test. The civil society coalesced to propose significant reforms 
including the adoption of a universal Basic Income Grant or universalising the CSG that would 
ensure child grants reach all poor children. Mbeki’s administration was not amenable to the 
proposals and eventually opted to partially raise the age limit and review the means test. As 
discussed later, the CWR largely became redistributive with strong social democratic 




In 2002, the Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security, amongst other civil society 
organisations, proposed ‘a Basic Income Grant for all citizens’ to effectively cover poor children 
not reached by the existing grants particularly the CSG (Rosa & Guthrie, 2002:4). The Basic 
Income Grant would reduce the coverage gaps within the social security system by providing 
social assistance to everyone i.e. it would extend social assistance to the 60% of the adult 
population living in poverty without receiving government assistance (Samson, 2002:76; Rosa & 
Guthrie, 2002:4). The Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security also proposed a 
universal child grant by extending the CSG to all children under 18 years and removing the 
means test. Earlier, the Basic Income Grant idea had been raised at the Presidential Jobs Summit 
by the powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions in 1998, promoted by the Basic 
Income Grant Coalition in 2001 and resurfaced in the government’s Taylor Committee 
recommendations to rationalize the social security system in 2002 (Ferguson, 2007:78; Makino, 
2004; Meth, 2004; Seekings, 2002; Matisonn & Seekings, 2002; 2003; Samson, 2002). A Basic 
Income Grant would be a welcome income support to the increasing number of poor and 
unemployed people. The Basic Income Grant was to be a universal monthly modest payment of 
R100 (US$7) per person ‘paid to the person primarily responsible for childcare’ for children 
(Samson, 2002:76). The ANC was cautious in handling the proposal arguing that it was not 
affordable and would cause dependency (Meth, 2004:1). Simulations suggested a Basic Income 
Grant was affordable (Le Roux, 2002). Despite being endorsed by the civil society organisations, 
the political opposition and supported by influential ANC members, the Basic Income Grant 
was, ‘emphatically rejected by the top leadership’ (Ferguson, 2007:79). 
The rejection of a Basic Income Grant continued the exclusion of children who were not covered 
by the existing grants. The excluded children included those living in poor households headed by 
the excluded 60% adult population already mentioned like 76% of children who lived without 
non-pensioners (Samson, 2002:71). The Basic Income Grant proposal unsuccessfully sought to 
introduce a citizen grant that would have benefited all children regardless of their caregivers’ 
income. The rejection reveals the Mbeki-led ANC government’s conservative characteristics. 
Mbeki himself was against a radical reform through introducing the Basic Income Grant but 
preferred a social assistance system that maintains such grants as the Old Age Grants and 
Disability grants and free public health care (Meth, 2004:2). As also shown by the rejection of an 




to experiment with new social protection programmes. Still, the debates leading to the rejection 
were vital in influencing the government to instead consider the first age extension of the CSG in 
2003. As Seekings observes, ‘Hostility to a Basic Income Grant opened space for raising the 
CSG age limit as a compromise’ (Seekings, 2016c:18). 
Apart from the poverty-targeted CSG reforms and debates, the Foster Care Grant, the second 
largest child-specific cash transfer scheme in South Africa, was reformed significantly in 2002/3. 
The Foster Care Grant, inherited at independence, was initially part of the child protection 
system (in contrast with the CSG which was part of the government’s poverty alleviation 
response) since it was given after court ordered foster care placements in cases where the 
government had removed children from their family environment due to abuse or neglect (Hall & 
Proudlock, 2011:1). The Foster Care Grant, thus, was used for child protection since it targeted 
children on the basis of their condition (abuse or neglect) rather than the fact of their being poor.  
Between 1994 and 2002 the number of Foster Care Grants beneficiaries remained relatively 
stable at about 50,000 per year but a major policy change since 2003 led to a rapid expansion of 
over than 50,000 per year. Orphans were brought into the foster care system in 2003 when then 
Minister of Social Development, Zola Skweyiya, announced that the Foster Care Grant would be 
made available to relatives who cared for orphaned children (Skweyiya 2002). Hall and 
Proudlock argue that the number of Foster Care Grants in 2003 (and subsequent years) increased 
rapidly after the minister’s announcement and similar statements from other officials (2011:2). 
Hall and Proudlock further claim that since 2003, the Foster Care Grant ‘has increasingly been 
used to provide financial services to orphan caregivers and has effectively been used as a poverty 
alleviation grant for orphans in kinship care.’ The Foster Care Grant, possibly because of its 
higher value (nearly three times the CSG) has been used as a social protection rather than a child 
protection mechanism. The shift to a social protection scheme promoted South Africa’s pro-poor 
child welfare regime. 
 In 2003 the ANC government also rejected proposals for an orphan grant. In the early 1990s and 
2000s Southern Africa, and many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, experienced an unprecedented 
increase in the number of orphans primarily due to HIV/AIDS. By July 2002 South Africa had 
885,000 maternal orphans (i.e. children whose mothers had died), 73% as a result of AIDS 




22% in 2003 (Bhorat & Kanbur, 2006:12) and continued to increase AIDS-related mortality. 
This orphan situation called for government immediate action. The big question facing the region 
in relation to child welfare was how states should respond to the orphan problem in the era of 
HIV/AIDS. Botswana introduced an Orphan Care Programme in 1999 and Namibia primarily 
focused its two major child welfare grants – the Foster Care Grant and Child Maintenance Grant 
- on double (both parents dead) and single (one parent dead) orphans respectively.  
Given that orphans – defined as children ‘under the age of 18 whose mother, father, or both 
biological parents have died’ (Meintjies & Hall 2010: 102) - placed under foster care benefited 
from the Foster Care Grant, the debate was on whether to introduce an orphan grant (to benefit 
orphans living with relatives without being placed under foster care by a court order), similar to 
Botswana or Namibia or to reform the existing grants to accommodate all orphans. After 
replacing the State Maintenance Grant with the CSG in 1998, the government was reluctant to 
universalize child support grants on affordability basis. Without a universal CSG, the 
Department of Social Development, through the draft Children Bill (2002), proposed four 
orphan-targeted grants. An Informal Kinship Care Grant would cover South African children up 
to the age of 18 living in the care of their relatives without the intervention of the courts. A 
Foster Care Grant would be for children up to the age of 18 who are by legal definition ‘in need 
of care’ and placed by a court order in the care of unrelated foster parents. A Court-ordered 
Kinship Care Grant would target children up to the age of 18 who are by legal definition ‘in 
need of care’ and are placed by court order in the care of relatives. An Adoption Grant for 
caregivers adopting orphans ‘with recommendations that this be equal in value to the Foster Care 
Grant’ or ‘Court-ordered Kinship Care Grant on the assumption that this would facilitate the 
permanent placement of children who require long-term caregivers because their biological 
parents are deceased or unable to provide care’ (Giese et al., 2003:12). These ‘foster care’ grants 
were meant to, as later revealed by the Minister of Social Development, Zola Skweyiya, 
encourage ‘relatives to take care of orphaned children under the foster care package’ (Giese et 
al., 2003:1).  
Domestic civil society organisations collated arguments and supporting evidence against orphan-
targeted grants. Various researches showed that although orphanhood increased vulnerability to 




some cases less poor than other vulnerable children. A government commissioned study 
conducted by the Children’s Institute concluded that the majority of poverty related needs 
prioritised by orphans were shared by other children not experiencing orphanhood (Giese et al., 
2003). Other studies showed that the predicted impact of AIDS-related orphanhood, including 
that family will not cope, were overrated in South Africa and other parts of Africa (Foster, 2000; 
Bray, 2003). Using evidence from ‘primary research, demographic projections and by costing a 
range of different social security scenarios’ Meintjes et al., (2003) argued that South Africa had a 
long history of poor children not living with biological parents and cared for by relatives. Black 
Sash commissioned its own a comparative study that projected a decline in the number of 
orphans by 2015. This meant government would reduce expenditure on orphans through foster 
care grants. Black Sash recommended that ‘government had to increase substantially per capita 
spending on health and social welfare if it is to cater for the requirements of needy people... 
irrespective of HIV status’ (Kallmann, 2003:55).  
Given that many children lived in poverty, a universal child grant, possibly by extending the 
CSG to all children (and removing the means test that restricted children’s access) would have 
been a more effective child social protection intervention. This research evidence convinced the 
government not to introduce orphan grants but to explore other more inclusive ways of 
increasing access to social grants. Government still continued to place orphans in foster care with 
relatives. The Foster Care Grant was, therefore, ‘used to meet the social assistance (poverty-
related) needs for orphaned children’ (Hall, Skelton & Sibanda, 2016: 68). Civic organisations, 
as discussed later, used these studies to pressure the government to extend the CSG to all 
children and to advocate for additional grant payments for families caring for orphans.  
Rather than introducing new grants – the Basic Income Grant and the orphan grant – the ANC 
opted to extend the age threshold of the CSG to 14 years in 2003. Assessments of the CSG 
indicated ‘coverage’ (number of beneficiaries) and ‘benefit’ (amount of money) gaps (ACESS, 
2003a & b; Rosa & Guthrie, 2002). The CSG was strategically designed to exclude equally 
deserving children who fell outside the age limit, what Kidd, Gelders and Bailey-Athias (2017) 
term ‘exclusion by design’. A total of 3,5 million children were excluded by 2002. The Alliance 




‘the small benefit amount [R160/month by February 2003] and the limited age eligibility’ 
(ACESS, 2003a).  
To improve the impact of the CSG, the Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security 
recommended a universal child grant through the ‘Extension of the CSG to all children under 18 
years’ (Rosa & Guthrie, 2002:4). The Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security 
argued that the age extension would be in line with the definition of a child as defined by the 
South African constitution and lobbied the ANC party at its 2002 Policy Conference and 
thereafter the government through the Minister of Social Development (Budlender, 2008:18). 
The government did not fully accept the proposals on ‘affordability’ grounds (Seekings, 2016c; 
2017). Using research evidence, the Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security, other 
civil society organizations and research institutes, including the Children’s Institute at the 
University of Cape Town, successfully advocated for the age extension from 6 to 14 years. This 
first raising of the age limit for the CSG expanded the coverage and increased the value of social 
grants for poor families with children. The age extension, as discussed, was a compromise 
between introducing a universal CSG or Basic Income Grant.  
 On the part of government, ‘improved public finances’ led President Thabo Mbeki’s 
administration to increase the CSG age limit (Seekings, 2016c:11) and allocate more budget on 
public spending (RSA, 2002; Patel, 2011:79). Consequently, more children were reached 
through the CSG, widening the overall coverage of cash benefits for families with children. The 
overall coverage increased from ‘2.6 million in 1994 to more than 10 million as of 2005’. ‘Much 
of the increase is due to the fact that the child support grant programme has been expanded 
several times to include children under 9 years of age in 2003, children under 11 years of age in 
2004, and children under 14 years of age in 2005’ (Ferguson, 2007:77).  
Age extension to 14 was implemented in three phases: the first phase-in of children under 9 years 
increased beneficiaries by 170% by 2003 (Department of Social Development, SASSA & 
UNICEF, 2016:70), the second phase in 2004 included 10- and 11-year-olds, increasing 
beneficiaries by another 39% between 2003 and 2004, and the last phase in 2005 phased-in 
children up to 14 years increasing by 70%. As a result, the total number of beneficiaries 
increased from 4,273,056 in 2003 to more than 7 million in 2005 (Department of Social 




Nevertheless, the civil society was unsuccessful in convincing the government to increase the 
CSG amount. The government ironically argued it was not affordable yet it had increased the 
coverage by extending the age limit. Seekings (2016c) maintains that this paradox can be 
explained by the mediation role of politics on affordability. ‘The expanded space resulted in 
policy reforms because, however, of political conditions, within the government, within the ANC 
and the ANC-led ‘Alliance’, in civil society and in the electorate.’ (2016c:14). Seekings further 
argue that the ANC redefined ‘affordability’ to justify its position on expanding social grants. 
Thus, the unusual expansion of the CSG is a case of shifting discourses of affordability 
(Seekings, 2016c; 2017).  
The 2007-08 period leading to Thabo Mbeki’s resignation and his replacement by Zuma saw the 
civil society successfully push for fundamental reforms to access to child grants, especially the 
CSG. Three major reforms implemented by the Mbeki administration in 2008 include raising the 
CSG age limit to 15, adjusting the income threshold and allowing the temporary use of 
alternative identification documents. These reforms were consequential in increasing child grants 
coverage (reach). The reforms also meant increased household income support from government 
for newly enrolled families.   
Raising the CSG age limit to children under 14 years in 2003 meant children between 15-18 
years were still excluded. The civil society, particularly the Children’s Institute and ACESS, 
continued to advocate for the extension of the CSG to all children less than 18 years through its 
CSG Extension Project (Rosa & Mpokotho, 2004). The project (involving various strategies of 
collecting access cases on the CSG through the Case Alert hotline) established by the Children’s 
Institute and the Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security between 2003-4 captured 
complains from caregivers, parents, Community Based Organisations, Non-Governmental 
Organisations and paralegal offices. This evidence showed that despite the age extension, many 
eligible children were not accessing the CSG. Under pressure from civil society, the Minister of 
Finance announced in his 2008 Budget an age extension to children less than 15 years starting in 
2009. As discussed later, the extension was still exclusionary and did not deter the civil society 
from continuing to lobby for the extension to all children. Moreover, the civil society widened 
their advocacy for reforms to the general welfare regime indirectly impacting child well-being. 




the age threshold for men from 65 to 60 years (to match the age limit for women) for the Old 
Age Grant. The age limit was subsequently equalized in 2008. Given that many pensioners in 
South Africa and generally in Africa are likely to care for children, the Mbeki-led government’s 
move to equalize the Old Age Grant qualification meant increased reach for children in poor 
households. The number of children benefitting from the change in the age threshold for men 
might have been negligible since women (grandmothers) supported other dependents more than 
men (grandfathers). 
Second, adjustment of the CSG income threshold expanded the coverage and cash benefits for 
poor families with children.  For a decade, the income eligibility threshold - amount of money at 
which the household is eligible to apply for a grant - for the CSG remained unchanged yet the 
old age and disability grants ‘automatically adjusted in line with increases in the grant amounts’ 
(Budlender, 2008:16). Eligibility was based on monthly household income (R1,100 or US$162 
for single caregivers and R2,200 or US$324 for a married couple), the type of household 
structure (single or married caregivers and with caregivers only able to apply for a maximum of 
six of children) and ‘whether the child lived in a rural or urban area (R800 or US$76 and R1,100 
or US$162 in urban and rural areas)’ (Delany & Jehoma, 2016:61). The failure to adjust the CSG 
income threshold resulted in the exclusion of more than half a million children under 14 years of 
age in 2005 and approximately 700,000 children under 15 years in 2008 (Proudlock, 2011:158). 
The Department of Social Development responsible for social protection’s own review of CSG 
means test in 2007 had concluded ‘the eligibility income threshold had not accounted for price 
inflation between 1999 and 2008, meaning that an increasing number of poor families were being 
excluded from social assistance’ (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 
2016:71). Many poor children were excluded because to qualify for the CSG by 2007, they had 
to be 50% poorer than when the grant was introduced in 1998 (Williams, 2007). The existing 
means test had discriminatory anomalies including different thresholds for urban and rural 
applicants and subjecting married couples (who had to support larger households) and single 
caregivers to a similar income threshold.  
The Legal Resources Centre, in partnership with the Children’s Institute, successfully compelled 
government to address the means test anomalies through litigation in August 2008. The revised 




caregivers and married couples respectively. Similarly, the CSG income threshold was indexed 
on inflation. ‘The Department of Social Development changed the Regulations of the Social 
Assistance Act, introducing a formula to provide for annual adjustments of the means test to 
keep pace with inflation’ (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016: 71). 
The relaxation of the income threshold to determine the CSG eligibility meant ‘many 
beneficiaries whose income had increased’ between 1998 and 2008 became legally eligible. 
Department of Social Development, SASSA and the civil society widely publicized the change 
in eligibility rules allowing many families to apply for the grant. These reforms ‘expanded the 
pool of eligible children from 7.8 million under the old, stricter means test to 9.5 million’ 
(Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016: 72). 
Finally, the review of documents required to apply for the CSG increased poor children’s access 
to the grant. Until mid-2008, the regulatory requirements for the application of the CSG included 
original identification documents like the child’s birth certificate and the caregivers’ national 
identification card. The original documents were to be submitted with police or commissioner of 
oaths certified copies. An application not meeting these requirements would not be approved. 
Many caregivers did not have these documents hence could not apply for the CSG. The 
requirement disqualified poor children in need of the grants, excluding about 20% of eligible 
children in 2007 (Hall & Proudlock, 2008).  Through litigation, ACESS succeeded in pushing for 
the temporary acceptance and use of alternative identification documents by grant applicants 
without prescribed documents in June 2008. This meant more applicants previously excluded for 
lack of original documents could apply and start receiving the grants within a three-month grace 
period of obtaining the original documents. The ‘alternative documents’ statutory provision 
allowed 433,872 caregivers to apply for the CSG between 2008 and 2010 (Department of Social 
Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016:72). 
Although the progressive increase in the number of CSG beneficiaries was over time, the most 
dramatic increase was under Mbeki’s presidency. CSG beneficiaries increased from 150,366 in 
1999/2000 to 8,189,975 in 2007/8 before Zuma came into office. The real expansion of CSG 
beneficiaries happened earlier between 2003/4 and 2007/8 when the number of beneficiaries 




conservatism of the ANC-led government to reflect, as discussed, the influence of child-focused 
civil society organisations. 
2.2.3 The ‘left’ and social grants reforms under Jacob Zuma presidency since 2009 
Zuma emerged as ANC president, with support from COSATU and ‘constituencies representing 
the poor’ in late 2007 (Historical Materialism, 2008:168). Zuma’s ascendency to ANC (and later 
South Africa) presidency, referred to as ‘the Zuma tsunami’, initially appeared to shift political 
power to the left wing within the ANC (Lodge, 2009). The left wing was critical of ANC’s 
liberal policies, seemed more pro-poor and supported cash transfer policies (Leubolt, 2014:14). 
Perhaps frustrated by Mbeki’s conservative policies (Ceruti, 2008), including social policies, 
Zuma assumed a different governance approach, co-opting the civil society unlike Mbeki his 
predecessor. The wide expansion of child grants to poor families during Zuma’s presidency 
shows social provision leaning towards a social democratic state. But Zuma did not have a 
completely different ideology with Mbeki as he also believed that South Africa’s economic 
policies should build a ‘developmental state not a welfare state’ (Lodge, 2009:32). Although 
Zuma has been described as scoring an ‘own goal’ because he is ‘losing South Africa's ‘War on 
Poverty’’ (Maharaj, Desai & Bond, 2011), he has implemented substantial social cash transfer 
reforms for poor families with children. Under his presidency, access to child grants was 
significantly increased by raising the age limit of the CSG to 18 years and the child grants were 
extended to ‘refugee children’ previously excluded. His administration also put to rest the long-
standing issue of support for orphaned children living with their relatives by agreeing to pay an 
additional amount to such households that led to the rejected proposal for an orphan grant 
already discussed. Despite proclaiming all these reformist credentials, Zuma attempted, without 
success, to return to Mandela and Mbeki’s ‘conservative’ approach to social policy by 
conditioning child grants. Nonetheless, under civil society pressure, access to child grants 
improved, increasing coverage more than any of Zuma’s predecessors. 
The first remarkable pro-poor reform under Zuma’s presidency is the age extension of the CSG 
grant to all children under the age of 18 in 2009. In 2008 the civil society welcomed the raising 
of the CSG age limit to 15 but continued to campaign for the CSG extension to all children. 
CASE conducted a study that demonstrated that the age-limit was still a barrier to access to the 




all children as it excluded some children from realizing their constitutional right to social 
security. The Children’s Institute made its submission to the Department of Social Development 
proposing the extension of the CSG to children less than 18 years. The Children’s Institute 
argued that excluding the 15-19-year-old children increases the chances of dropping out of 
school because of lack of fees, participation in harmful forms of labour or crime, compromising 
their education because of high chances of their engagement in activities to contribute to 
household income and excluded them from automatic grant-holder benefits like medical fee 
waivers. Access to the CSG would promote better health outcomes and improve access to 
services such as health facilities for the excluded children (Jamieson & Smith, 2008: 2-3). 
Within ANC, economic and social policy debates including expansion of social grants persisted 
between the right and left wings. The ANC party’s leadership shift to left wing in late 2007 may 
have increased the support for the extension of the grant in 2008 and 2009 (Proudlock, 2011). 
Proudlock further argues that civil society, particularly the Children’s Institute, ACESS and 
Black Sash, took advantage of the power shift within the ANC to campaign for the extension of 
the CSG age limit and lobby ANC to honour its 2007 resolution to extend the CSG all children 
(2011:156). On the other hand, the power of ministries relative to each other was important. The 
Ministry of Social Development supported the expansion of child grants but faced resistance 
from other ministries especially the Ministry of Finance. ‘There were clear disagreements within 
the state, with the Department of Social Development pushing for a raised age limit, against 
resistance from the Treasury and possibly other government departments also’ (Seekings, 
2016c:18). In October 2009, the ANC finally decided to raise the CSG age limit to 18 years. 
Political pressure from the civil society led to the CSG’s ‘parametric’ (changes in the benefit 
levels and eligibility conditions) and ‘dramatic’ reforms (‘massive increase in the number of 
beneficiaries and a significant increase in real expenditure’) (Seekings, 2017:14). These reforms 
significantly increased the CSG and overall coverage of the CWR. The CSG increased from 
3,947,073 in 2003 to 8,832,675 in 2009. The rapid increase was a result of ACESS’ education 
campaigns that informed and encouraged eligible households to apply for the CSG following the 




reaching 4,273,056 children in 2003 and 9,423,019 in 2009.21 The total number of children 
receiving child grants ‘had grown to more than 11.3 million children by 2012, and is now [2016] 
about to reach 12 million’. (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016:70). 
As at end of February 2017, child grants reached 12,665,840 beneficiaries (SASSA, 2017).  
Zuma’s administration might have fulfilled children’s right to social security through extending 
the CSG to all children (subject to their caregivers passing the means test) but did so 
conditionally. In 2009 the government imposed conditionalities on the CSG (Lund et al., 2009). 
Following urgent submissions from the civil society, the conditions were ‘softened’ – the 
regulations remain but in the case of failure to comply the grant will not be discontinued (Hall, 
2011). This means the ‘soft’ conditions will not affect the number of beneficiaries. Like most 
cash transfers in Latin America such as Brasil’s Bolsa Familia or Mexico’s Oportunidades (De 
la O, 2015; Handa & Davis, 2006.) the CSG would be conditional on ‘nutrition, attendance at 
Early Childhood Development facilities, and school performance’ (Lund et al., 2009:73). To 
continue receiving the grant, caregivers/family should participate in livelihood activities and 
attend health workshops.  
The low uptake of health and education in South Africa was rather a structural than individual 
problem which would not be addressed by the proposed CSG conditions (Budlender, 2008). The 
CSG already had costly and in some cases unconstitutional exclusionary measures (children 
excluded because of the age limit) on applicants. The CSG excluded some children from the 
poorest families (Barrientos & DeJong, 2006; Case et al., 2005). Research evidence had 
illustrated that the CSG had achieved similar outcomes with conditional cash transfers like 
‘reducing child poverty, increasing school enrolment, improving children’s health and nutritional 
outcomes’, reducing incidence of child hunger and child labour (Hall & Wright 2010; Woolard 
& Leibbrandt 2010; Budlender et al., 2008; Williams 2007; Coetzee 2010; Budlender & 
Woolard 2006; Agüero et al., 2005; Case et al., 2005). Generally South Africa has high school 
enrolments and attendance rates but the unconditional CSG already positively impacted on 
school attendance. Conditioning the CSG on school attendance, for example, would be ‘a step in 






Conditionalities would potentially shift South Africa from its redistributive and inclusionary 
social policy approach. Rather than imposing conditionalities, government should improve on 
grants administration and provision (Lund et al., 2009). Realising that imposing conditionalities 
was more regressive than progressive, the government kept the CSG unconditional. The 
government had similarly attempted to condition the CSG when it was introduced in 1998 and 
later in 2004 but civil society advocacy resulted in the conditions being dropped (Hall, 2011:4). 
Therefore, civil society mobilisation contributed to the making of South Africa a welfare state 
for children as it was for whites and not for blacks during apartheid. 
Civil society campaign to extend child grants to all children extended to the fight for the right to 
social security for ‘refugee children’. Until 2011, children in refugee families were not entitled to 
social security including child grants. Child grants were only available to permanent residents 
and citizens. Following legal action, in 2012 the government acceded to the demands and 
extended social grants to all documented refugee children (Delany & Jehoma, 2016:61). The 
reforms increased the number of children accessing child grants in South Africa. 
The second major reform under Zuma’s administration is the payment of additional grants for 
families with orphans in 2016. The debate to introduce orphan grants dating back to the early 
2000s continued over the years. Although the number of orphans has gradually decreased, 
orphanhood remained a developmental challenge in South Africa (and many other countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa) since the 1990s. Orphans rates increased from 16% in 2002 to 21% 2006 
(Meintjes et al., 2010: 43), remained constant up until 2008 (Meintjies & Hall 2010: 102) before 
declining to 16% in 2014 (GHS, 2015). Despite the high orphan rates, it did not mean that the 
living conditions of orphans were worse-off than other vulnerable children. Hence the situation 
of orphans did not require a new orphan-targeted grant (Ritcher & Desmond, 2008). 
Nevertheless, many orphans (and other children) live in ‘households where their parents are 
absent’ and are cared for by relatives (Hall & Wright, 2010). Another vulnerable group of 
children, though proportionally insignificant, lived in child-headed households (Meintjes et al., 
2010). 
In response to proposals to introduce an orphan grant or pay additional amounts for the CSG to 
orphans and children in child-headed households, the government chose the latter in December 




November 2016 to ‘allow the Ministers of Social Development and Finance to make these 
additional payments’ in April 2017. The payments, the Minister of Social Development, 
Dlamini, indicated,22 would increase the capacity of extended families that have the additional 
responsibility of caring for orphans. They will ‘provide social assistance for poor children who 
are orphaned and living with family members and children living in child-headed households.’ 
Dlamini’s statement indicates that the government was more concerned with child poverty, and 
not orphanhood. 
Poor orphans and children in child-headed households were already provided for through the 
Foster Care Grant. It would have been expected that the government would enroll them on the 
Foster Care Grant rather than increasing the value of the CSG to orphans. It is not clear why the 
government did not choose this policy option but is likely that affordability concerns might have 
been key considerations as in the case of universalising the CSG already discussed. In 2016, the 
Foster Care Grant amount (R890 or US$66) was more than double the CSG (R360 or US$26). 
What is clear is that ‘neither a court process nor the associated heavy social work process for 
placement’ was required (as in the Foster Care Grant) for the caregiver to receive the increased 
amounts, hence it was administratively easier for government to increase the value of the CSG 
than the Foster Care Grant to orphans. As Dlamini said, the new provisions allow the 
government to ‘provide greater income support to all orphans and not only for those fortunate 
enough to access the foster care system.’ More importantly, the choice might have been informed 
by the government’s preference to maintain poverty-targeting as opposed to enrolling more 
orphans on grant that is not means tested. 
2.3 Explaining South Africa’s Child Welfare Regime 
South Africa’s CWR regime illustrates a form of path dependence. The social grants system was 
consolidated during apartheid (Seekings & Matisonn, 2012: 130; Lund,1993), and reformed after 










significant reforms were implemented since the late 1990s reflecting domestic politics 
(ideological shift within the ruling party, the influence of individuals, a supportive Minister of 
Social Development and strong civil society advocacy). In contrast with the lack of political 
mobilisation for social pensions reforms (Pelham, 2007:8), the child sector civil society was 
more organised and influential in advocating for child grants reforms. Unlike in other countries 
in Southern Africa including Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, strong civil society advocacy in 
South Africa partly explains the pro-poor reforms including the increase in age of eligibility, 
income thresholds, use of alternative identity documents and inflation indexed benefits. 
2.3.1 ‘Structural’ factors 
South Africa, like most countries in Southern Africa, experienced high rates of HIV and AIDS 
that affected the household structure and weakened family capacity to provide social protection. 
High mortality rates left many children orphaned and vulnerable to the risk of poverty. AIDS 
increased orphans and subsequently the demand for social protection. It is not clear, however, if 
AIDS was a factor in the pro-poor reforms in South Africa in similar ways it shaped the familial 
CWR in Botswana. ANC-led government’s response to orphanhood - enrolling orphans into 
existing grants without having to introduce orphan-targeted grants – show the focus on 
addressing the poverty needs rather than preserving the extended families that looked after these 
orphans like in Botswana. The Foster Care Grant was oversubscribed in the early 2000s because 
it became the primary source of income support for households caring for abandoned or 
orphaned children (Meintjies et al., 2003). The resistance to was premised on the argument that 
social provision ‘on the basis of orphanhood mistargets crucial resources, is inequitable, risks 
further overburdening the child protection system and is not a cost-efficient way of supporting all 
poor children’ (Meintjies et al., 2003). Hence poverty became the primary concern in the 
provision of child grants. 
In South Africa, unemployment, underemployment and low wages have left many families to 
rely on the state for their livelihood. This has increased the number of social grants beneficiaries 
for poor families. Ferguson argues that ‘the poor majority of black South Africans have in some 
ways become worse off since the end of apartheid. This is largely due to the massive shedding of 
jobs under the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy especially the low-




times, averaged 25% between 2000 and 2016 (World Bank, 2016:2) declining from about 30% in 
2010 using a broad definition of unemployment (Woolard, Harttgen & Klasen, 2011:358). A 
large population of the working poor earn low wages and qualify for the means tested child 
grants. Child grants (and social pensions) either become the primary source of income or 
significantly contribute to the low wages. The proportion of children who live in households 
where no adults are employed in either the formal or informal sector reduced from about 42% in 
2003 to approximately 30% in 2014.23 Unemployment is worsened because there is no peasant 
safety net in South Africa, unlike in Zimbabwe. Thus, while AIDS is the most challenging 
structural factor determining familial targeting in Botswana, unemployment is the most 
important factor that influenced poverty targeting in South Africa. The influence of 
unemployment in the reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa has received limited 
attention in literature. 
2.3.2 Ideological factors 
ANC’s approach to child social provision during Zuma’s presidency broadly resemble Esping-
Andersen’s social democratic regime but also show conservative and liberal characteristics. The 
expansion of the CSG, for instance, has been subjected to ideological criticism with some 
political elites arguing that it will cause bad behaviour change like increasing teenage pregnancy, 
claims that have been refuted by empirical evidence (Devereux, 2013; Makiwane & Ujo, 2006). 
As the ANC efforts to establish a development state failed, the welfare state gained much support 
within the party. Despite a powerful conservative strand within the ANC, as in much of Africa, 
there is also a more progressive strand. The ANC did play a major role in writing the constitution 
that provided social security rights and the Minister of Social Development, Skweyiya, was a 
strong and effective advocate of expanded coverage. The state plays a central role in family 
provision with near universal and relatively generous child grants (compared to other countries 
in Southern Africa) that reach almost all children living in poor households. Most households 
receive both a child grant and either a disability or Old Age Grant.  
Nonetheless, the wide coverage came at the backdrop of a ruling party that sought to minimise 






means tested and categorically targeted which is characteristic of a liberal regime. It is likely that 
had it not been of path dependence - the current legislative framework and programmes are 
traced back to the colonial period – the ANC might not have introduced and maintained such an 
exceptional expansive child grant system. Concerns about ‘dependency’, ‘handouts’ and 
‘affordability’ within the ANC post-apartheid could have played differently in the social policy 
dialogue had ANC not inherited legislated child grants. The ANC could have followed other 
cases where social protection programmes were abolished and scrapped from the constitution at 
independence like Zimbabwe’s Old Age Pensions in 1980. But the economic conditions in South 
Africa (particularly high poverty due to unemployment as opposed to Zimbabwe’s agrarian 
regime providing employment through agriculture) urged the ANC to consider reforms focused 
on poverty reduction rather than abolishing altogether. Overall, the reforms of the pro-poor CWR 
are, in part, explained by the ideological shift within ANC but other factors, particularly the 
influence of individuals within ANC and CSOs discussed later, largely account for sustained 
poverty targeting. 
2.3.3 Political factors 
Path dependency is central to South Africa’s extensive pro-poor CWR, especially the reforms 
under the Mandela-led government and not the recent reforms. Pre-apartheid South Africa 
institutionalised social provision for poor families with children, albeit on racial lines (Lund, 
2009). In a clear case of path dependence, the ANC did not abolish but chose to continue the 
grants. Path dependence, therefore, is a strong factor explaining programmes inheritance. Social 
grants for children after 1994 are similar to those that existed during apartheid. The reforms of 
the SMG to the CSG, for example, are not a radical transformation from pre-democracy support 
for children. Other scholars have similarly argued that the current social grants reflect South 
Africa’s colonial history (Patel, 2011:80).  
Path dependence only explains part of the story of reforms of the pro-poor CWR. Other factors 
explain the significant reforms that happened since the late 1990s. After transition to democracy 
South Africa experienced multi-party democracy hence the pressure to reform the apartheid-era 
discriminatory social policies. The substantial child grants reforms were primarily to remove 
racial discrimination which excluded black mothers but provided for white South Africans. This 




achieve ‘racial parity’ (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015; 2016; Budlender et al., 2008; RSA, 1997; 
Van der Berg, 1997).  
In countries like Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, party competition between the ruling party 
and other parties and the power of donors and international agencies became significant political 
explanations to the distinctiveness of CWRs. These factors played a negligible role in shaping 
South Africa’s CWR. Due to the ruling ANC’s ‘electoral dominance’ which has translated into 
its dominance of the policy-making process since 1994 (De Jager, 2013:149), electoral 
competition between ANC and other parties has been dismissed as a key driver of welfare 
reforms in South Africa. The ANC ‘faces little immediate electoral incentive to expand the 
welfare system’. As a result, ‘welfare reform is not a major electoral issue’ (Seekings, 2008b:35).  
Seekings’ claim might not be entirely correct to the pro-poor reforms of the CSG. Poverty 
targeting was, in part, influenced by structural factors, particularly unemployment, but the 
provision of grants to poor children could have been politically strategic. The urban and rural 
poor (caregivers who receive grants on behalf of children) in South Africa forms ANC’s political 
support base. The expansion and wider coverage of grants to the poor could have secured the 
ANC the poor voters’ support. On the other hand, poverty targeting excluded the rich who are 
less likely to vote for the ANC. There is no peasantry in South Africa (unlike in Zimbabwe) and 
the poor are the landless, the unemployed and those underemployed who form a large proportion 
of caregivers targeted by the child grants. Hence the expansion of social grants resonated with 
voters’ interests to help ANC gain political support. Other scholars have demonstrated that social 
transfers may be targeted on the poor to buy their loyalty (Ulriksen, 2017). Thus, the ANC could 
have used social grants to win elections (even in the absence of strong electoral competition). 
Domestic politics - ‘factional’ divisions within the ANC, the power of civil society and the 
powers of ministries relative to each other are important in reforms of the CWR. The civil 
society and the Department of Social Development-induced reforms especially Skweyiya who 
served between 1999 and 2009 (Seekings, 2015:15; 2016:29) resulted in widening of grants 
coverage for poor families with children. Skweyiya was central in ‘recruiting paternalistic 
conservatives in support of a broadly social democratic position’ (Seekings & Nattrass, 




reforms. This observation supports existing studies (Seekings, 2016c; Proudlock, 2011; Lund, 
2008) that emphasised the influential roles of individuals, particularly in the expansion of the 
CSG. 
Party politics in the form of shifting party ideology triggered by succession politics within the 
ANC ushered major child grants reforms especially the last age extension of the CSG. The 
internal ‘fighting’ within the ANC saw president Jacob Zuma oust Thabo Mbeki (Lodge, 2009). 
In office, Zuma increased the CSG age eligibility to age 18 in 2009. Mbeki had cited fiscal 
constraints to reject proposals for a universal child grant and to defend his ‘reluctance to raise the 
age-limit to 18 during the debate of 2005-08’ (Seekings, 2016c:28). Hence, the shift of political 
power to the left resulted in ‘a more populist and participatory faction of the party’ that finally 
supported CSG extension (Proudlock, 2011:54).  
Domestic civil society organisations is another important domestic politics factor that supported 
the reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa. Previous research claims the absence of civil 
society pressure to reform the general welfare regime (Seekings, 2008b:35). This contrasts with a 
strong child sector civil society successfully lobbying for the expansion of child grants to all 
eligible children. The government had proposed gradual expansion of the CSG but that meant 
many poor families could not access the grants either because they were ineligible or lacked the 
requisite documentation (Department of Social Development, SASSA & UNICEF, 2016; Hagen-
Zanker et al., 2011).  
ANC-led governments since independence have been ‘conservative’, introducing new forms of 
maintaining inequality including strict means testing, limiting access to grants discriminating 
against children (and adults for the Old Age Grants at some point) by age, imposing ‘soft’ 
conditionalities and hesitancy to introduce a citizen grant. Through litigation, the civil society 
advocacy urged ANC governments to implement substantial reforms that led to the 
implementation of near universal child grants. A strong civil society pressured, primarily through 
litigation, a seemingly conservative ANC government to expand poverty-reducing grants through 
increases access. Perhaps the pressure emanated from the belief that children count as deserving, 




arguing that it has driven welfare policy reforms in the face of resistance from powerful political 
elites (Devereux &White, 2010:55; Pelham, 2007; Devereux, 2013:22). 
This chapter provides supporting evidence to previous literature on factors influencing child 
grants reforms broadly but further show the effect of the different factors identified in literature 
in shaping a pro-poor CWR. The rejection of an orphan grant (Ritcher & Desmond, 2008) and 
the recent introduction of additional amounts for families caring for orphans but receiving a 
CSG24 indirectly point to the ANC’s inclination towards poverty-targeted rather than ‘family-
breakdown’ targeted grants. The analysis of how ‘political, normative and ideological factors’ 
defined the politics of affordability of the CSG (Seekings, 2017) brings to the fore the 
importance of these factors in reforms but sheds less light on how affordability contestations 
were important in promoting a distinct poverty-targeted CWR. Similarly, the analysis of path 
dependence (Patel, 2012) crucially points to historical factors that led to the adoption of specific 
forms of child support but reveals very little about the inheritance of means testing that 
continued to support poverty targeting. ANC did not only inherit the grants but also the means 
testing criteria. Also, the discussion of civil society (Proudlock, 2011) highlights the successes of 
Civil Society Organisations in pushing for reforms. Their failure to successfully advocate for a 
universal CSG, however, falls short of explaining how that could have been a result of the ruling 
party’s ideological position to maintain a poverty-targeted CWR. This chapter has built on these 
arguments to show that the different factors were important in promoting an enduring pro-poor 
CWR.  
In summary, South Africa depicts a distinct pro-poor CWR that transformed from a familial 
regime post-independence. The CWR is comparatively exceptional - legislated, expansive and 
primarily poverty-targeted. Unlike in the other three case studies, almost all children benefit 
from social grants. This is a result of the combined effect of direct and indirect programmes 
coverage. A large proportion of poor families with children benefits directly from the CSG and 
other child grants. The unique comprehensive CWR is widened by social pensions that provide 







reflect not so much the historical or structural as to domestic political factors, especially the 





CHAPTER 3   
Mixed (familial-poverty) child welfare regimes: The case of Namibia, 1990-2017 
	
3.1 Distinctive characteristics of Namibia’s child welfare regime  
 
Namibia’s child welfare regime (CWR) transformed from familial to a distinctively mixed (pro-
poor and familial) regime. Except for the Special Maintenance Grant whose eligibility is based 
on medical assessments, the other child grants directly target the poor because they are means 
tested. The Vulnerable Grant directly targets poor households with children but with both living 
parents. The Child Maintenance Grant is pro-poor as it targets households that are likely to be 
poor due to death or incarceration of one spouse who was either an Old Age Pension or disability 
grant beneficiary. The Child Maintenance Grant is also familial by targeting households with one 
absent parent (who is likely to be the male breadwinner). But the Child Maintenance Grant also 
covers many non-poor children since the means test threshold is linked to the applicant caregiver 
yet ‘other household members may have other (better) sources of income’ (ILO, 2014:115). The 
Foster Care Grant, on the other hand, largely targets on the basis of perceived family breakdown. 
The Foster Care Grant is primarily limited to double orphans. But the Foster Care Grant ‘has an 
in-built poverty targeting element’ as it targets households that are likely to be poorer due to 
over-representation of orphans and the number of children in such households (ILO, 2014:116). 
Many of the features of CWR in Namibia reflect the South African influence which is not 
surprising given that the Child Welfare Grants were built on apartheid-era foundations. But there 
have been significant reforms since independence which has shifted the CWR in a mixed regime 
direction different to the pro-poor CWR in South Africa. The post South African rule eligibility 
criteria for the Child Maintenance Grant and Foster Care Grant directly limit access to ‘broken’ 
families and indirectly target poor households while the Vulnerable Grant is designed to directly 
benefit poor families with children to support a mixed CWR that is distinct from CWRs in South 
Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe. This chapter investigates why Namibia, a variant of South 
Africa, did not follow South Africa’s lead in introducing a CSG, only expanded pro-poor 




Namibia is an upper middle-income country with about one million children and a national 
population of 2.5 million (see Table 1.1). Namibia has enjoyed political stability since it became 
independent from South Africa in 1990. The country has experienced sustained period of strong 
growth, with an average annual rate of 6% per annum between 2010 and 2014 (World Bank, 
2016) and a generally moderate economic growth of about 4% per year since independence. 
Nevertheless, Namibia still experiences many development challenges.  Unemployment rate was 
28% in 2014, down slightly from 30% in 2013 (NSA, 2015a:68). The country remains one of the 
most unequal countries in the world. The Gini coefficient was 0.57 in 2015/6 decreasing from 
0.70 in 1993/4 (NSA, 2016a:12). Vision 2030, the country’s national development framework, 
acknowledges the inequality and envisions a Namibia where ‘Poverty is reduced to the 
minimum, the existing pattern of income-distribution is equitable and disparity is at the 
minimum’ (NPC, 2004: 104). Relatively strong economic growth has not been sufficient to deal 
with poverty, inequality, and unemployment (World Bank, 2016). Child poverty,	the proportion 
of children living in a poor household, is relatively high and has remained considerably above 
the general poverty rate. As shown in figure 3.1, in 2009/10 more than half (52%) of the poor 
were children and 34% of children lived in poverty. National poverty was at 29%. About 17% of 
children population aged 6 to 18 years never attended school (NSA, 2012b). In 2013, 14% of all 
children were orphans, 28% lived with neither parent, child mortality (deaths per 1,000 children 
surviving to their first birthday) was 16% and 24% were stunted. The national HIV prevalence 





Figure 3.1: Child poverty in Namibia 
 
Source: National Statistics Agency (2014; 2012); MoHSS (2003) 
 
Since the 1990s ‘Namibia became one of the few countries in Africa that has a well-established 
and long-functioning social grant system, though the quantity of such grants is still relatively 
low’ (NSA, 2012a:16). Income support for families with children is extended (in)directly 
through a set of social cash transfer programmes. Children directly benefit, as discussed, from 
four Child Welfare Grants - Vulnerable Grant, Child Maintenance Grant, Foster Parent Grant 
and the Special Maintenance Grant (Levine et al., 2011; NPC, 2012; NSA, 2015b:23). In 
addition, all children in public primary (since 2013) and secondary schools (since 2016) access 
free education and since 1991 almost all children in primary school benefit from the School 
Feeding Programme (see Annex 1). 
 
Children also benefit indirectly from social pensions – Old Age Pension, Disability Pension and 
War Veterans’ Subvention - paid to the elderly (60 years and above), disabled (above 16 years) 
and war veterans. The social pensions, though received by adults like grandparents, strengthen 




























Grandparents contribute enormously to the safety net in Namibia by letting the entire family 
share their social pension in times of need (Subbarao, 2008). Child care by grandparents, 
particularly grandmothers, is a common phenomenon in African countries and more prevalent in 
Namibia. Grandmothers end up being the orphan caregivers as their own children die and 
maternal and paternal or double orphans are likely to end up in their hands when their parents 
die. UNICEF reported that grandparents ‘care for around 40% of all orphans in the United 
Republic of Tanzania, 45% in Uganda, more than 50% in Kenya and about 60% in Namibia and 
Zimbabwe (2007:30). Although there is lack of beneficiary data, children with poor but able-
bodied parents benefit from their parents’ participation in food- or cash-for-works programmes	
that ‘are usually implemented in times of covariant shocks like drought or floods’ (Chiripanhura 
& Niño-Zarazúa, 2013:27). Approximately 21% of all children indirectly benefitted from social 
pensions in 2013 (ILO, 2014). In as much as coverage of the direct child benefits is low 
compared to neighbouring middle-income countries, South Africa and Botswana, these indirect 
benefits expanded, albeit modestly, coverage of the Child Welfare Grants. This chapter discusses 
the distinctive characteristics, evolution and suggest explanations to the reforms of the mixed 
CWR in Namibia. In Chapter 6, I shall examine more fully how and why Namibia’s mixed CWR 
is different from South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe.  
3.1.1 Coverage 
Namibia’s CWR is distinguished by low coverage. Coverage for the CWR considers two 
dimensions of child benefits: direct child grants and programmes and indirect social cash 
transfers a family receives. In 2009/10, 35% of all children directly and indirectly benefited from 
social grants (include Child Maintenance Grant, Foster Parent Grant, the Special Maintenance 
Grant, Disability Grant, Old Age Pensions and War veterans’ grants but exclude the Home-
Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSFP) and fee waivers) (NSA, 2012a:17). The number of 
children directly benefiting from child grants is relatively low but has been gradually increasing. 
Figure 3.2 shows that all direct child grants cover about 25% of all children in 2016, increasing 




communities25 and all children in public pre-primary, primary and secondary schools covered by 
the free education policy. 
 
 




Children benefit indirectly from other social protection programmes. Given that 70% of all 
households in Namibia have at least one child (ILO, 2014:41; NSA, 2012c) it can be estimated 
that all recipients of social pensions and Veterans’ subvention share their benefits with at least 
one child. Table 3.1 shows the proportion of children who likely benefited from social pensions 
in 2013. A total of 21% of all children benefit indirectly. The Old Age Pension contributes 15% 





























Table 3.1: Proportion of children indirectly benefiting from other programmes, 2013 
Programme Recipients Proportion of children 
% 
Old Age Pension 143,007 14.9 
Disability Grant 27,312 2.9 
War Veterans’ subvention 24,682 2.6 
Food/cash for work - - 
       Source: ILO, 2014. * no statistics available for food for work programmes 
Namibia is one of a few countries in Southern Africa with legislated social provision. According 
to the World Bank, child and family benefits programmes anchored in national legislation 
‘usually are more stable in terms of funding and institutional frameworks, guarantee coverage as 
a matter of right, and provide legal entitlements to eligible individuals and households’ (World 
Bank, 2014:16). Article 95 of the constitution of Namibia promotes the ‘Welfare of the People’ 
through ensuring the ‘enactment of legislation to ensure that the unemployed, the incapacitated, 
the indigent and the disadvantaged are accorded such social benefits and amenities as are 
determined by Parliament to be just and affordable with due regard to the resources of the State’ 
(Article 95(g)).  Sections 240-252 of the Children’s Act (2015) provide for the payment of state 
grants to children caregivers. 
Namibia’s CWR benefits are very low both relative to the poverty lines and GDP per capita at 
US$4,947 in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). Namibia, like South Africa, uses three poverty lines: the 
Food Poverty Line; Lower Bound Poverty Line; and the Upper Bound Poverty Line. In 
December 2017, the Food Poverty Line was US$18, the Lower Bound Poverty Line was US$25 
and US$33 for the Upper Bound Poverty Line (using the 2012 prices adjusted for purchasing 
power parity, PPP). The poverty lines, unlike in South Africa, are set at quite a low level to 
reflect the residual design of Namibia’s CWR. Most poor children are likely to live in 
households that receive a child grant (N$250 or US$16) and either a monthly universal Old Age 
Pension or Disability Grant (N$1,100 or US$69). In December 2017, a five-person average 
household received a combined transfer of US$85, translating to US$17/person/month (or 
US$0.55/person/day) which is very ungenerous relative to all the three national poverty lines and 




Cash benefits for child-specific grants are the lowest compared to other neighbouring middle-
income countries, specifically Botswana and South Africa. The modest cash benefits of the Child 
Welfare Grants are, in part, a result of the supposedly indirect benefits children receive from the 
country’s broader social protection system. Most needy children are cared for by the elderly and 
the political elites within SWAPO believe that an increase and expansion of benefits for the 
elderly (which are universal) will have a ‘trickle-down effect’ on children in such households.  
3.1.2 Targeting ‘broken’ families  
Notwithstanding that Namibia has four child-specific grants supposedly for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (OVCs), up to 2014 the grants largely targeted ‘broken’ families - one or no 
parent families due to death caused by war or AIDS or absent fathers (unknown or incarcerated) 
- rather than poverty-targeted. Broken families had either single orphans (maternal or paternal), 
double orphans (lost both parents) or ‘social’ orphans (children with absent parents or the 
parents’ status is unknown). Orphans increased from about 7% in 2000 to approximately 10% of 
all children in 2013 but the number of children living with either parent was high at about 58% in 
2013, decreasing from 60% in 2000 (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Distribution of orphans by parent status, 2000-2013 
Parent survival status 2000 2013 
Both M[other] and F[ather] alive and 
present 
26.4 24.8 
M present, F deceased 3.9 4.6 
M present, F alive but absent 29.3 27.8 
M deceased, F deceased 1.1 1.9 
M deceased, F alive but absent 2 2.7 
M deceased, F present 0.4 0.5 
M alive but absent, F deceased 3.7 3.7 
M alive but absent, F alive but absent 26.4 28.3 
M alive but absent, F present 3.6 3.7 
Orphans as % all children 7.4 9.7 
Source: NSA (2003:12) & NSA (2014a:22).  
Namibia’s living arrangements were consequential in the design of the child grants that focused 




years whose maternal mother or paternal father or both are dead’ (NSA, 2015b:22; GNR, 2004) 
to exclude equally or more needy poor, non-orphaned vulnerable children.	A vulnerable child in 
Namibia refers to a child with a high probability of experiencing a welfare loss above a socially 
accepted norm, and as well as a lack of appropriate risk management instruments in place which 
may result in risky/uncertain events on the part of the child (NSA, 2015b:22). This contrasts with 
the international definition that defines a vulnerable child as a child  below the age of 18 and: (i) 
has lost one or both parents, or (ii) has a chronically ill parent (regardless of whether the parent 
lives in the same household as the child), or (iii) lives in a household where in the past 12 months 
at least one adult died and was sick for 3 of the 12 months before he/she died, or (iv) lives in a 
household where at least one adult was seriously ill for at least 3 months in the past 12 months 
(UNICEF, UNAIDS, United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2005). Up 
to 2013, OVCs in Namibia meant orphans. Therefore, the CWR was primarily familial from 
independence until 2013.  
Without general support for poor households with children, the system of child grants was 
inequitable as well as badly targeted and did little to ensure the future of Namibia’s vulnerable 
children and the country’s growth prospects (ILO, 2014). Research in Southern Africa has shown 
that household poverty rather than orphanhood is a more important negative determinant of child 
well-being (Campbell et al., 2008).  Despite the evidence that not all households with orphans 
were vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity (MGECW & WFP, 2007), there was a marginal 
difference in incidence, depth and severity of poverty between orphaned and non-orphaned 
children and that a high number (82%) of poor children were non-orphans (MGECW, 2010:151), 
the eligibility criteria for the main child grants – Child Maintenance Grant and Foster Care Grant 
– were ‘strongly focused on the orphan status (single or double orphans) of the beneficiaries’ 
(MGECW, 2010:150). Orphan statistics in Namibia show that orphanhood was a major problem 
as in other countries in the region. Orphanhood was, however, less important than ‘broken’ 
families in determining child grants targeting. 
Concerns about children in ‘broken’ families rather than orphans per se (as in Botswana, see 
Chapter 4) were important in cabinet’s decision to focus more on orphans than other groups of 
vulnerable children. France Kaudinge, SWAPO Director of Administration, pointed out that 




(2012-2015) and Nangolo Mbumba particularly as Personal Secretary to SWAPO President Sam 
Nujoma (1990-1993) and Finance Minister (1996-2003), believed in poverty reduction through 
employment creation hence viewed extending government support to children with both 
surviving parents as assuming the parents’ responsibility.26 In principle, the Child Maintenance 
Grant was designed to benefit poor children irrespective of status of their parents but in practice 
it is for single orphans with one parent for whatever reason such as those incarcerated for more 
than six months, is absent or dead. Angula said at independence the government was more 
concerned with ‘children of war’ (children who lost their parents during the colonial period) and 
that led to the narrow focus on orphans whose caregivers received Child Maintenance Grant if 
they were single or Foster Care Grant to double orphans.27 
The adoption of a Vulnerable Grant in 2014 shifted targeting from orphan to poverty targeting 
but it was not a complete change as the old grants continued to target orphans. Overall, child 
provision assumed a mixed (familial-poverty) CWR with the introduction of a poverty-targeted 
grant. The shift, as discussed later, reflect international influence combined with domestic 
politics (party politics with the ruling SWAPO). 
3.2 The evolution of Namibia’s child welfare regime: changes and choices, 1990-2017 
From independence in 1990 to 2017, the CWR in Namibia went through three key moments of 
change and choice. Under President Sam Nujoma (1990-2005), the SWAPO-led government 
inherited Child Welfare Grants introduced during the colonial period when Namibia was under 
South African rule. Before independence, the grants were paid to poor single mothers but the 
grants amount depended on race. At independence, President Nujoma’s government equalised 
the grants amounts across all races as well as targeting ‘broken’ families to assume a familial 
trajectory. The second phase is between 2005 and 2014 under President Hifikepunye Pohamba. 
Familialism persisted in the first part of Pohamba’s administration but later shifted to include 
poverty targeting to form a mixed CWR. The last phase is since 2014 under President Hage 







education which was already at an advanced stage of implementation when he came to power. 
Hage, therefore, has maintained the mixed CWR.  
3.2.1 Social grants reforms under President Sam Nujoma, 1990-2005 
The SWAPO-led government, like ANC in post-apartheid South Africa, inherited Child Welfare 
Grants introduced before independence (Namibia was subsumed under South African between 
1915 and 1990). The new Sam Nujoma administration did not abolish the grants like the ANC in 
1994 but expanded them to primarily cover a small category of 'broken' families that was barely 
above 1% by 2003. The lack of general support to poor families with children and limited Child 
Welfare Grants access to ‘broken’ families supported a familial CWR (later changed to mixed 
regime). By contrast, South Africa moved in a different direction at independence. When the 
ANC came to power in 1994 it inherited similar grants but progressively expanded them to most 
poor children to adopt a pro-poor CWR (see Chapter 2). Hence, Namibia inherited the same 
apartheid social protection system of social grants with South Africa at independence. 
Nevertheless, child grants in South Africa have remarkably reformed in terms of targeting poor 
children, the number of beneficiaries and generosity (see Chapter 2) whilst in Namibia they 
comparatively remained modest, limited to ‘broken families and ungenerous. 
The variation between Namibia and South Africa after democracy is, in part, due to differences 
in the political dynamics each of the new government had to redress. The ANC-led 
government in South Africa had to deracialise the grants that primarily benefited the white 
population (see Chapter 2). By contrast, in colonial Namibia (under South African rule) grants 
were also targeted at lone poor mothers but for all races. The value of grants also depended on 
race. Thus, the SWAPO-led government had to redress variation in benefits while the ANC-led 
government had to make reforms that would achieve racial parity. 
At independence in 1990, President Nujoma’s administration equalized the amount of Child 
Welfare Grants for all children regardless of their race, fairly expanded support for families with 
children particularly orphans and not the broader group of vulnerable children. Before 
independence, few children benefitted from the Child Maintenance Grant if they were poor or 
received Foster Care Grants if they were double orphans because the grants were urban biased 
yet large proportion of these children resided in the rural areas. Yet grants were distributed on 




(US$24) for whites, N$135 (US$9) coloureds and N$55 (US$3) blacks. The amounts also 
applied to other grants including the Old Age Pension and Disability Grants. In 1990, Namibia 
inherited a dual economy characterized by interrelated challenges of low economic growth, a 
high rate of poverty, inequitable distribution of wealth and income, and high unemployment 
(ILO, 2014). So, households, especially those with children, suffered from exceptionally high-
income inequalities and poverty levels compared to other medium human development countries 
and interventions were needed to reduce inequality, extreme poverty and vulnerability (NPC, 
2012; GRN & UNICEF, 2013). Equalizing child grants clearly became a central component of 
the national response.  
 
Albert Biwa, Acting Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare 
(MoPESW), said when Namibia got independence from South Africa in 1990, all the grants – 
child and other grants – were equalized to N$135 (US$9), an amount previously set for coloureds 
and not the highest amount that was received by whites because it was not affordable as more 
beneficiaries were enrolled.28  
 
Child Welfare Grants amounts increased sporadically if at all. Since independence, the amount 
of all child grants changed three times only, from N$135 (US$9) in 1990 to N$200 (US$13) in 
2000 and N$250 (US$16) in 2013. As a result, the real value of grants declined due to inflation 
and children could not maintain their standard of living and fall back in poverty in-between the 
increments. The consequence of not raising  the value of child grants in line with inflation (as 
was the case with the Old Age Pension) is that the real value of the Child Maintenance Grant and 
Foster Care Grant has eroded by 39% between 1996 and 2009 and by 23% between 1999 and 
2009 (Levine et al., 2009). Comparably, the increments for the universal Old Age Pension and 
the Disability Grant were equal to child grants up to 2000 but thereafter increased bi-annually to 
reach N$1000 (US$63) by 2015. The regular increase for the Old Age Pension were, perhaps, 
because most elderly people care for children, especially orphans who lost their parents during 








The low reforms of value of child benefits could be explained by low electoral competition and 
partial change of government. Since independence the war of liberation party, South West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO) has been in power to keep a same one-party rule. Unlike in 
Zimbabwe where Robert Mugabe was president from 1980 to 2017, three SWAPO presidents 
have changed power since independence: Sam Nujoma (1990-2005), Hifikepunye Pohamba 
(2005-2015) and Hage Geingob (since 2015). SWAPO has been winning all the presidential and 
parliamentary elections emphatically with the largest percentage poll in 2015 when Geingob 
polled 87% of the vote. Sam Nujoma was elected as president without elections in 1990, won 
with about 76% 1994 and about 77% in 1999. Pohamba won about 76% in 2004 and 2009 
respectively. Unlike in Zimbabwe where electoral competition between ZANU PF and the 
Movement for Democratic Change formations led to substantial social policy reforms between 
2009 and 2013 (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016) or in Zambia when the Patriotic Front led by 
Michael Sata took over from the Movement for Multiparty Democracy from 2011 (Siachiwena, 
2016), SWAPO has been under no pressure from the political opposition to reform welfare 
policies. 
 When Pohamba came to power child grants were N$200 (US$13) and they almost remained so 
throughout his presidency only to change to N$250 (US$16) in 2013, just before the 2014 
elections and his exit in March 2015. Ivin Lombardt, Executive Director, Namibian Non-
Government Organisation Forum, said while Pohamba was hailed for pushing for increased 
spending on education and housing, he seemed ambivalent about social spending on child social 
protection. Lombardt noted that Pohamba, like his predecessor Sam Nujoma did not favour cash 
transfers.30 Surprisingly it was during his tenure, almost at the end of his second term in office 
between 2010 and 2014, when discussions about the universal child grant started and his 
government was at the point of adopting the grant when elections were held in 2014 and the 
negotiations between cabinet and MGECW supported by UNICEF had to be revamped with the 






The stagnation of grants amount was also partly due to the prioritization of expanding the grants 
coverage over amounts. When the grants were split into different ministries in 2002 i.e. child 
welfare grants placed under the MGECW (then Ministry of Women Affairs) and Old Age 
Pensions and Disability Grant in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, bureaucrats in 
MGECW debated on whether to bid for increasing the number of beneficiaries or benefits and 
settled for enrolling more beneficiaries. Albert Biwa, then Grants Coordinator in the Ministry of 
Health and Child Care, said, ‘The ministry [MGECW] did not really push for increasing the 
benefits. The major drive was in registering beneficiaries rather than increasing the amount of 
the grants since there were few children [9600] benefiting when they took over.’31 Helena 
Andjamba, Director: Child Welfare Services in MGECW concurred: 
Our major concern as a ministry was not to increase the amount of benefits for those 
already receiving the grants. There were many children who needed the grants but 
were excluded. We did not fight for money to increase the amount so much although 
it was part of our proposal. We fought for money to increase the number of children 
benefiting and not the amount. We knew we could not get both. So, we put the 
amount issue aside for the meantime.32 
The near absence of review of the amount was thus, the result a conscious choice to expand 
coverage over generosity although there were concerns over affordability. Biwa indicated that, 
‘From the finance side it was the lack of fiscal space to increase the grants. We had to increase 
but also keep the bill manageable not to fall in the same trap as what happened in Greece 
(expanded benefits but now could not sustain the bill).’33 Affordability was more of a political 
than a fiscal one. More often than not, political elites shift their definition of affordability to suit 
their political ends (Seekings, 2017b). Slater (2011:257) concurs, ‘Affordability is not only about 
cost but also about political choice.’ On the other hand since independence it became SWAPO 
policy to increase grants that they deemed more important in reducing poverty especially the Old 








decision not to increase both child grants and the Old Age Pension at the same time. As a result, 
the government have tried to keep the Old Age Pension to at least US$2/day and have made 
consistent inflationary adjustments. The Old Age Pension increased from N$135 (US$9) in 1990, 
N$1000 (US$63) by 201534 and N$1,100 (US$69) in 2016. 
 
 Ideological underpinnings within SWAPO were important in policy decisions to increase social 
pensions rather than child grants. Although child grants in Namibia target OVCs, in practice they 
were for orphans and provided to ‘single caregivers’ (surviving spouses, a single parent looking 
after children when the husband is saving a jail term or a father (not mother) receiving an Old 
Age Pension). The general belief in Cabinet appears to have been that the elderly were more 
responsible than the ‘single parents’ hence government favoured increasing the Old Age Pension 
than child grants. Biwa stated that the ‘grandmothers are the mothers’ so government prioritized 
them knowing they will share the benefits with their grandchildren.35  
Also, the amount of child grants was maintained at N$200 (US$13) for more than a decade - 
2000 to 2012 – as the SWAPO cabinet decided in 2002 to increase all the other grants (Old Age 
Pension, Disability Grants and Veterans grants) except for child grants on the perception that 
caregivers were abusing child grants. Nahas Angula who was influential in the decision was 
against cash transfers as he believed caregivers receiving ‘child grants were either abusing grants 
through converting them for their own use or had too much cash from child and their own 
grants’. Angula started lobbying the Cabinet to ‘be cautious’ with giving cash transfers during 
his time as Minister of Higher Education from 1995 to 2005, supposed that cash encouraged 
welfare dependency and believed government should only give cash to the most vulnerable 
people such as orphans and the elderly. Prime Minister Angula successfully convinced cabinet to 
limit cash transfers to needy families by only adjusting grants for the elderly.36 The result was an 
increase of Old Age Pension, Disability Grants and Veterans grants from N$200 (US$13) in 









who supported self-help income generating projects or public works said, ‘the government was 
giving too much cash for nothing. It was not necessary to increase child grants and pensions [Old 
Age Pension, Disability Grants and Veterans grants] because they end up in the same household. 
That is why those looking for the children will abuse the grants, they buy alcohol or use the 
money on themselves because they will have a lot of cash’.37 Angula represented political elites 
in Namibia and Africa, as in the United States or other developed countries, who are likely to 
oppose the expansion of social protection programmes to the poor because their own moral 
arguments about welfare dependency. 
It is true that the grants may end up in the same household but only 18% of all children and 22% 
of poor children were in households where there is a person receiving a pension (NSA, 
2012a:16). Also, there is no corroborative evidence to suggest that recipients abused grants. Iben 
Nashandi also believed beneficiaries abuse cash transfers. Nashandi supported the parsimonious 
benefits noting that, ‘children already have free basic education and will have free secondary 
education starting in 2016. They are benefiting from the school feeding programme and fee 
waivers at health facilities’. Research has shown that poor people do not spend cash transfers on 
‘temptation’ goods such as beer, cigarettes and drugs.  Evans and Popova (2016) use 19 studies 
from across the globe, Africa, Latin America and Asia included, to examine poor people cash 
transfer spending on ‘temptation goods’ (cigarettes and alcohol) and conclude that consumption 
of ‘temptation goods’ actual reduces after cash transfers. Evans and Popova argue that the 
reduction is because conditional cash transfers are earmarked for health and education, for 
example, and unconditional cash transfers motivate recipients to redirect cash they would use on 
alcohol to other things. 
In 1991 the Nujoma administration adopted a Home-Grown School Feeding Programme in pre-
primary and primary schools. HGSFP was introduced by the World Food Programme (WFP) in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Education in 1991 and the government took over in 1996 
(ILO, 2014:98; MoE, 2012). HGSFP increased the coverage of child social transfers, increasing 








programme serves a mid-morning meal and supported 35% of all children (330,000 children) in 
2016. Home Grown School Feeding Programme was initially designed to benefit Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (OVCs) in schools in poor communities. In practice, it is extended to all 
children wishing to partake the food in beneficiary schools. The focus on OVCs shows 
SWAPO’s ideological preferences to provide social protection to the indigent. The support for a 
minimalist welfare state within SWAPO was also demonstrated when the Nujoma government 
reintroduced School Development Funds in 2001. Thus, while South Africa’s CWR transformed 
to a pro-poor regime through the CSG in the late 1990s, the CWR in Namibia took a familial 
trajectory at independence and remained so during Nujoma’s presidency.  
 
3.2.2 Social grants reforms under President Hifikepunye Pohamba, 2005-2014 
Reforms during the second phase, 2005 to 2014, under president Pohamba, fall into two parts. 
The first part is between 2005 and 2011 almost corresponding to Pohamba’s first term of 
presidency. Initially, Pohamba, like Nujoma after grants equalisation, did not institute any 
significant reforms but maintained a familial CWR that continued to be minimalist by targeting a 
small category of 'broken' families. Pohamba seemed not different from Nujoma i.e. he was 
conservative (familial) and he continued with School Development Funds. During this part 
SWAPO continued to face a weak opposition, passive Civil Society Organisations and limited 
international pressure. Pohamba was reelected in 2009 with a landslide victory of about 77% of 
the vote (like in his first election in 2004) without literally implementing any child grants 
reforms. His could have drawn his political support from SWAPO’s general support as a 
liberation movement that liberated Namibia from South African rule.  
The second part of this phase is between 2012 to 2015, a period of substantial reforms that 
entailed the introduction of new grants and, most importantly, the shift from primarily family 
targeted to a mix with poverty targeting to create a mixed CWR. The one party (SWAPO) 
dominance persisted during so the pressure to reform did not come from competitive elections 
like in Botswana and Zimbabwe (see Chapters 4 and 5) or organised Civil Society Organisations 
like in South Africa but it was both internal (within government and SWAPO) and external 





During this second part, political elites formed into two categories. The first group comprised 
influential leaders who were ambivalent about cash transfers but supported minimal state 
provision hence they did not abolish but continued the grants without major reforms. Cabinet 
members including the president Pohamba, Angula and Mbumba constitute this group. Nujoma, 
as former president, was said to continue to be very influential in policy-making even in his 
retirement.39 The second category consisted of less influential advocates of reform. This group 
included the minister responsible for child grants and bureaucrats within this ministry especially 
the two directors and the permanent secretary. This group believed in the expansion of Child 
Welfare Grants to fulfill the rights of women and children in line with the ministry's mandate yet 
were cautious in their approach to convince cabinet to endorse their proposals. This category was 
fully aware of the first group of politicians who were likely to resist their proposals hence they 
preferred proposing one reform at a time. During the second part of Pohamba’s presidency Sioka 
and team collaborated with UNICEF at a time SWAPO was seeking reelection in 2014. These 
political dynamics led SWAPO to embrace the civil society and international organisations to 
introduce the Special Maintenance Grant, adopt free education, review grants amounts, adopt the 
poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant and legislate Child Welfare Grants. The result was a mixed 
CWR born out of the continued family-focused and poverty-targeted grants. 
During Pohamba’s first term as president, bureaucrats continued to be cautious with proposing 
‘outrageous’ reforms.40 Bureaucrats and the minister responsible for Child Welfare Grants, 
Sioka, realised the need to increase the grants amounts and expand coverage to other poor 
children and excluded orphans as reported by the World Food Programme funded outreach 
(registration) exercise conducted in 2006/7. Sioka was not convinced that Pohamba would warm 
to her proposals. Instead, the ministry focused ‘on registering more orphans, at least to enrol 
more children than increase the money for a few children’.41  
The first part of Pohamba’s presidency was characterised by failed reforms as his government 








had proposed the abolition School Development Funds to improve access and enrolment as part 
of ‘mitigating the multiple impacts of HIV and AIDS on children’s right to education’ (UNICEF, 
2007:3). The proposal, drafted by Khin-Sandi Lwin, a UNICEF representative who had worked 
in the country for seven years, noted School Development Fund as ‘a major barrier for access 
and retention for both primary and secondary school’ (UNICEF, 2007:1). Cabinet turned down 
the proposal on the basis of affordability and the perceived responsibility of the family to provide 
for children. Although Nangolo Mbumba, Minister of Education (2005-2010), who supported 
work-based programmes to support poor families, made the submissions to Cabinet, he was 
himself against free education. Mbumba was one among Cabinet members who believed that 
parents should contribute to their children’s education,42 suggesting that political elites within 
SWAPO supported a minimalist welfare state. The rejections saw the continued exclusion of 
poor children but sustained familialism that resonated with political elites within SWAPO. 
The second part of Pohamba’s presidency (2012-2015) is characterised by significant reforms 
that transformed the CWR from a familial to a mixed regime. In May 2012 the Pohamba 
administration adopted Special Maintenance Grants paid to caregivers of children under 16 years 
who are diagnosed as temporarily or permanently disabled including children with HIV/AIDS 
and or blind (Levine et al., 2011:44). The grant provided income relief for caregivers of disabled 
children who barely had time to leave them and engage in economic activities such as looking 
for employment or petty buying and selling, activities that require them to be away from home 
and the disabled child(ren). In many cases, the caregivers had other children to provide for yet 
they had very limited income support.43 The government intervened to reduce this burden of 
care.  
Moreover, the increasing number of households headed by disabled children was becoming 
worrisome, at 306 in 2011 from 205 in 2001 and 10 in 1991 (NSA, 2016:51). While Namibia, 
like South Africa, had an adult disability grant for ‘people with temporary or permanent 
disability, including the blind’ to support ‘disability prevention and rehabilitation’ (Chiripanhura 







Civil society, particularly the National Federation of People with Disabilities in Namibia, 
proposed a grant for children with disabilities which government approved.44 Pohamba’s 
openness to civil society shown by his embracing of the National Federation of People with 
Disabilities in Namibia marked the beginning of his willingness to work with Civil Society 
Organisations and other agencies. As shown later, the reforms that changed the CWR from a 
familial to a mixed regime entailed close engagement between these agencies and Pohamba’s 
government. The Special Maintenance Grant’s parsimonious benefits, like all the other child 
grants, amounted to N$250 (US$16) per month per child in 2016 up from N$200 (US$13) in 
2012. In Namibia, only a third of people living with disabilities receive disability grants (NSA, 
2016:7). The Special Maintenance Grant benefitted 4972 children in 2015 from 4018 in 2012. 
 
After adopting the Special Maintenance Grant, Pohamba continued to be a reformist who became 
sensitive to children’s rights to education, leading his government to abolish School 
Development Funds to adopt free primary education in 2012/3 (MoE, 2011). Pohamba had 
continued with School Development Funds during his first term of presidency. A total of 
458,933 children (48% of all children)45 benefited from the new policy. The provision of free 
primary education fulfilled the constitutional provisions of free and compulsory primary 
education (Iipinge & Likando, 2013:137). 
Three factors were significant in cabinet decision to implement the free primary education 
policy. UNICEF had proposed the removal of School Development Funds in 2007 to help 
achieve Millenium Development Goal two (UNICEF, 2007). The education minister then, 
Nangolo Mbumba, and Prime Minister Angula, both known advocates of poverty reduction 
through employment creation, were against free education hence the UNICEF proposal was 
rejected.46 But Abraham Iyambo’s, Minister of Education, Arts and Culture (2010-2013), 
dedication to education reforms in Namibia was influential. As Minister of Education, Iyambo, 









and the Chairperson of his Party ‘Think Tank’47 had urged the SWAPO cabinet to respect the 
constitution through adoption of free education. Iyambo’s personal interest in free education 
earned him the nickname ‘Doctor Book’ (one who loves education) by his Deputy Minister, 
David Namwandi.48  Mourning his untimely death in February 2013, Namibia Non-
Governmental Organizations Forum’s chairperson, Henry Platt, remembered Iyambo as ‘one of 
our strongest and most dedicated allies in the pursuit of free and accessible quality education for 
all’ (New Era, 5 February 2013).49  Because of his interest in free education, Iyambo supported 
UNICEF proposal and presented it to cabinet.50  
Although the government had rejected UNICEF proposals to abolish School Development Funds 
in 2007, pressure to introduce free education from United Nations agencies was central in 
cabinet decision in 2012.  In 2011 the Ministry of Education (with Iyambo as minister) in 
partnership with UNICEF and UNESCO commissioned two studies to analyze the gaps in 
quality and equity in education and document the context of free primary education in Namibia. 
The first study found that ‘the inequitable distribution of wealth and income mirrors inequalities 
in education with the poorest children the most disadvantaged’ (UNICEF, 2011:2). The second 
study concurred but also concluded that School Development Funds contribution by parents did 
not only perpetuate educational inequalities but were inconsistent with the constitution hence 
recommended the removal of School Development Funds (Ministry of Education, 2011:16). The 
Legal Assistance Centre, a Civil Society Organisation at the University of Namibia, had also 
argued that School Development Funds were unconstitutional and government should consider 
abolishing them (Hubbard, 2011). The findings became the talking points during discussions for 
free primary education at the National Education Conference in 2011. The conference 













the study findings and conference deliberations, cabinet was convinced that elimination of 
School Development Funds was necessary and approved the recommendations in 2012 and 
Namibia had free primary education from January 2013. Benson Katjirijova, Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance Youth League Secretary-General and shadow Minister of Education indicated 
that UNICEF was the force behind the adoption of free education.51 The cabinet decision reflects 
both the role of individuals and United Nations agencies in social policy reforms. Finally, Elma 
Dienda, a Member of Parliament and Secretary General, Democratic Turnhalle Alliance political 
party, pointed out that SWAPO had already started preparing for the 2014 elections so these 
reforms, including the later introduction of the Vulnerable Grant in 2014, ‘were part of the 
campaign strategy.’52	 
SWAPO proved to be a programmatic party when the Pohamba administration surprisingly 
instituted the first upward review of child grants amounts in a decade in 2013. Child grants 
amounts were adjusted to N$250 (US$16) in 2013 from N$200 (US$13) in 2000, consequently 
increasing the value of the grant but below the absolute poverty line of N$283.47 (US$18). 
Levine et al. (2009:154) reported that ‘the real value of the Child Maintenance Grant and Foster 
Care Grant has eroded by 39% between 1996 and 2009 and by 23% between 1999 and 2009.’ 
MGECW, supported by UNICEF, had recommended the upward review of all child grants to 
N$300 (US$19)  in 2010 following a UNICEF funded grants assessment study that revealed their 
ineffectiveness in poverty reduction (MGECW, 2010). Child grants, as reported in this 
assessment, were last adjusted in 2000, were orphan-oriented and should be expanded to all the 
excluded category of vulnerable children other than orphans to improve grant effectiveness. In 
2013 a cabinet decision was made to increase all the grants to N$250 (US$16) but the first 
payments were to be made in the 2014, starting August 2014.53  
Two factors were imperative in the successful upward review of grants amounts. First, Angula 
who had ‘blocked’ the reviews had left the influential position of Prime Minister in 2012 and had 








Moreover, Hage Geingob who replaced him as Prime Minister was not ambivalent about cash 
transfers as Angula. The Minister of MGECW, Sioka relaunched the review proposals in 2013, 
‘was successfully supported by Geingob’ and the amounts were adjusted upwards. Second, the 
review reflects partisanship. ‘The adjustments were timely for SWAPO as the amounts were paid 
in 2014 just before the elections.’54 
A major reform that resulted in the creation of a mixed CWR was the adoption of the Vulnerable 
Grant before the 2014 elections. Earlier in 2010/11 UNICEF, in collaboration with the MGECW, 
commissioned a grants effectiveness study that recommended ‘a means tested grant for all poor 
and vulnerable children’ (MGECW, 2010:52). The Pohamba administration rejected the 
recommendations to continue with low coverage and ungenerous benefits targeted at ‘broken’ 
families. The proposed grant would increase coverage of vulnerable children as it would benefit 
all poor children in kinship care who at the time were eligible for the Foster Care Grant that 
restricted enrolment as it required court order placements. The study concluded that the current 
Foster Care Grant and Child Maintenance Grant schemes excluded a large number of vulnerable 
children under the care of impoverished parents. About 95% of Foster Care Grant applicants 
were extended family members ineligible for the Child Maintenance Grant (NPC, 2012). The 
proposal resonated with the MGECW’s focus to increase the coverage of the two main child 
welfare grants- the Foster Care Grant and Child Maintenance Grant (MGECW, 2010:153). 
Having closely worked with the Doreen Sioka, MGECW minister, Petra Hoelscher,	 former 
UNICEF Namibia Social Policy Specialist, said:  
The minister favoured universal over means tested child welfare grants because of 
the large number of vulnerable children beyond those falling under the very 
narrow definition of poverty, the ease of administration and time freed up for 
social workers to provide family support, the greater accessibility for the most 








Minister Sioka submitted the proposal to Cabinet in 2011 and it was disapproved on affordability 
grounds. Angula said, ‘We [government] did not have the money to start such a big programme 
for all children. Where will the money come from?’ Affordability was not the only reason for the 
rejection. Ideologically, political elites within SWAPO believed that social cash transfers should 
only be orphan-focused and parents should work for the welfare of their children. Angula said, 
‘Primarily we should be giving the grants to orphans only and that is what we are doing, but 
those children whose parents are still there should take responsibility. We will do our best to 
support the parents. Those parents failing to take care of their children can get licenses for 
fishing and we have grants for that.’56  
Although the UNICEF recommendations for a means tested child grant were not implemented, 
the study, as we shall see, kept the proposals for a poverty grant on the reform agenda until the 
introduction of the Vulnerable Grant in 2014. Hoelscher said, ‘The 2010 UNICEF/MGCEW 
study started to raise awareness on child poverty in Namibia and the potential of using child 
welfare grants as a mechanism to reduce child poverty and improve children’s well-being, 
including their nutrition, health and education’.57 Despite the rejection, the government 
acknowledged in the Namibia National Development Plan Four (2012/3 to 2016/7), that 
‘poverty-stricken children that are not classified as orphans are not covered by current social 
grant schemes.’ The government planned to ‘Expand the social protection system to cover 
children in all poor households’ (NPC, 2012:18) through introducing a poverty-targeted Kinship 
Grant (NPC, 2012:67). The Plan outlined two possible child grant reform options: a universal 
child grant (Kinship Grant) for every child in Namibia or a means tested child grant with a more 
generous means test set at the same level as the war veteran subventions which would cover 
some 80% of all children.  
 
When the UNICEF proposal was rejected, in 2013 the ILO advocated for a universal child grant 
which the government also rejected. Following a heightened Basic Income Grant Coalition 
(supported by UNDP) push for a Basic Income Grant that would have paid all citizens a monthly 







the existing universal State Old Age Pension (Haarmann & Haarmann, 2007:4), the Parliament 
of Namibia in 2013 requested for a review of social protection programmes in the country to 
determine social protection priorities.58 The ILO and UNICEF, in collaboration with Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare, contracted Oxford Policy Management Limited international 
consultants (supported by national consultants Haimbodi Ya Nambinga and Immaculate 
Mogotsi) who were more likely to maintain international agencies’ social protection reform 
agenda on national dialogue to establish a comprehensive national social protection floor 
including a universal child grant. 
The assessment revealed coverage and benefit gaps as well as less impact on household welfare. 
ILO reported corroborative evidence with UNICEF studies that although the country had put in 
place child grants, the current system did not provide for general support for poor households 
and children’ (ILO, 2014:137). Moreover, the benefits were inadequate to keep children out of 
poverty and address multi-dimensional poverty.  Existing child grants reduced child poverty by 
1.4% only (NSA, 2012a). In view of these gaps the ILO proposed a universal Child Grant that 
would provide ‘basic income support’ for all children from 2015.  The universal child grant 
would reduce child poverty from 34% to 9% and income inequality (Gini coefficient) from 0.60 
to 0.52.  The Child Grant proposal was among other social protection reforms including a 
universal Old Age Pension, Maternity Grant, Disability Grant, Attendant Allowance, 
Employment Safety Net Programme together at a cost of 3.2% of GDP (ILO, 2014:141). The 
universal child grants would be gradually introduced to children 0-17 years and replaces the 
child and special maintenance grants in phases. It would provide a monthly transfer of N$250 
(US$16) similar to the current amounts and was anticipated to cover ‘about 70% of all 
households’ countrywide and reach more than ‘70% of all social assistance beneficiaries at full 
scale’ (ILO, 2014:143). 
The ILO proposal was rejected on more of political than economic considerations by the 
SWAPO-led government. First, despite the Namibian tax-benefit microsimulation model 
evidence that Namibia could afford a universal child grant (Wright et al., 2014), the Ministry of 






Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Welfare (2015-), Deputy Permanent Secretary in 
Ministry of Finance, 2012 to 2015, said that a universal child grant was not sustainable because 
‘we [Namibia] have few resources to spread over many children including those who do not need 
them’. Nashandi maintained that expanding the child grants was beyond ‘what the economy can 
support.’ 59 Angula supported the affordability narrative, ‘It’s not affordable to give social grants 
to all children. Means testing should stay.’60 
 
Second, UNICEF advocacy was strongly weakened by the departure of its influential 
representative, Hoelscher, who had championed the child grant reform agenda. The lobbying and 
advocacy for child welfare grants reforms intensified during her time from 2010 as UNICEF 
Social Policy Specialist but slowed when she was redeployed in 2013. Andjamba stated that 
Hoelscher’s redeployment affected the universal child grant negotiations as she had established 
personal relations with the ministers and ‘we [MGECW] spoke to the Cabinet through her since 
she knew we supported a universal grant. Since she left UNICEF’s influential power had 
decreased and we are also affected.’61   
 
Despite the rejection, the ILO and UNICEF proposals kept the poverty-targeted child grant on 
the reform agenda but the outgoing Pohamba administration seemed supportive to the proposal 
to introduce a universal child grant. Pohamba’s Cabinet had already instructed UNICEF and 
MGECW to explore funding options for the implementation of a universal child grant. UNICEF 
funded a study that assessed the funding options and recommended that Namibia would fund the 
universal grant through taxes and levies from financial transactions, electronic funds transfers, 
national revenue turnover, financial sector and solidarity tax (Mwinga, 2014).  
 
In the midst of these negotiations and instead of adopting the ILO proposed universal child grant, 
Pohamba introduced a mean-tested Vulnerable Grant similar to the UNICEF proposed poverty 








MGECW were crucial in the introduction of the Vulnerable Grant. The Vulnerable Grant rapidly 
expanded the Child Welfare Grant total coverage, almost doubling to 25% in 2016 from 15% in 
2013. To be eligible for the grant, both parents must be surviving but their income should fall 
below a set income threshold, set at a total monthly household income of less than N$1000 
(US$63).  
 
Two events occasioned the introduction of the grant. A UNICEF-arranged study tour was crucial 
in lobbying for political support for the programme. Granvik (2015:3) asserts that among other 
‘weapons’, ‘international agencies (such as UNICEF, the ILO and World Bank) and donor 
organizations (such as the British Department for International Development) persuade national 
policy-makers through ‘fly[ing] politicians and officials to international workshops and arrange 
study tours to other countries to learn from their experiences’. In Namibia, international donors 
and agencies pushed the government through the MGECW. In 2013 UNICEF organized a 
learning visit to South Africa, led by MGECW Permanent Secretary and included government 
representatives from the MGECW, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
and National Statistics Agency to learn about planning, administration and monitoring of social 
grants and South Africa’s targeting decisions. The visit was important in prompting the policy-
makers to critically review how they could address child poverty through the child grant system. 
Based on their knowledge of South Africa’s experience, the government decided to introduce the 
Vulnerable Grant along the lines of South Africa’s CSG as a preferred child poverty reduction 
option to the universal Basic Income Grant. A decision was also made to keep all the other 
‘complementary’ grants (Child Maintenance Grant, Foster Care Grant and Special Maintenance 
Grant) to benefit children requiring special care (orphans, children living with disability).62  
 
The adoption of the Vulnerable Grant can be viewed as a rare successful story of policy transfer 
in Southern Africa, at least for child grants. ‘Countries strategically respond to policies adopted 
by other countries, emulate policies that turned out successful abroad or react to external 
pressure to adopt a particular policy’ (Obinger et al., 2013: 112). South Africa has led Southern 






footsteps. Even the introduction of Lesotho Child Grant programme in 2010 is not a case of 
policy diffusion as the programme was initially donor driven and later embraced by the political 
elite (Granvik, 2015).  
 
Elections also played an important role. The poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant could have been 
used by the ruling SWAPO party for patronage purposes considering that it was announced at a 
political rally in 2013 by the SWAPO presidential candidate Geingob63 and introduced in 2014, 
an election year. This was clientelistic (Stokes et al., 2013) as the grant was a political tool to 
secure political support, especially from poor urban voters.  
 
On the other hand, at the time of introducing the grant the SWAPO administration was under 
pressure from civil society, Non-Governmental Organisations and international donors to 
introduce both a Basic Income Grant and a universal child grant as the flagship poverty reduction 
schemes. Although there were concerns regarding the form of child grant the government could 
adopt, the Vulnerable Grant was favoured grant than the Basic Income Grant among the SWAPO 
leadership64 hence introducing the Vulnerable Grant was a ‘scape goat’ from this pressure as 
well as a way to gain political support from the large numbers of the rural and urban poor and 
unemployed parents who were not receiving any of the existing grants.65 In Botswana, the 
Botswana Democratic Party under President Ian Khama reformed the Destitute Persons 
programme to include previously excluded vulnerable children in the period leading to the 2014 
elections (see Chapter 4). Similarly, the age-reforms of the CSG in South Africa particularly in 
2009 were partly influenced by the ANC’s strategy to avoid introducing a Basic Income Grant 
(see Chapter 2). 
3.2.3 Social grants reforms under President Hage Geingob, since 2014 
The third and final phase is end of 2014 to 2017 during the Geingob presidency. In November 








winning overwhelmingly with 87% of the vote but he has not implemented reforms of his own. 
Instead, he completed universalising free education, a project that started under Pohamba. 
Without major reforms, Geingob has maintained the mixed CWR. 
In the 2014 elections SWAPO did not only face a fragmented opposition but the perceived 
reformist credentials of SWAPO's presidential candidate, Geingob, could have secured SWAPO 
a large support of the electorate. Geingob seemed in support of the Basic Income Grant 
Coalition's proposal for a Basic Income Grant in Namibia during his time as Vice President and 
the electorate was very expectant that it will be easy for him to introduce the grant as the 
president. It appears Geingob almost was determined to fulfill this expectation when he formed a 
new ministry dedicated to poverty reduction and appointed the former chair of the Basic Income 
Grant Coalition, Bishop Kameeta, as the minister.  Unfortunately, the Basic Income Grant idea, 
hence the voters’ expectations, has not materialised. Therefore, in the 2014 elections voters could 
have rewarded SWAPO by voting for Geingob overwhelmingly anticipating that he will also 
meet their social protection interests. The result is the continuation of a one-party dominance 
system and an enduring mixed CWR that is more familial than poverty-targeted. 
In January 2016, the Geingob-led government abolished the (School Development Funds for all 
secondary school children in public schools. Free secondary education benefits 182 94566 
children (19% of all children) at a cost of N$50million (US$31,498,150) for the 2016/7 academic 
year (New Era, 10 November 2015).67 As discussed, Namibia introduced free primary education 
in 2012/3. In 2016, free education reached 641,878 children (67% of all children).  
Free secondary education was a fulfilment of the election promises made by SWAPO in 2014. 
The 2014 election manifesto stated that ‘In 2013, the SWAPO Party Government abolished the 
requirement for parents and guardians to pay for school development funds. The same 









year.’68 The Namibian newspaper, 24 March 2014, reported that the announcement was made by 
then President, Hifikepunye Pohamba, in the run-up to the 2014 elections. Addressing a SWAPO 
star rally for 2014 elections in Katima Mulilo, Mbumba,	SWAPO Party Secretary General, had 
already indicated that ‘we have introduced free primary education and we have even extended 
that to secondary level’ (New Era, 13 October 2014).69 Hence, although free education for 
secondary schools was finally introduced under Geingob’s presidency, it was Pohamba’s legacy 
as pre-primary and primary fee waivers were introduced and preparations for the adoption of free 
secondary education started during his presidency.  
Overall, the enduring minimalist welfare regime in Namibia has transformed from primarily 
targeting ‘broken’ families (familial) under President Nujoma to include poverty targeting and 
create a mixed CWR under President Pohamba. President Geingob has maintained the mixed 
regime. Until such a time when the Vulnerable Grant is significantly reformed to remove the 
urban bias to resemble the CSG in South Africa, the CWR in Namibia remains mixed despite 
being a variant of the South Africa system. 
3.3 Explaining the distinctive characteristics of Namibia’s child welfare regime 
The distinctiveness of Namibia’s mixed CWR (the result of the evolution discussed in section 
3.2) is a result of structural, ideological and political factors. The increasing number of orphans 
and other vulnerable children (OVCs), mostly due to HIV/AIDS, and increasing household 
poverty caused by drought and high unemployment resulted in a change of targeting form (from 
‘broken’ families to poverty-targeted) and modest expansion of coverage of social cash transfers 
for families with children. SWAPO’s conservative ideology, its focus on the indigent and 
preferences for poverty reduction through employment (in farms and formal employment) 
support a mixed CWR with low coverage and ungenerous. Politically, the electoral dominance of 
SWAPO, coupled with a weak opposition and civil society enabled the SWAPO governments to 
reject proposals for universal cash transfers. Despite the failure to convince government to adopt 







consider the primacy of poverty rather than household composition in designing child poverty 
reduction strategies. International agencies, particularly UNICEF and the ILO were important in 
advocating for the provision of child grants as entitlements. This resulted in legislated provision, 
the introduction of a near- universal poverty-targeted child grant and universal free primary and 
secondary education that led to increased but still low benefits and coverage. 
3.3.1 'Structural' factors 
 
The increasing number of OVCs, instigated by structural factors like the environment, 
unemployment and demographic changes, contributed to a shift from orphan to poverty-targeted 
direct income support for families with children. AIDS, surprisingly, was not an important factor 
despite its effects on household structure. Unlike in Botswana where AIDS necessitated the 
reforms of the familial CWR, AIDS had limited influence on the reforms of the mixed CWR in 
Namibia. Other structural factors were important.  
Unemployment urged the government to reform child grants through the introduction of a 
poverty-targeted vulnerable child grant as opposed to other child grants targeting ‘broken’ 
families only. The Vulnerable Grant changed the targeting form, increased coverage and value of 
income support for families with children. Unemployment increased the number of vulnerable 
children who were not covered by the existing child grants and at the same time their parents 
lacked the economic means to provide for them. High unemployment has been of major concern 
in Namibia and has left many families with children vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity. 
President Pohamba singled out ‘the lack of employment opportunities available in the country’ 
as the biggest challenge caused by ‘inadequate and volatile economic growth’ Namibia has 
experienced as of 2012 (NPC, 2012: vii).  Although unemployment has generally decreased over 











Figure 3.3: National unemployment rate, 2004-2014 
 
 
Source: Namibia National Statistics Agency 
Nationally, highest unemployment was 51% in 2008, reduced to 37% in 2011 and 28% in 2014 
(NSA, 2014b; World Bank, 2016). The drop in 2010 was likely caused by the end Targeted 
Intervention Programme for Employment and Economic Growth employment programmes that 
provided employment especially to youth and retrenchments due to closure of industries (ILO, 
2010). Unemployment among youth remains the highest at about 40%. Moreover, as a primary 
sector economy, the 2008/9 global economic crisis affected the export industry of Namibia. The 
crisis contributed to the waning demand for Namibia’s products leading to closure of industries 
and job losses through retrenchment (ILO, 2010:7).  
In terms of environmental factors, drought induced vulnerability triggered the government to 
expand the welfare state through introduction of temporary public works programmes and school 
feeding programmes. Namibia is located between the Namib and Kalahari deserts and most parts 
of the country constitute some of the most arid landscapes south of the Sahara. As a result, the 
country receives the least rainfall in sub-Saharan Africa (MoHSS & ICF, 2014:1). At the same 
time, ‘seventy percent of the population in Namibia relies on agriculture for their livelihoods but 




















rural areas have been left without employment’ (World Bank, 2016). Over 90% of Namibia is 
arid/desert or drought-prone (Subbarao, 1998:7; Chiripanhura and Niño-Zarazúa, 2013) and the 
government has initiated food/cash for work programmes in response. President Pohamba 
declared the 2012/3 agricultural season an emergency due to drought that reduced crop 
production by 48% and as part of food security the state sought to strengthen and expand ‘safety 
net programmes such as the school feeding programme, food-for-work and cash-for-work 
programmes’. In other countries in Southern Africa and other regions, the recurrent problem of 
drought-driven food insecurity urged countries to develop and expand social welfare policies that 
indirectly benefit children.  
The 2012/3 drought was instrumental in government’s decision to introduce the Vulnerable 
Grant for children from poor families. Helena Andjamba said, ‘Many children especially with 
both parents unemployed were left exposed by the drought as many parents could not afford a 
meal or pay school fees for their children in secondary school.’ The failure of poor parents (both 
husband and wife living with their children) to provide for their families in cases of drought and 
floods as was experienced in 2011 became ministers Doreen Sioka and later Rosalia 
Nghidinwa’s rallying point in arguing for a grant that covers poor children regardless of the 
survival status of their parents.70 
3.3.2 Ideological factors  
 
The earlier adoption of a familial and later shift to poverty targeting to form a mixed CWR with 
low coverage and ungenerous benefits reflect SWAPO party’s conservative ideology, individual 
beliefs and influence among politicians and bureaucrats within SWAPO and government. 
SWAPO leadership believes poor but able-bodied people should work for their upkeep and 
social assistance should target those who cannot work such as the elderly and children hence 
child welfare grants have remained targeted (not universal) with low benefits and coverage. Most 
of the influential political leaders in SWAPO, Nujoma, Pohamba, Geingob and Angula, hail 
from northern Namibia known for its agricultural economy and they all were involved in 






work for their income security through employment- formal or self-employment in the form of 
farming or income generating activities. Nujoma himself comes from the North and worked for 
his well-being in the farms (Nujoma, 2001) and assumes the poor should follow the same 
approach to social protection. To promote work-based welfare, the MGECW has a poverty 
reduction programme that provides funds for women and men to embark on Income Generating 
Activities in order to promote self-employment among the urban and rural poor communities. 
The funding opportunities ideologically encourage families to participate in their own economic 
development rather than rely on government child grants. Child grants are, therefore, regarded as 
an incentive for economic emancipation especially for unemployed caregivers.   
 
Pohamba shared Nujoma’s ideology having grown up in the north where people used to make 
life through farming in the fields and argues that people (other than children, the elderly and 
disabled who cannot work) should not receive cash for doing nothing but should look for 
employment and if they do not get it they should work in the fields. Yet the SWAPO leadership 
is detached from the reality that the government is performing poorly in employment creation, 
the land is no longer productive, people lack farming inputs and most rural areas are constantly 
hit by drought.71 The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in Namibia reported that 64% of 
extremely poor households owned land (CBS, 2006:91) and households that report ‘subsistence 
farming’ as their main source of income reduced from 35% in 1993/4 to 23% in 2009/10 
(CBS,1996; NSA, 2012).  
Targeted programmes with low coverage and benefits are partly explained by Nujoma’s beliefs 
which became SWAPO’s ideology and are fostered on succeeding presidents and other important 
policy makers in government. France Kaudinge, SWAPO Director of Administration, pointed 
that SWAPO believes ‘the less fortunate should not be condemned and excluded from benefiting 
from Namibia’s resources since they are all Namibians. The focus on those who cannot support 
themselves especially the disabled, the elderly and children has been informed by this view, our 
party view which becomes government policy.72 As espoused in its 2009 election manifesto, 







of vulnerable groups of our society, especially orphans and vulnerable children, senior citizens, 
war veterans and people with disability’.73 The 2014 election manifesto promised ‘ continued 
support to the vulnerable groups within the society through the improvement of safety nets and 
other social support services.’74 Tom Alweendo, Director General of Namibia National Planning 
Commission showed his support for targeted than universal programmes when he said ‘poverty 
is a multidimensional phenomenon and … can be addressed through … targeted programmes 
and projects according to peculiarities of particular area of interest’ (GRN, 2012:7).  
Individual philosophies (presidents, ministers and representatives of United Nations agencies) 
played significant roles in Child Welfare Grants (failed)reforms. Most of the reforms occurred 
during Pohamba’s presidency (2005-2015). Other than his reluctance to review the amount of 
child grants for fear of abuse by caregivers,75 Pohamba was more supportive of the expansion of 
Child Welfare Grants. Sam Nujoma had equalized the grants amounts across races but only 
focused on orphans and excluding other vulnerable children. Nujoma did not make an attempt to 
provide general income support for poor families with children. Nujoma adopted a pauperist 
approach (see Seekings, 2008 for details of this approach) to social provision as he believed that 
social protection should only target the indigent hence he was anti universal benefits.76 
Accordingly, Nujoma was the first president to reject the Basic Income Grant and review child 
grants amounts only three times in his 15 years presidency. 
Pohamba was different as he was more open to reform the CWR. For his part, Pohamba 
introduced a disability grant for children less than 16 years, free primary education and made 
preparations for the adoption of free secondary education, adopted a poverty-targeted Vulnerable 
Grant and legalized the administration of child grants through the Children’s Act. When he left 
presidency in 2015 his government was at the verge of adopting a universal child grant which 










Ministers of MGECW, Sioka, and Rosalia Nghidinwa (2012-2015). The reforms resulted in 
poverty than orphan targeted grants, expanded coverage and a regime guided through a legal 
framework. Pohamba became conformist when he reintroduced school development funds in 
2006, first rejected proposals to fee waivers in 2007 but later yielded to pressure to abolish 
primary school fees from his minister of education, Nickey Iyambo, in 2013, rejected proposals 
for a universal Kinship Grant in 2012 and a universal Child Grant in 2013. The result was a 
CWR that maintained a benefit gap (low value relative to the poverty line) as Pohamba did little 
to change the value of the grants. 
Rejections of universal programmes, particularly the child grant and Basic Income Grant, and 
irregular review of child grants amounts which led to low coverage and benefits, are also 
attributed to the continued influence of Nujoma on policy-making despite that he left 
government as president in 2005 and left active politics as SWAPO president in 2007. Nujoma 
who was honoured by Namibian parliament and his party as ‘Leader of the Namibian 
Revolution’, ‘Founding Father of the Namibian Nation’ and ‘National Chairman of SWAPO’ is 
still influential in policy decisions as he attends meetings of two governing bodies of SWAPO - 
the Central Committee and Politburo – and sits in SWAPO Party Elders Committee. Nujoma still 
plays the important advisory role both to SWAPO party and presidents.77  
The continued parsimonious benefits and coverage are partly due to SWAPO’s ideology. 
SWAPO ‘could be considered as a party with trends towards neo-liberalism and social 
democracy with some diehards supporting democratic socialism and Marxism’ (Toetemeyer, 
2007:3). Yet its approach to social protection show high degrees of conservatism. The 
conservative SWAPO governments rejected proposals for a universal child grants. Political elites 
are ambivalent about providing social cash transfers ‘to too many children’. The same 
conservatism applies to the general welfare regime in Namibia where SWAPO governments 
have also rejected proposals to adopt a universal Basic Income Grant. The Basic Income Grant 
was part of the proposals of the Namibian Tax Consortium in 2002 to achieve equitable 
distribution of resources. Basic Income Grants were to be paid to all Namibian citizens at a 






which point citizens become eligible for the existing universal State Old Age Pension of N$370 
(about US$53). Despite efforts by the Basic Income Grant Coalition78 to convince the 
government to adopt Basic Income Grant, the SWAPO administration under Nujoma, Pohamba 
and now Geingob rejected the proposals, maintaining the inequality the programme sought to 
address. Angula’s preference for employment creation, worry about dependency and skepticism 
about ‘handouts’ are reflected in his beliefs: ‘I would rather have the Basic Income Grant money 
used in skills development to empower people not to be dependent on government. I want people 
to be empowered not just to be given. I believe in the Chinese saying that give somebody a rod 
not fish.’79 As a result of the rejection of the Basic Income Grant and a universal child grant but 
with the introduction of the Vulnerable Grant, Namibia’s CWR continue to differ with the 
country’s general welfare regime that does not provide general support to poor people.  
3.3.3 Political factors 
Individuals within government, combined with intra-party politics, were important in the reforms 
of the mixed CWR. The 'stagnation' in reforms between 1994 and 2012 broadly reflect SWAPO's 
conservative ideology prioritising the preservation of 'broken' families but primarily 
show Angula' s influence before and as Prime Minister. Angula was a very influential individual 
within SWAPO having saved as minister in different portifolios since independence in 1990. 
Angula, like many political elites within SWAPO, was anti-cash transfers arguing that they are 
‘handouts’ causing ‘dependence.’  
Angula has always harbered presidential ambitions since the 2004 congress and he used his 
influential position on social policy, rejecting proposals for reforms. Angula's lost the fight for 
SWAPO presidency to Pohamba in 2004. In office Pohamba replaced Angula by Geingob but 













Pohamba anointed Geingob his predecessor when he appointed him deputy in 2012, forcing 
Angula to resign from active politics. 
Geingob was different from Angula. It is unclear why Geingob finally landed the presidency 
ahead of Angula but it is likely that Pohamba and Angula did not agree much in terms of social 
and other party policies. As discussed, Pohamba was pro-reforms in contrast with the 
conservative Angula. Geingob’s influence on social policy as Prime Minister is also unclear but 
most of the reforms happened during his time as Prime Minister into his presidency - from 2012 
when he became Prime Minister to 2014/15 when he became President - suggesting that he was a 
reformist like his anointer but in contrast with Angula. The change of prime minister in Namibia 
was important in similar ways the change of presidents in South Africa affected reforms when a 
populist Zuma succeeded Mbeki. 
Lack of political competition between SWAPO and other political parties to reform social policy 
has resulted in low coverage and parsimonious cash benefits but international pressure led to a 
shift from orphan to poverty-targeted and a CWR guided by legislation. Since independence 
Namibia has remained a ‘dominant party state’ (Toetemeyer, 2007). SWAPO has been 
comfortably winning both presidential and national assembly elections since independence in 
1990 (see figure 3.4) giving it the political power to control political policy and decision-making 
process in Namibia. SWAPO’s electoral dominance has become ‘a near-permanent feature of the 






Figure 3.4: SWAPO share of vote, 1994-2014 
 
Source: Electoral Commission of Namibia *The share of vote for other parties was not included because 
there are many opposition parties sharing the outstanding vote after SWAPO. 
 
SWAPO is opposed by ‘some small, mostly ethnic based political parties’	 that are weak hence 
‘there is no political counterweight of any relevance’ (Toetemeyer, 2007:2). SWAPO, whose 
political support thrives on ethnic voting particularly by the Oshiwambo-speaking tribe (Du 
Pisani, 2013:133), owes its dominance to ‘lack of challenge than to its own strength’ (Diescho, 
1996:15). Du Pisani (2013) further argues that SWAPO’s dominance of electoral politics is the 
absence of ‘any credible prospective challengers in sight’. But with regard to child social 
protection, SWAPO made programmatic efforts through adopting social transfers for all 
caregivers with school going age (free primary and secondary education and the Vulnerable 
Grant) and unemployed or employed but poor parents who were struggling to provide for their 
children. These programmes typified SWAPO’s programmatic child social protection. SWAPO’s 
programmatic cash transfers for families with children resonated with the new constituency of 
unemployed caregivers. The urban-biased Vulnerable Grant appears to have appealed to the 
unemployed and the working urban poor and might have increased SWAPO’s urban political 



























amounts of public money on targeted social investment programmes’ has won the Party support. 
Du Pisani argues the introduction of a N$19 billion (US$11,969,297,110) Targeted Intervention 
Programme for Employment and Economic Growth (TIPEEG) job creation project that appealed 
to unemployed Namibians given the 50% unemployment rate as one such programmes. It has 
become common for incumbents to gain political support by introducing cash transfer 
programmes that meet the needs of their constituencies. President Ian Khama and his Botswana 
Democratic Party were partly voted back into power in 2014 as their constituencies rewarded 
Khama’s programmatic efforts to redress high unemployment by rebranding the public works 
programme, Ipelegeng (Hamer, 2016a). Bolsa Familia contributed to the incumbency of 
President Lula in Brazil’s 2006 elections (Zucco, 2008). Progressa beneficiaries were more likely 
to vote for the incumbent in Mexico (De la O (2013). Consequently, cash transfers ‘enable ruling 
parties to build the political support critical in order to secure incumbency’ (Sandberg & Tally, 
2015:505). Since SWAPO implemented programmes that were more likely to generate political 
support from the working poor and unemployed, both in urban and rural areas, its dominancy 
and the expansion of cash transfers for children through such programmes are explained by 
‘programmatic mobilization’, where programmes foster the ‘incumbency effect’ (as in the case 
of Mexico’s Presidential elections in 2000) than clientelism (De la O, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the weak opposition (due to leader competition and ethnic differences) has not 
been sufficiently strong to push SWAPO to expand the existing grants, review the benefits 
regularly and introduce universal child grants that would widen the coverage. Comparatively, 
although the opposition in Botswana is fairly strong and has challenged the Botswana 
Democratic Party to reform social policy, in both countries the opposition has failed to push the 
ruling parties to widely expand cash transfers. A weak opposition combines with a weak civil 
society. Despite the establishment of Namibian Non-Governmental Organisation Forum, the 
umbrella board for civil society in Namibia in 2007, civil society advocacy efforts are not well 
coordinated. Ivin Lombardt, Namibian Non-Governmental Organisation Forum Director, 
Mahongora Kavihuha, Secretary-General, Trade Unions Congress of Namibia and John 







for social dialogue by the ruling SWAPO but agreed that due to civil society fragmentation, none 
of their organizations had advocated for the reform of child grants. A weak civil society means 
the SWAPO government lacks the necessary pressure from such organizations (as in South 
Africa) to implement social policy reforms hence child grants benefits and coverage have 
remained low and not universal.  
International pressure to reform child grants from donor and United Nations agencies urged the 
government to shift from orphan to poverty-targeted grants. Hoelscher, UNICEF Social Policy 
Specialist, working closely with a supportive minister, Sioka, Mbombo (Acting Permanent 
Secretary) and bureaucrats such as Andjamba (Director: Child Welfare Services) successfully 
advocated for the inclusion of cash grants on the agenda. From 2007 UNICEF started to fund 
studies to urge the government to expand the child social protection system through reforming 
the child grants (UNICEF, 2007; MGECW, 2010; NSA, 2012b; Mwinga, 2014; Wright et al., 
2014; GRN, 2015a & b). Up-to-date evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, on the current 
situation of children in poverty and the role of the social protection system has led to broad-
based support for an expansion of child welfare grants. The National Development Plan Four, for 
example, outlined two possible child grant reform options: a universal child grant (Kinship 
Grant) for every child in Namibia or a means tested child grant with a more generous means test 
set at the same level as the war veteran subventions which would cover some 80% of all 
children. UNICEF created a strong evidence base and advocacy for the expansion of child 
welfare grants to all poor and vulnerable children particularly between 2010 and 2014. Technical 
support to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare (MGECW) and the National 
Planning Commission on a qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of the current social 
protection system in addressing child poverty in Namibia created ownership of the child poverty 
agenda in the two key ministries involved in poverty reduction (MGECW, 2010). UNICEF 
collaboration with the National Statistics Agency led to the publication of the first child poverty 
report for Namibia, including an assessment of the impact of Child Welfare Grants on poverty 
rates and a simulation and basic costing of alternative policy options (means tested or universal 
Child Welfare Grant) (NSA, 2012a). UNICEF successfully advocated for the inclusion of child 
poverty and the expansion of the child welfare grant system in the Fourth National Development 




potential role of child welfare grants in reducing high child poverty rates led to a shift in public 
debate away from Orphans and Vulnerable Children – which in Namibia means mostly orphans 
– to a broader look on child poverty and other vulnerabilities. Subsequently, child poverty was 
recognized as national problem that needs to be tackled and government partners acknowledged 
the targeting of Child Welfare Grant towards orphans leaves the majority of poor and/or 
vulnerable children without support. Furthermore, UNICEF provided technical support to the 
Ministry of Finance to develop a tax-benefit microsimulation system (Namibian tax-benefit 
microsimulation model) that allows the assessment of the impacts of the social grant system and 
personal taxation on poverty, household expenditure, and income inequality as well as modelling 
and costing of alternative policy options, including an increase of social grants, changes in 
eligibility and new policies (Wright et al., 2014). This gives Ministry of Finance the possibility 
to generate themselves the evidence for the efficacy of an expanded child welfare grant system 
and its required resources. 
The World Food Programme also contributed to grants coverage in 2006/7 through financial 
support to register more beneficiaries but the assistance was part of a short-term food aid project. 
When the project ended in 2007, there was no traction in efforts to expand the grants through 
enrolling more children on the programme by government. The pressure to introduce a universal 
child grant did not result in the desired policy outcome but urged the SWAPO administration to 
reconsider the inclusion of vulnerable children through a Vulnerable Grant. In effect, the welfare 
state expanded, albeit modest. But the introduction of this grant is more likely going to curtail 
UNICEF push for a universal child grant. Iben Nashandi, Deputy Permanent Secretary in 
Ministry of Finance (2012-2015) and Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Poverty Eradication 
and Social Welfare from 2015 said ‘I am not a proponent of any type of universal social 
assistance.’ Nashandi’s view contradicted the beliefs of his minister, Bishop Kameeta. Nashandi, 
an economist, believed a universal child grant would perpetuate inequality as it ‘lifts both poor 
and rich children from poverty without closing the poverty gap.’ Nashandi was correct but he 
underestimated the reality that a universal grant would close the poverty gap. 
On the other hand, competing interests (with the same reform agenda) between United Nations 
agencies and international donors in advocating for different policy options led to stagnation in 




UNICEF (Mwinga, 2014) and the ILO (ILO, 2014) are advocating for universal child grants, the 
World Bank and UNDP are pushing for the Basic Income Grant. Monalisa Mbakumua Zatjirua, 
Acting Social Policy Specialist, Programme Officer- Child and Social Protection at UNICEF 
Namibia indicated that UNICEF is not against Basic Income Grant as it would still be a universal 
programme benefiting all children, but the ‘delays in approval of the Basic Income Grant 
proposals were worrisome and another form of a universal grant in the form of a child grant was 
necessary’.81 The simultaneous proposal of two universal policy instruments to address poverty 
partly explain the delay in Cabinet decision as it debates whether to adopt one or both 
programmes.82	 Herbert Jauch, former Basic Income Grant Coalition Chairperson and current 
Education Coordinator at Metal and Allied Namibian Workers Union saw proposals of a 
universal child grant as ‘confusing the recipient government’ as it might have distracted 
considerations for the Basic Income Grant which was proposed earlier than the child grant.83  
Expansion of child grants as part of general support for poor children through the Vulnerable 
Grant is a delayed but successful case of policy transfer (Obinger et al., 2013; Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 2000; 1996; Marsh & Sharman, 2009). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000:5) view policy transfer 
as political actions where ‘knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system.  Obinger et al., 
(2013:112) argue that countries ‘emulate policies that turned out successful abroad or react to 
external pressure to adopt a particular policy’. The success of the CSG in the neighbouring South 
Africa where Namibian officials from the ministry responsible for Child Welfare Grants visited 
had a positive effect on the ideological shift from orphan to poverty-targeted child social 
protection. Learning from and emulating the South African model of child provision were critical 
in the modest expansion of Namibia’s mixed regime. In summary, the failure to follow South 
Africa’s lead in introducing a CSG and the later slow expansion of pro-poor provision in 








Appendix 3.1: Existing child-focused social grants in Namibia 







Target group Orphaned children Orphaned children Children living with 
disabilities 
Children from poor households 
Eligibility 
criteria 
Child under 18 who has 
lost one (single parents) 
or two 
(married couples) 
biological or adoptive 





Presenting at clinics: 
 
Children <6 years 
 
Pregnant women 
Due to disabilities or chronic ill health, 
incapable of sustainable economic activity, 
has insufficient assets and income sources (<4 
LSU or gets <P120/month 
single,<P150/month with dependants) or 
incapable of sustainable economic activity, 
unreliable and limited sources of income due 
to old age, disability, terminal illness. 
 
Permanent: completely dependent, not suitable 
for rehabilitation. 
Temporary: suffered disasters, family crises 
etc., expected to exit. 
Targeting 
mechanism 
Categorical + community: 
referral by Village/Ward 
Social 
Welfare Committee, VDC 
or other leaders or 
concerned 
individuals for 
registration by local 
authority. Orphan or 
caregiver may also  apply 
directly 
Categorical Categorical Proxy means testing +community: referral by 
Village/Ward Social Welfare Committee, 
VDC or other leaders or concerned 
individuals. People	may al o apply directly to 
these committees or to S&CD 
Coverage National National National National but still disproportionately accessed 
by caregivers in urban and peri-urban areas. 
Value of 
transfer 
N$250 N$250	 N$250	 N$250 (US$30)	
Retargeting 
frequency 
annually  n/a 	 n/a 	 annually 
Graduation  
criteria 
Reach 18th  birthday Reach 18th  
birthday	
Reach 17th  birthday 
and start on Disability 
Grant	







CHAPTER 4   
Familial child welfare regimes: The case of Botswana, 1966-2017 
 
4.1 Distinctive characteristics of Botswana’s child welfare regime  
 
Botswana’s child welfare regime (CWR) is idiosyncratic within Southern Africa because it has 
not shifted from familial provision. Whilst South Africa had a largely familial system prior to 
1998 that transformed to a pro-poor CWR and Namibia resisted but later shifted to a mixed 
regime, the familial system in Botswana has endured since independence in 1966. The CWR is 
largely familial (targeted at families and not individuals) and not poverty-targeted, conforming to 
Esping-Andersen’s conservative welfare regime, falls within the 'Southern Africa' and ‘middle-
income’ models emphasizing categorical and in-kind transfers. Direct cash transfers have low 
coverage but total coverage is expansive. The familial primarily in-kind benefits are generous per 
household but ungenerous per person relative to the national and international poverty lines. 
Social grants provision, like in Zimbabwe and not in South Africa and Namibia, is not legislated. 
	
Botswana, a Southern African landlocked country with 800,000 children and a small national 
population of 2.3 million (see Table 1.1), is regarded as ‘one of Africa’s veritable economic and 
human development success stories’ transitioning ‘from Least Developed Country at 
independence in 1966 to Middle Income Country’ in three decades mainly ‘through the 
successful exploitation of its mineral wealth.’84 The discovery of diamonds and other minerals 
provided the resources used to transform social security through redistributive measures to 
promote social justice. The country's social protection system has been described as a miracle of 
Africa (Ulriksen, 2011:199; 2010:12). The successful introduction and extension of 
unconditional, categorical and universal (at least within some categories) social transfers made 
the country an African model (RHVP, 2011:17).  
Botswana has been made substantial progress in reducing poverty. ‘The percentage of people 






2009 and 19% in 2015 (GoB & UNDP, 2010). Despite the decrease in poverty and having a 
‘comprehensive regime of social safety nets with relatively high coverage’, albeit with 
parsimonious benefits (Seekings, 2016a), the country still experiences high rates of poverty, as 
well as rising inequality. Child poverty was at 33% in 2002 (CSO, 2002). Eight percent of 
children in Botswana lived in households where a household member was critically ill in 2008 
(BAIS III, 2008), 32% of children were stunted in 2013 and 11% of children were out of primary 
school in the same year (Statistics Botswana, 2013:6; UNICEF, 2013; World Bank & BIDPA, 
2013:10). The situation of orphans is exacerbated by high unemployment rate for their 
caregivers, ‘Thirty-one percent of orphans lived in a household where there was no one gainfully 
employed in 2008, down from 55% in 2001’ (MLG, 2008; CSO, 2002). 
Newly-elected president Ian Khama summarized the challenges facing Botswana in his 2009 
inauguration address to the National Assembly, ‘unemployment, poverty, crime, HIV and AIDS, 
shortage of shelter, declining social values, environmental degradation and global competition 
….’85 In the same address Khama outline the government’s response, ‘we have put	 in place a 
number of policies, programmes and projects, measures and	initiatives to tackle most if not all of 
them.’  
Children in Botswana are supported by a number of programmes: those for orphans; vulnerable 
children- ‘needy children’ and ‘needy students’ (provided under the programme for destitutes). 
Children also benefit from government school feeding programmes, initiated in the mid-1960s 
and taken over by the Government from the World Food Programme in 1997 (Seekings 2016a & 
b), operated at primary and secondary levels, and in some cases from their parents’ registration 
as destitute persons. There are special provisions for the children of remote area dwellers (under 
the Remote Area Development Programme). Generally, these programmes, especially indirect 
schemes, have a high coverage, offer in-kind child benefits that are relatively generous and 
family-based but without statutory provision.  
 
The expansive but thrifty safety nets persisted in successive Botswana Democratic Party 







the country since independence, like the preceding three presidents, is a known passionate 
conservative.86 In his 2009 inauguration address to the National Assembly President Ian Khama 
mentioned that, ‘A change of [political] leadership does not mean radical changes in the way we 
have been setting out our objectives as agreed upon by the ruling party and government for this 
nation. Our party has a manifesto that I signed on to and the government has a national 
development plan that I am also a party to.’87 It is no surprise that he has presided over a 
conservative government in favour of a market-based approach to poverty reduction in the 
country through a poverty unit situated in his office. The promotion of workfare and minimal 
social welfare could have been to reduce family overdependence on the state and, argues 
Makgala (2013), to rekindle self-help and self-reliance ethos that had been eroding. I argue that a 
combination of structural (AIDS challenges and social factors such as family dynamics), political 
(party competition between the ruling Botswana Democratic Party and other parties), cultural 
and ideological (national culture and the Botswana Democratic Party’s conservative ideology) 
influences shaped the CWR. The Botswana Democratic Party promoted a unique but segmented 
array of social protection programmes that	 preserved the family, a strong characteristic of a 
familial CWR. This chapter discusses the distinctive characteristics, evolution and suggest 
explanations to the reforms of the familial CWR in Botswana. In Chapter 6, I shall examine more 
fully how and why the familial CWR in Botswana is different from South Africa, Namibia, 
Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
4.1.1 Coverage 
Assessments of social assistance programmes in Botswana indicated that safety nets coverage is 












Table 4.1: Programme coverage and spending 
Programme Budget (Pula-
millions) 




% of child 
population  
2009/10 2012/13 2009/10 2012/13 2009/10 2012/13 2009/10 2012/13 2013 
Direct coverage  
Orphans 47 301 - 0.2 48,119 40,030 2.6 1.9 4.6 
Primary School 
Feeding Programme 
208 275 - 0.2 301,970 268,761 16,6 12.8 31.3 
Secondary School 
Feeding Programme 
172 210 - 0.2 165,097 161,929 9.1 7.7 18.8 
Total direct coverage 54.7* 
Indirect coverage 
Community Home 
Based Care  
160 38 - 0.0 3,702 3,434 
(6868) 
0.2 0.2 - 
Vulnerable Group 
Feeding 
216 166 - 0.1 230,985 383,392 
(192000) 
12.7 18.3  30 
Destitute Persons 207 241 - 0.2 40,865 30,518 
(67000) 
2.2 1.5 7.8 
Old Age Pension 256 279 - 0.2 91,446 93,639 
(187278) 
4.8 4.5 22 
World War 
Veterans 
15 - - - 2,940 
(5880) 
- 0.2 - 1 
RADP 49 - - - 43,070 
(86140) 
- 2.4 - 10 
Ipelegeng 260 409 - 2.6 19,431 55,000 
(110,000) 
1.1 0.3 13 
Total indirect coverage 83** 
Total coverage 85 
Source: Adapted from World Bank & BIDPA (2013:x); Turner et al., (2010a: xi). * total does not add up to 100% 
and it is an overestimation because there is duplicate counting of children who benefit from more than one 
programme. Even if we assume that all orphans attend school to avoid double counting, the proportion is 49.3%. 
This is misleading because this represents coverage for one programme ** overestimation due to double counting of 





There are, however, conflicting evaluations primarily because of the variation in programmes 
research teams focus on. Seleka et al. assessed 11 social safety net programmes (see Table 4.1) 
and concluded that they reached less than 10% of the population and covered 19% of poor 
households (2007:28). Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP), a regional 
programme that “supported improvements in policy and programme approaches to hunger and 
vulnerability in southern Africa with particular emphasis on the role of social protection,” 
assessed ten programmes (excluding the Community Home Based Care programme which 
Seleka et al., included) and concluded that ‘Together these reach approximately 900,000 people 
or half of the total population, although 700,000 of these are beneficiaries of the universal school 
feeding programmes or vulnerable group feeding. Of the remaining seven programmes, none 
reaches more than 5% of the population,’ (2011:2). RHVP’s assessment is misleading as its 
conclusion is based on the wider coverage of the School Feeding Programme only.   
The World Bank & BIDPA (2013) and Turner et al (2010b) reached the same 5% conclusion but 
included scholarships, transfers to NGOs and poverty eradication initiative that were excluded by 
Seleka et al. and RHVP. The World Bank (2015) shows that, ‘Almost 72% of the population 
lives in a household with at least one member who benefits from a social-protection programme.’  
 Turner et al., (2010b:4) argued that ‘despite fears of a national trend towards dependency’, 
social assistance has a very low coverage compared to the number of people who should be 
covered. This is not entirely true of Botswana’s CWR. Children benefit directly from the Orphan 
Care Programme (reaching about 5% of all children in 2013), fee waivers, and School Feeding 
Programme and most children (about 85% in 2013) benefit indirectly from family benefits i.e. 
from general welfare programmes including the Community Home Based Care, Old Age 
Pensions, World War Veterans and Ipelegeng (see Table 1.1). The Department of Social 
Protection in the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) has made progress towards children’s 
well-being through the provision of social safety nets and social services in education, health and 
housing.  
Previous researchers based their arguments on coverage by establishing the number of children 
covered as a percentage of total population. This is useful in understanding the general coverage 
of social protection programmes but sheds very little light on the number of children benefiting 




CWR’s coverage may be considered low compared to South Africa (another middle-income 
country) but has extensive coverage particularly in comparison to Namibia and Zimbabwe. 
Children averaged 43% of the population between 2007 and 2013 (MLG, 2008:38; Statistics 
Botswana, 2014:6) and, as discussed, approximately 85% of all children benefited from social 
safety nets in 2013. The percentage of children who benefitted was calculated using 40,030 
children benefitting under Orphan Care Programme, 430,690 primary and secondary school 
feeding (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:x), 67,000 vulnerable children under Destitute Persons 
Programme (MLG, 2008:41) and 192,000 children under Vulnerable Group Feeding (estimating 
that half of the 383,392 beneficiaries in 2013 were children). The estimated reach excludes 
15,524 Remote Area Dweller children assuming they are counted under the school feeding 
programme if they attend school (an underestimation because not all Remote Area Dwellers 
children are of school going age). Using these estimates, if we assume that all orphans attend 
school and count them under the School Feeding Programme also, the percentage of children 
covered drops to 72% of all children. Child focused programmes, especially the School Feeding 
Programme (see Table 4.1), are very extensive.  
Seekings asserts that Botswana ‘had an extensive but parsimonious, ‘conservative’ welfare state, 
focused on economic growth and social stability but protecting most of its citizens against 
extreme poverty’ and precisely discerns, ‘By 2010, most children and many adults received free 
food rations, and one in ten people received individual cash transfers, often on behalf of their 
entire households,’ (2016b:1-2). These coverage estimates differ because they take into account 
different programmes. As already discussed, Seleka et al., (2007:10-12) assessed only selected 
11 programmes and the other studies took into account a wider range of programmes (World 
Bank & BIDPA, 2013:x; Turner et al., 2010a:x; RHVP, 2011:7-12). The CWR covers almost all 
children taking into account school and other feeding programmes which have very modest 
benefits, many children when considering indirect benefits through familial programmes, but 
only some children taking into account only child-focused programmes such as the Orphan Care 
Programme. Only the narrowly child-focused programmes are generous, however; the other 
programmes provide very modest benefits. 
Geographical coverage of child and family benefits show Botswana has remarkably made great 




programmes is expected to follow that of the overall population to increase access to the most 
needy, there is remarkable inconsistence between the two in many Southern African 
Development Community countries. According to Mupedziswa and Ntseane (2012), ‘the 
geographical coverage of social protection beneficiaries broadly follows that of the overall 
population (76% rural) and of poverty (91% rural).’ In 2011 over 80% of 10 social protection 
programmes beneficiaries were “rural residents, exceeding the national population percentage” 
and ‘nine out of ten beneficiaries of poverty-targeted programmes were in rural areas’ (RHVP, 
2011).	The registration of need children and students under the destitute programme was also 
skewed towards rural areas. About 98% of the 2008/9 destitute registrations were in rural 
communities where the larger proportion of the poor live as opposed to the higher standard of 
living in the towns (Turner et al., 2010a). Overall, coverage of in-kind benefits that are family 
targeted is high to support a familial CWR. 
 
With regard to legal status of programmes, Botswana, unlike South Africa, Mauritius or 
Namibia, does not have statutory provisions for social assistance. Social assistance is governed 
by administrative fiat, not legislation. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) 
developed a number of policy instruments and guidelines including the Short-Term Plan of 
Action (STPA) on Care of Orphans in Botswana, 1999-2001(1999), Revised National Policy on 
Destitute Persons, 2002 (2002), Revised National Rural Development Policy (2002), National 
Guidelines on the Care of Orphans and Vulnerable Children (2008), Botswana National Plan of 
Action on Orphans and Vulnerable Children 2010-2016 (2010) that replaced STPA and a draft 
National Policy on Orphans and Vulnerable in Botswana (2013). Turner et al., (2010b) observe 
that Botswana has an abundance of policy yet ‘none is directly supported by law’. Seekings 
refers to Botswana’s inheritance at independence as ‘an ad hoc system of destitute relief, without 
any statutory poor law’ (2016a:18). Even so, the policies highlight the ‘importance accorded to 
social protection in the national polity’ (RHVP, 2011:5). Contrary to Namibia with the provision 
of Child Welfare Grants enshrined in the Children Act of 2015, Botswana’s Children’s Act of 
2009, the only legal instrument that provides a legal and institutional ‘framework for the 
protection and care of children,’ is silent on social protection for children. This is not surprising 
as bureaucrats and politicians alike were well aware of the policy implications of having 




be obliged to provide it. A government official indicated the government was reluctant to 
legislate social assistance because, ‘Even if when we can’t fund it, we are stuck with it.’88 	
Eligibility for child support is based on need (through proxy means testing) for vulnerable 
children (needy students, needy students and children in need of care) targeted under the 
Destitute Persons Programme and children requiring supplementary nutrition covered by 
Vulnerable Group Feeding programme. Child benefits were universalized in some categories. 
The Orphan Care Programme, designed to respond to need of orphans, was open to all families 
with orphans who applied and all children attending government primary and secondary schools 
benefited from the School Feeding Programme.  
In terms of generosity of benefits, Botswana uses two national poverty lines: the Food Poverty 
Line i.e. ‘the minimum food expenditure necessary for the household to maintain good caloric 
requirements’; and the Poverty Datum Line i.e. the ‘cost of a basket of goods and services [food, 
clothing, personal items, household goods and services, and shelter] deemed to be necessary and 
adequate to meet basic needs for household members’ (World Bank, 2015:26). In 2013 the 
average value was P685 ($82), equivalent to 92% of the Food Poverty Line (World Bank, 
2015:143). In December 2017, using the 2016 prices (converted to US$ and adjusted for 
purchasing power parity, PPP), the Food Poverty Line was US$67/household/month and the 
Poverty Datum Line was US$86/household/month. A poor household with an orphan was 
presumably eligible for the Orphan Care Programme (between P500-P850 or US$49-US$83) and 
an Ipelegeng opportunity (P480+food P100 or US$47 + US$10). The total cash value would be 
US$143/household/month translating to US$28/person/month or US$0.90/person/day in an 
average five-person household, a very ungenerous amount that is far below the two poverty lines, 
the international extreme poverty line of US$1.90/person/day and ungenerous compared with 
other middle-income countries including South Africa. 
In December 2017, the Orphan Care Programme transfers were US$0.90/person/day 
(US$28/person/month) which is ungenerous relative to the international poverty line of 
US$1.90/person/day. Overall, the Orphan Care Programme cash value was parsimonious relative 







The overall benefits are, however, generous relative to the Food Poverty Line taking into account 
what a poor household was likely to receive in total. The World Bank rated major social 
assistance programmes in Botswana as ‘generous’. For instance, the Destitute Persons 
programme that directly and indirectly benefits many children contributed ‘77% of the poorest 
household food consumption’ and the benefits were equivalent ‘to 94% of Statistics Botswana’s 
BCWIS’s Poverty Datum Line for 2009/10 (P680/month or US$67)’ (World Bank, 2013:49). 
Therefore, the CWR offers high value benefits relative to the Food Poverty Line per household 
in contrast with the parsimonious general welfare regime (Seekings, 2017:3; Seekings, 2016b:22; 
Ulriksen, 2017). 
4.1.2 Familial-targeting 
A key distinguishing feature of Botswana’s social safety net system (both general and CWR) is 
its familialist focus. This focus is applied to both child and family benefits. Unlike South Africa, 
Lesotho and Namibia that have child grants for individual children, social protection 
programmes in Botswana target the family. For programmes that target groups such as orphans 
and destitute persons, their families become ‘automatic’ beneficiaries as the family receive a 
family-based food basket/coupon determined by family size. Sharing scarce resources, including 
food, in times of need has been a cultural practice of Batswana. AIDS weakened the nuclear and 
the extended family (Nthomang, 2007:193), rendering the traditional family support system 
inadequate to provide for orphans. Dahl argues that many Batswana, including political elites, 
the church and ordinary people, admit that kinship care for orphans (tied to the Batswana culture 
of family provision) can no longer adequately address the ‘demographic devastation’ caused by 
AIDS (2009:24). The government’s provision of family-based food baskets reflects the political 
elite’s ideas about reinventing the family and the promotion of the kinship culture in addressing 
the AIDS challenge. Social policy, hence, is rooted in the cultural aspects of kinship (Durham, 
2007; 2005).  
The government did not only promote familial provision by targeting the family but also by not 
providing transfers to some families assuming that the family will take the responsibility. The 
government has been conservative in providing for orphans placed under foster care of non-kin. 
Under the pilot Foster Care Programme (Dahl, 2009:33), the government withdrew the food 




purposes of accessing the basket and not to provide care. It is surprising that the government 
initiated a programme but could not avail the resources (food or cash) to sustain it and assumed 
absolute family responsibility. Such a romanticised view of the family partly explains the 
persistent familial orientation of all the programmes. The view may also account for the failure 
of the proposed foster care system which could not be implemented beyond piloting.  
4.2 The evolution of Botswana’s child welfare regime: changes and choices, 1966-
2017 
Between 1966-2017 Botswana’s CWR went through four phases of reforms without shifting 
from the familial system. The first phase is between 1966 and the mid-1990s, traversing from Sir 
Seretse Khama (1966 to 1980) to Masire’s presidency when the ruling Botswana Democratic 
Party enjoyed political security as a result of weak political opposition. The Botswana 
Democratic Party, therefore, lacked the incentive to reform social grants, limiting state provision 
to drought-related food aid.  
The second phase is between the mid-1990s to 2002 when the ruling Botswana Democratic Party 
under Masire’s presidency faced competitive elections that threatened its political security hence 
urged the ruling party to institute social grants reforms to secure the waning electoral base. 
During this period, the Botswana Democratic Party had to regain its lost electoral support in 
preparation for the 2004 election in which Masire sought reelection and had to address the 
devastating impact of structural challenges, especially AIDS-related health and demographic 
shocks. 
The Botswana Democratic Party’s political insecurity persisted into the third phase between 
2007 and 2009 but this time Mogae had to strengthen the party against the strong opposition and 
prepare for the incoming president Ian Khama. The period was again characterised by structural 
challenges but in a different form - high unemployment combined with the AIDS crisis to 
increase family vulnerability to poverty and family breakdown. In response, Mogae expanded the 
food basket to the new category of vulnerable children and made the Ipelegeng public works 
programme permanent.  
The last phase is between 2010 and 2015 characterised by political complacence by the Khama-




Party regained its political security by winning the 2009 elections. The result was a series of 
failed reforms as the government rejected proposals for new poverty-targeted grants on the one 
hand and an enduring familial CWR providing familial benefit. Khama he rebranded the 
Ipelegeng to secure his reelection in the 2014 elections but the complacence costed the Botswana 
Democratic Party electoral support hence won the 2014 tightly contested election by a small 
margin and without winning a majority vote (Hamer, 2016a, Seekings & Hamer, 2017). Across 
the four phases, the Botswana Democratic Party maintained its conservative ideological 
orientation, promoting familial social provision, distributing primarily in-kind benefits to the 
neediest families with children and rejecting proposals to shift to poverty targeting.  
4.2.1 Social grants provision under a politically secure Botswana Democratic Party, 1966-
1994 
Botswana’s ruling Botswana Democratic Party faced a weak opposition from independence up to 
1994 (Hamer, 2016a; Ulriksen, 2017) hence lacked the political incentive to reform the child 
social provision. Figure 4.1 shows Botswana Democratic Party’s electoral dominance, winning 
the majority vote despite declining from about 80% in the first election in 1965 to about 57% in 
1994.  






















Source: Botswana Independent Electoral Commission *By 2014 elections, Botswana National Front had merged 
with Botswana Movement for Democracy in 2010 to form Umbrella for Democratic Change. 
This period of political security is characterised by a conservative minimal CWR and limited 
defamiliarisation with the government intervening with donor-assisted drought-related food aid 
and public works programmes that promoted workfare (Seekings, 2017; 2016a; Munemo, 2012). 
Children benefitted mostly indirectly from general welfare except for feeding programmes in 
schools and at home when their families qualified for the WFP-funded Vulnerable Group 
Feeding.  
Minimal state intervention in family provision, representing the foundations of a conservative 
CWR, can be traced to the pre-independence era when the colonial government initiated these 
school and community nutritional programmes in response to incessant droughts. Unlike in 
South Africa or Namibia where the colonial government provided cash transfers to poor families 
with children (see Chapters 2 and 3), Botswana had no permanent support for poor children. 
Familialism continued in independent Botswana during this era of Botswana Democratic Party’s 
political security. Destitute children were primarily provided by the family (Mupedziswa & 
Ntseane, 2011) except for the 1980 destitute policy that targeted adult destitute persons and 
indirectly benefited children. The orphan problem existed during this period (MLG, 2007) but 
the family and community provided a safety net to orphans with limited government support.  
4.2.2 Social grants reforms under a politically insecure Botswana Democratic Party, mid-
1990s- 2002 
Researchers have argued that up to the 1990s the Botswana Democratic Party led government 
played a residual social provision role on the assumption that families could support themselves 
through rural activities or supported by other community members (Mugabe in Ulriksen, 
2017:84-5). This assessment is partially correct but it underestimates the lack of political 
competition that characterised this period. The 1994 competitive elections caused electoral 
discomfort to President Masire and his ruling Botswana Democratic Party (see figure 4.1). The 
Botswana Democratic Party’s political insecurity from the mid-1990s to 2002 urged the 
Botswana Democratic Party-led government to make significant social transfer reforms including 




reviewing of the destitute policy to cover ‘destitute children’. The reforms, as discussed later, 
supported familial provision reflecting Botswana Democratic Party’s conservative ideology. 
The Botswana Democratic Party’s first major reaction to the opposition electoral threat in 1994 
was the Masire-led government’s unceremonious introduction of the Old Age Pension in 1996. 
South Africa and Namibia (under South African rule), had Old Age Pensions for the elderly pre-
independence but Botswana did not inherit or introduce the scheme until 1996. According to 
Ulriksen (2017: 83) the motion to introduce an Old Age Pension was moved in 1988. Such a 
delay could have been a result of the perceived prospects of self-reliance for survival by retired 
workers (Ulriksen, 2017:84) and the weak political opposition. Ulriksen further attributes the 
pension’s introduction to electoral competition – the Botswana Democratic Party experienced the 
strongest opposition in the 1994 elections so the pension was a political tool to maintain rural 
support (ibid). The pensions were ‘conservative’ in that they were limited to destitute adults aged 
65 or older despite the retirement age of 60.  
There is no clear evidence to suggest that the design of the pensions considered poor children in 
the targeted ‘destitute’ families but it is likely that demographic changes (age) and the possible 
burden of the elderly (the destitute persons) caring for children might have been important 
considerations. In other words, the pensions were familial. Evidence suggests that pensions for 
elderly and disabled people have a distributional aspect as, ‘they are awarded to individuals but 
are to a large extent consumed by the household’ (Ardington & Lund, 1995:558). In Lesotho, the 
design and introduction of pensions in 2004 deliberately sought to benefit pensioners and OVCs 
(Pelham, 2007). In Namibia (see Chapter 3), the political elite supported inflation indexed 
increment of the Old Age Pension amount in contrast with child grants because of the perceived 
trickle-down effect of the Old Age Pension. It is likely that when the Old Age Pension was 
introduced in 1996 the government was cognisant of its possible indirect impact to the orphan 
problem. Moreover, the government’s concern for orphans was shown in 1996 with the inaugural 
distribution of the Orphan Care Basket. 
The second remarkable reform after the 1994 competitive elections and the devastating effects of 
the AIDS pandemic was the Orphan Care Basket initiative that began in 1996 under president 
Masire and became a fully-fledged Orphan Care Programme in 1999 during Mogae’s presidency. 




fiscal and governance impacts.’89 There were 350,000 people living with HIV in 2003 (37% 
prevalence rate) (UNAIDS & WHO, 2005). Despite the prevalence rate falling to 22% by 2013, 
Botswana still had the third highest HIV prevalence rate in the world (after Lesotho and 
Swaziland) and the pandemic had left many disintegrated families (UNAIDS, 2014: A8-A9). In 
comparison to its Southern African neighbours - South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe - also 
affected by the advent of HIV and AIDS in the 1990s, Botswana was one of the hardest hit with 
high AIDS-related deaths triggering an unprecedented increase in ‘AIDS’ orphans. A total of 
110,000 and 120,000 children lost their parents to AIDS in 2003 and 2005 respectively (CSO, 
2005; UNCEF, 2005). An estimated 77% of registered orphans and 16% of all children in 2007 
were AIDS orphans (Hu, 2011:63; CSO, 2009:55). Many Batswana children grew up ‘as double 
orphans, in single parent families or even in child-headed households’ (UNICEF, 2012:17).  
Stegling corroborates that the effects of HIV at household level included the “growing number of 
orphaned and vulnerable children and the increasing number of patients that are taken care of at 
home” (2004:234). Festus Mogae, President of Botswana from 1998 to 2008, viewed HIV/AIDS 
as “the biggest problem facing post-colonial Botswana” as it became an economic and security 
threat to the nation (Kaboyakgosi & Mpule, 2008:302). Kanki and Marlink show President 
Mogae’s acknowledgement of the AIDS problem in Botswana and his commitment to fighting 
the epidemic.  Mogae ‘decried the possible extinction of the Batswana’ and declared a ‘war’ 
against AIDS. In his words: ‘Ntwa e bolotse’ (The war has started) (2009:4). 
HIV/AIDS threatened to destroy the human capital and government efforts to combat the disease 
had economic and human cost (Masire, 2006: x). One of its major social impact was the 
reduction of life expectancy from 65 to 35 years in 2005 (Kallings, 2008:238). UNICEF reported 
the devastating impacts of AIDS in Botswana: 
HIV/AIDS touches every aspect of life in Botswana. It continues to undermine the 
enormous advances this democratic country has made by aggravating poverty, 
increasing child mortality, weakening families, compromising productivity, and 
decimating the working age population. At home, families live with the effects of 






losing loved ones, the costs of caring for the sick, the burden of looking after orphaned 
relatives, and the overall physical, emotional and financial drain that the disease 
engenders (UNICEF, 2004:12). 
The country mounted a strong HIV/AIDS intervention, providing more than 70% of all HIV 
spending, reaching universal access to HIV treatment by the end of 2011 and halving new HIV 
infections for infants between 2009 and 2012 thereby making important progress towards 
achieving an AIDS-free (GoB & UNDP, 2010) but ‘its capacity to sustain the response is being 
stretched to the limit.’90 Mupedziswa & Ntseane argue that ‘the pandemic threatened the socio-
economic fabric of Botswana society, with breadwinners succumbing to the virus in large 
numbers, in the process leaving behind thousands of orphans and vulnerable children requiring 
assistance’ (2012:60). 
After facing its major political competition in 1994, and in response to the increasing need (HIV 
related demographic and social changes) the Botswana Democratic Party-led government started 
providing an Orphan Food Basket to families with orphans without establishing a proper orphan 
care policy (Dahl, 2014; 2009). Dahl (2009:29) argues that the basket was an ‘incentive to keep 
orphans connected to their kin and culture’. The food basket ensured that orphans ‘are not 
abandoned or neglected’ (Dahl, 2016:290). In 1997 the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) 
commissioned a situation analysis of orphans that reported an increasing number of orphans as 
result of AIDS-related deaths than other causes (MLG, 1998). Some scholars argue that orphan 
estimates were an underestimation resulting from AIDS-related stigma underreporting (Ntseane 
& Solo, 2007:93; BFTU, 2007). The analysis identified orphans as a particular vulnerable group 
that needed immediate government intervention. In this report, the government acknowledged 
that family coping mechanisms such as reliance on the traditional extended family were severely 
stressed. The provision of basic social welfare services and material support to ‘needy’ children 








Local Government (1999) reported “Orphans had no access to basic needs such as food, clothing, 
toiletry and shelter” as a result of household poverty.  
In response to this orphan problem, the Ministry of Local Government (through its Social 
Welfare Division, now Department of Social Protection) adopted, in 1999, a Short-Term Plan of 
Action (STPA) on Care of Orphans in Botswana (replaced by the Botswana National Plan of 
Action for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, 2010-2016 in 2010) that provided for the 
introduction of the Orphan care Programme the same year. 1999 was a turning point in the social 
policy history in Botswana as STPA was the first and only policy directly targeting children 
since independence.  
The STPA’s main objective was “to respond to the immediate needs of orphans i.e. food, 
clothing, education, shelter, protection and care.” In keeping with the Botswana Democratic 
Party government’s approach in delivering services to the need, STPA emphasised that the 
government will support ‘community based responses to the orphan problem’ (MLG, 1999), 
suggesting promotion of the familial and community approaches that existed before the AIDS 
era. Although the Orphan Care Programme’s ultimate goal was to remove orphans from poverty 
trap (Ntseane & Solo, 2007:93), its immediate aim was to ‘offset the burden of [families/kin] 
taking on additional mouths to feed’ (Dahl, 2009:29). Hence, the Orphan Care Programme 
promoted kin-based orphan care. 
The Orphan Care Programme is regarded as a social allowance hence it is not means tested. All 
families with orphans under 18 years were eligible for the programme.  An orphan is narrowly 
defined as “a child below 18 years who has lost one (single parents)92 or two (married couples, 
whether married in civil or traditional marriages) biological or adoptive parents.” STPA further 
defines ‘social orphans’ as “children who are abandoned or dumped or whose parents cannot be 
traced.” This definition excluded children living with single parents such as the mother only but 







Table 4.2: Distribution of orphans by status of parent, 2001 & 2008 
Parent survival status 2001 2008 
Both M[other] and F[ather] alive and 
present 
23 28.7 
M present, F deceased 6.1 9.3 
M present, F alive but absent 35 15.7 
M deceased, F deceased 1.6 3 
M deceased, F alive but absent 2.6 6.4 
M deceased, F present 0.5 3.9 
M alive but absent, F deceased 1.6 10.2 
M alive but absent, F alive but absent 22 28.8 
M alive but absent, F present 3 0.9 
Orphans as % all children 15.2 16.2 
Source: CSO (2001:52) & CSO (2009:110).  
The orphan definition contrasts with other definitions within Botswana and internationally. The 
Botswana Central Statistics Office (now Statistics Botswana) defined orphans as children under 
18 years who have lost one or both parents or whose parents’ survival status is unknown (see 
Table 4.2) while the UNICEF/UNAIDS/USAID (2002) state that ‘an orphan is a child below the 
age of 18 years who has lost one or both parents,’ adopted by Botswana’s neighbours, South 
Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The narrow definition of orphans excludes children falling in 
the ‘orphan’ category according to international definition. For instance, ‘single’ orphans (either 
maternal or paternal) are not recognized in Botswana. To compel absent fathers to provide for 
their children, ‘Deserted children born out of wedlock were excluded from the definition of an 
eligible orphan, and therefore excluded from benefits under STPA unless there was clear proof 
that the child’s father had indeed died’ (MLG, 2006:4). As a result of this disparity orphan rates 
were estimated at 7% and 17% using the Botswana and the international definition in 2008 
(MLG, 2008). 
The value of the food basket remained unchanged at P216,00 (US$21) per orphan irrespective of 
geographical location of their home from 1999 until 2009. In 2010, the value increased and 
ranged between P500,00 (US$41) and P650,00 (US$76) depending on geographic location 
(urban, peri-urban or rural). The amount was supposed to be ‘adjusted for inflation at the 
beginning of each financial year but it has not been reviewed since 2010 due to affordability 




children in need of care (vulnerable children)’93 and ‘direct more financial resources towards 
income generating projects for families with children to increase their chances of self-reliance.’94  
The Orphan Care Programme earned political support as it maintained the ‘safety net’ typology 
which the ruling Botswana Democratic Party favoured. Based on the 1998 rapid assessment of 
the situation of orphans in the country conducted by the Ministry of Health and international 
donors (USAID and UNICEF) which revealed the escalating numbers of orphans as a result of 
AIDS-related deaths, then president Festus Mogae, soon after taking over from Quett Masire in 
April of that year, declared the situation of orphans as a national disaster.95 Orphanhood was 
henceforth viewed as an emergency compelling government to act swiftly by introducing the 
Orphan Care Programme. The STPA was initiated prior to the change of president, but the 
introduction of the Orphan Care Programme was under Mogae suggesting that Masire appears to 
have underestimated the devastating effects of AIDS on the family which his successor took 
seriously. 
The introduction of Orphan Care Programme offering in-kind benefits can be viewed as some 
form of ‘path dependency' (Pierson, 2000). Informed by the destitute programme which was 
already giving out monthly benefits as food parcels with a small cash component of P81 
(Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2012; Ntseane & Solo, 2007; Seleka et al., 2007), it was 
administratively easy and cost effective to extend the same benefits (in-kind) to children in need 
using the same distribution structures already established.  
Donors were also influential on the Orphan Care Programme targeting up to 2012 but the narrow 
orphan focus resonated with the Botswana Democratic Party’s minimalist ideology. Although the 
government-President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (USAID/PEPFAR) funding 
partnership was that of government supported partnership, contrary to lower income countries 









country. The pressure to target orphans is attributed to the fact that Orphan Care Programme was 
funded by USAID under the PEPFAR programme through the National AIDS Coordinating 
Agency until 2013. There was not much political will until the 2010s when Government only 
took over in 2014 when it started funding Orphan Care Programme from ministerial budget.96 As 
part of financing HIV/AIDS programmes such as the Community Home Based Care Programme, 
USAID scheme (initiated in 1995 by government and donors) also financed the food basket for 
orphans as part of mitigation strategy since a larger percentage of the orphans were ‘AIDS’ 
orphans. Ansell views the ‘singular focus on AIDS orphans as a ‘funding magnet’. The funding 
of AIDS orphans programmes through PEPFAR is not unique to Botswana. Ansell observes, 
“PEPFAR sets aside 10% of its programme funding to address the needs of orphans and 
vulnerable children and claims to have supported more than 5 million of them” by 2014 
(2016:168).’ PEPFAR has been funding OVCs programmes in almost all countries in Southern 
Africa between 2004 and 2017.97 The PEPFAR-funded OVCs programmes included ‘food and 
nutrition, shelter and care, legal protection, health care, psychosocial support, education, and 
economic strengthening of families’ and households’ (Bryant et al., 2012:1509). In Botswana, 
donors did not contradict but rather supported the government’s narrow targeting of AIDS 
orphans. 
Global pressures also influenced the shape of the Orphan Care Programme. Botswana is party to 
the “Code on Social Security in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)” that 
was formulated in 2004 and signed by all member states in 2008. Article 1 of the code 
distinguishes between social assistance and social allowances. Social allowances98 are defined as 
“universal payments made to ‘persons in designated categories’ to include children, the disabled 
and the elderly. They are financed from government revenue and are not mean-tested.” Persons 
falling within the designated category receive social allowances regardless of their economic 
position. Put differently, though having the same funding modalities, social assistance is cash or 









dependents” and it is means tested. This type of government intervention is meant to ‘alleviate 
poverty’ through ‘provision of minimum income support’ (SADC CODE, 2008:1). Based on this 
distinction, a matrix of child-focused programmes under each class and the guiding policy/Act 
for Botswana is drawn as shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Botswana Social Protection Matrix 




Orphan Care Programme  • Short Term Plan of Action for Care of 
Orphans in Botswana 
• National Guidelines on the Care of Orphans 
and Vulnerable Children 2008	
• Botswana National Plan of Action on Orphans 
and Vulnerable Children 2010-2016 
Vulnerable Group Feeding • National Health policy (1995,2011) 




Destitute programme • Revised National Policy on Destitute Persons 
(2002) 
Needy students • National Policy on Destitute Persons (2002) 
Needy children • National Policy on Destitute Persons (2002) 
Remote Area Dweller Programme • National Policy on Destitute Persons (2002) 
• Remote Area Development Policy 
Adapted from Ntseane and Solo (2007:27). 
Table 3.4 indicates that the core social transfer for children in Botswana, Orphan Care 
Programme, falls under social allowances which are ‘universal’ and ‘not means tested’. The slow 
reforms of programme shown in the matrix are partly explained by Botswana’s adoption of these 
classifications and definitions. Although the Code is not legally binding, using the SADC Code, 
there is no doubt that Botswana conformed to the regionally agreed standards of social provision 
and the government has viewed the current provisions as internationally acceptable and 
adequate.99  
Although the Orphan Care Programme was a programmatic response to AIDS and the associated 
social and demographic changes, its implementation was conservative and shows aspects of 
patronage. It was conservative because orphans were supported within a family, indirectly 






might have benefited from the Orphan Care Programme, because it was not means tested, many 
orphans joined their extended families in the rural areas when their parents died and most of the 
caregivers were likely to be elderly and poor (Dahl, 2014). These poor caregivers’ livelihoods 
depended on the food baskets and were, like other poor beneficiaries of food aid (Ulriksen, 
2017), Botswana Democratic Party loyalists. Overall, Mogae seem to have intensified his 
response to AIDS but the response (introduction of the Orphan Care Programme) actually 
intensified his election campaign for the 1999 elections. Without specifying the strategies to be 
taken, Mogae underscored that, ‘The Botswana Democratic Party will continue to pursue new 
strategies to mitigate the effects of HIV/AIDS and arrest the spread of the virus.’100 
 
The last social transfer reforms during Masire’s presidency was the revision of the Destitute 
Policy in 2002 to expand coverage of ‘destitute’ children in destitute families. Like the Orphan 
Care Programme, Masire initiated the review during the run up to the 2004 elections where he 
was seeking reelection. Masire was re-elected, perhaps because the expanded coverage of 
‘destitute families’ became popular among the poor, especially the urban poor who were 
previously excluded from other social assistance programmes and the old destitute criteria.  
 
The review entailed redefining child destitution to cater for children previously not covered by 
any other programme and introducing a new Head Start Programme targeted at vulnerable 
children (needy students and needy children). The Destitute Persons Programme, guided by the 
National Destitute Policy, was formally introduced in 1980 to respond “to the gradual erosion of 
the traditional safety net.” Although it covers other people in need, the programme was “intended 
to serve the few who have absolutely no other sources of support” (MLG, 2002). ‘Destitutes’ had 
been assisted prior to 1980, but on an ad hoc basis (Seekings, 2016a:18). The policy was revised 
to the Revised National Policy on Destitute Persons in 2002 and was being reviewed to be a 
National Policy on Needy and Vulnerable Families as of October 2016. The 2002 revision was 
reportedly motivated by six considerations: (1) “changes in the circumstances of poor people in 
Botswana since the original policy was introduced in 1980” (2) “the 1980 policy assumed that 






without exception, destitute persons in fact share their rations with their immediate dependents” 
(3) “in the old policy document, a person was only eligible to be assessed as ‘destitute’ if he or 
she did not own any assets. Subsequently, more accurate analysis has shown that it is indeed 
possible for a household to own just a few assets, for example, up to a maximum of four 
livestock units, and still be very poor” (4) “poor households require a small amount of cash, to 
meet their non-food requirements. The need to introduce other forms of assistance such as a 
small amount of cash to instill a sense of being and confidence on the beneficiaries” was 
identified (5) “government had introduced other social benefit programmes such as Rural Area 
Dweller Programme and it was found necessary to review the 1980 policy to prevent ‘double 
dipping’ but this excluded the Old Age Pension since eligibility was not means tested” (6) “the 
need to emphasize the rehabilitation component was found to be critical” (MLG, 2002:3). Thus, 
the revision was necessitated by the ‘changing social conditions’ (Ulriksen, 2017:82). 
 
The monthly benefits include a food coupon (similar to the Orphan Care Programme) valued 
between P450 and P550 (US$44 and US$54) by October 2002 depending on locality (higher in 
remote areas with usually high food prices) and family size or the number of dependent children 
and a cash allowance pegged at P70 (US$7) since October 2002.  The amount of the food basket 
is doubled ‘for families of five or more members’ (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:24). The cash 
component is meant to cater for other non-food individual needs, bestow dignity and pride on 
destitute persons (MLG 2002:7).  
The 2002 policy provides for the support of three categories of destitute children i.e. ‘minor 
children’, ‘needy children’ and ‘needy students’. The policy redefined a destitute child as “a 
child under the age of 18 who is need of care and may not be catered for under the Orphan Care 
Programme, or has parent(s) who are terminally ill and are incapable of caring for the child, or 
has been abandoned and is in need of care”. “Child in need of care” is “a child who has been 
abandoned or is without visible means of support; has no parent or guardian or has a parent or 
guardian who does not or is unfit to exercise proper control over the child; engages in any form 
of street trading, unless he has been deputed by his parents to help in the distribution of 
merchandise of a family concern; is in the custody of a person who has been convicted of 
committing upon or in connection with a child any offence referred to in part IV of the act; or 




calculated to cause or conduce his seduction, corruption, or prostitution,” (see Botswana 
Children’s Act, 2009 Section 14). “Children in need of care’ therefore refers to ‘orphans, abused, 
abandoned, and neglected children” (Maundeni, 2009). Children under 18 years also qualified as 
destitute persons if they lived under ‘difficult circumstances’. Such categorization shows the 
government has always done something but not ‘too much’ for its poor citizens. Consequently, 
the support has provided useful social safety nets for families with children but has remained 
fragmented (Seleka et al., 2007) and modest.  
In both the original and revised versions the policy objective of ensuring “government provides 
minimum assistance to the genuine destitute persons to ensure their good health and welfare’ and 
to alleviate poverty” (MLG, 2002) did not change. The policy states that the government will 
provide ‘destitute persons with a reasonable level of benefits’ that will motivate them to use their 
efforts to escape poverty trap and not ‘serve as a disincentive to such persons making an effort to 
obtain a sustainable livelihood’. The extent of government assistance is to ‘allow some latitude 
before the disincentive level is reached’. For destitute children under 18 years this meant 
furthering their education ‘to the best of their ability’ (MLG, 2002:10). By defining these 
responsibilities and obligations of persons receiving government assistance the Botswana 
Democratic Party government emphasizes that social provision for the indigent should be 
temporary of last resort. Support should also be only for people who are ‘genuinely’ destitute. 
Poor people should turn first to other means of work, family or community support and only in 
the event that these institutions fail to meet their basic needs, i.e. they are ‘genuinely’ destitute, 
will government intervene. The clause ‘It is the responsibility of the eligible persons to make 
most out of the rehabilitation opportunities that are provided by government’ (ibid) reminds 
beneficiaries that government can only assist to a certain level (provision of basic needs and 
rehabilitation programmes) beyond which the poor should endeavor to work for their well-being. 
Batswana seem to share the credence that ‘there is dignity in working’ as opposed to receiving 
social assistance.  ‘Parents or caregivers must work for their children. They should not just 
expect to receive social assistance from government. We are guided by botho, values that guide 
our behaviour to respect and assist each other in time of need’.101 Another interviewee said, 






have ways of helping each other in our communities not to start by running to the 
government.”102 Similar sentiments were echoed in other interviews with government 
officials.103  
This philosophy of providing minimal assistance but ‘enough’ to empower the poor to work for 
their welfare has largely informed the design and implementation of child social protection 
programmes in Botswana. Poor families with vulnerable children (destitute children) are 
subjected to a means test before they are certified as eligible candidates for the destitute 
programme and those who qualify are usually registered on a temporary basis except for the 
chronically sick or disabled. Similarly, the Orphan Care Programme is limited to a narrowly 
defined category of orphans that excludes single (one parent surviving) orphans such as those 
living with their mother but the father is deceased accounting for about 6% and 9% of all 
children in 2001 and 2008 assuming that the parent present will be able to provide for the 
child(ren).  
The revised policy emphasized beneficiary graduation upon rehabilitation despite that the 
‘majority of those enrolled on such programmes are “old, sometimes frail persons with low 
educational levels and few skills” (Ntseane & Solo 2007:92). Rehabilitation was meant to 
promote self-reliance but the number of able-bodied persons on the Destitute Persons 
Programme increased to ‘alarming rates’ (8,785 in 2008) raising government concerns about 
dependency. For this reason, two thirds of this category had been moved to government workfare 
Ipelegeng104 programme by 2010 (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:25). This transfer cemented the 
Botswana Democratic Party government’s view that family and child support should first and 
foremost be sought from work, a notion dating back to Seretse Khama’s emphasis on ‘self-help’ 
– working in subsistence farming, or for the community or state through a public works 
programme - captured in Botswana’s first full National Development Plan in 1968 (Seekings, 








Botswana suggests the universality of welfare dependency discourses in shaping public policy in 
developing and developed countries. 
 
To protect the increasing number of needy students, the revised Destitute Policy provided for a 
Head Start Programme. The programme’s near cash benefits are similar to the Orphan Care 
Programme but it is the adult destitute person who is registered and receives cash and a family 
food coupon. Under this programme, ‘needy students’ are defined as, “needy children’ who are 
at school or in vocational training or tertiary education.” These include destitutes under 18 who 
are not cared for by other programmes, but “are mainly children in the households of registered 
destitute persons.” The level of support for needy students depends on whether the child is at pre-
school, primary, community junior secondary, senior secondary school or vocational training and 
tertiary institutions. Benefits offered are similar to the Orphan Care Programme. In recognition 
of difficult circumstances under which needy students study, they are considered for repeating at 
school to allow them to improve their grades (MLG, 2002). “Sponsorships and scholarships for 
students in tertiary education as part of this programme accounted for 1.4 % of GDP	 -	45% of 
total social assistance spending” and the same percentage of the population in 2012/13 (World 
Bank, 2013: x). This budget is huge and incomparable to any of the other social grants for 
children. The Bank asserts that these programmes are “likely to be regressive, benefiting mostly 
rich and upper-middle income students,” and while they promote skills development, “Their use 
results in a private benefit, with fewer positive externalities than in primary or secondary 
education.” Such high expenditure show government commitment “to ensure that every child 
gets access to education, including tertiary” with the ultimate goal of breaking intergenerational 
poverty and invest in human capital development through “ensuring that children attain the 
highest level of education, so that they can compete in the labour market,” (ibid: xiv). 
The government revised the destitute policy together with National Policy for Rural 
Development in 2002 to cater for socially and economically marginalized families with children 
living in remote areas covered by the Remote Area Dweller programme. The Remote Area 
Dwellers Programme beneficiaries are not means tested (Tesliuc et al., 2013:38); eligibility is 
open to all children living in selected remote areas and belonging to the previously 
disadvantaged Basarwa ethnic group. Like in other programmes, children from such 




and other educational expenses. Again, the food basket under the Orphan Care Programme 
applies to children these families. Government assistance to these children is both a safety net 
and investment in human capital as it is meant “to enable school going children to participate in 
the education system and allow them to compete effectively in the job market and graduate from 
the remote area dweller programme support” (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013). 
The policy reforms initiated by president Mogae show his pragmatism on the one hand and his 
alignment to partisan politics on the other. The social programmes he introduced and the reviews 
of existing policies instituted promoted inclusivity but simultaneously supported his political 
ambitions especially through using the programmes to campaign against the competitive political 
opposition and seek reelection. The reforms reflected the Botswana Democratic Party’s familial 
ideological orientation, promoting family targeted primarily in-kind benefits limited to the 
neediest families. 
4.2.3 Botswana Democratic Party’s political insecurity, (un)employment and vulnerability 
induced social transfer reforms, 2007-9 
	
The Botswana Democratic Party continued to face a strong political opposition in the 1999 and 
2004 elections. Although the Umbrella for Democratic Change’s share of the vote declined from 
about 38% to about 26% in the 1999 and 2004, the united party continued to cause electoral 
discomfort to the Botswana Democratic Party. During 2007/9, the Botswana Democratic Party’s 
political insecurity persevered yet the government faced another structural challenge –high 
unemployment leading to increased vulnerable families with children. Like many other countries 
globally, Botswana experienced the effects of the 2008 Great Recession much earlier. The 
Botswana Democratic Party responded by expanding the food basket to OVCs and made the 
public works programme a permanent scheme. These ‘pro-poor’ reforms were politically 
strategic since they were instituted before the 2009 elections and might have helped the 
Botswana Democratic Party to expand its political support base into the urban areas. The reforms 
were conservative in that the programmes remained familial and targeted at ‘destitute’ families. 
In 2007 the Department of Social Services (DSS) expanded the coverage of the Destitute Persons 
Programme to households designated as households with OVCs - previously excluded poor 




were not gainfully employed or were chronically ill. Orphan caregiving households (already 
receiving or eligible for Orphan Care Programme) with vulnerable children were also targeted.105 
Caregiver/parent employment status became important in the designation of OVCs households.  
Recognizing the increasing number of OVCs, government had spearheaded social transfer 
provision specifically to orphans through STPA without a major focus on vulnerable children. 
The exclusion of vulnerable children during the formulation of STPA was as a result of the plan 
being “largely guided by a rapid assessment of orphans” without considering ‘the distribution 
and magnitude of problems facing orphans (not to mention other vulnerable children)’ (MLG, 
2006:6). A 2005 MLG-UNICEF supported evaluation concluded that, ‘STPA has managed to 
reach virtually all eligible orphans with food packages’ that ‘helped to protect not only the 
nutritional status of the orphans, but also other children in orphan caregiving households, and 
even caregivers’ (MLG, 2006: xv). The evaluation established that ‘orphan’ food was shared 
among family members suggesting that the Orphan Care Programme basket was already a 
‘family basket’ although the government did not initially see it as such. While acknowledging 
that the ‘move from an orphan to an OVC orientation’ was already underway as some vulnerable 
children in destitute families were supported under the Destitute Persons Programme, the 
evaluation recommended a ‘move from an orphan focus to an OVC focus’ (ibid: xvii).  
Based on these recommendations, the MLG, supported by USAID/PEPFAR, commissioned a 
National Situation Analysis on OVCs in mid-2007. Prior to this analysis, the Destitute Policy had 
defined vulnerable children other than orphans as: “street children; child labourers; children who 
were sexually, physically or emotionally exploited, neglected or abused; children with 
disabilities; and remote area dweller children from minority groups” accounting for 9% (67,900) 
of all children in 2008, doubling from 33,380 in 2003 (MLG, 2008:41). By contrast, MLG 
broadly defined vulnerable children as children “below the age of 18 years who live in an 
abusive environment; live in a poverty-stricken family and cannot access basic services; heads a 
household; lives with a sick parent(s)/guardian; is infected with HIV; lives outside family care” 







children to children ‘below 18 years living in a household where there was no person who was 
gainfully employed’ (constituting 31%) or ‘where there was a person who was critically ill for at 
least three months’ (constituting 4%) (2008:10) to estimate the prevalence of this category of 
children. Similar to the STPA evaluation that observed that, “the rapid rise in the number of 
orphans has coincided with a rise in the number of vulnerable children, including children in 
households caring for orphans, but also other households” (MLG, 2006:8), nearly 31% of 
children were identified as vulnerable (and about 17% as orphans using international orphan 
definition) as they lived in poverty, child-headed households or struggled to grow up in families 
prone to internal conflicts, alcoholism, abuse and poor parenting skills. Almost all OVCs lived 
with family relatives but ‘most of the relatives were unemployed (about 58%), widowed, 
grandmothers with a low education and low income.’ Furthermore, ‘90% of the households were 
female-headed,’ up from 68% of orphan caregiving households in 2001 (MLG, 2008:29). An 
increasing number of unemployed youths were living in poor families and cared for by the 
elderly (43% of heads of households surveyed were grandmothers) highlighting ‘that the burden 
of care is falling on the most aged and frail, the grandmother’  
The OVC situation prompted the MLG through the Social and Community Development 
departments at council level to start registering ‘vulnerable children’	who were not benefiting 
from any other social assistance programmes under the Destitute Persons Programme. Three 
categories of vulnerable children - needy students, needy children and children in need of care106 
– defined as a ‘person below the age of 18 years who is in any situation or circumstance which is 
or is likely to adversely affect the child’s physical, emotional, psychological or general well-
being, which prevents the enjoyment of his or her rights, and who is in need of protection” were 













support as orphans has been increasing. The number increased from 25 483 in 2008 to 29 033 
and a peak of 34 633 in 2009 and 2010 respectively. By October 2015 the number had decreased 
to 33 681 as more children exited the programme compared to entrants. Entrants were few due to 
the shortage of social workers who were overwhelmed by other duties other than assessing 
referred children.  
The unemployment statistics show that the structural challenges facing the family, particularly 
the urban households had extended from AIDS to unemployment. Hamer summarised the 
economic situation, ‘In 2008, the country’s real GDP contracted by 6% and jobs in the mining 
sector fell by almost 10%. Nearly one out of five Batswana lived below the poverty datum line 
and the unemployment rate was 18%, though this rate was no doubt much higher among the 
youth and in rural areas’ (2016a:12). Unemployment related child vulnerability especially 
deepening poverty necessitated the targeting of vulnerable children. The expansion could have 
been part of the Botswana Democratic Party’s strategy to generate support by correcting the 
‘insufficiently inclusive growth’ that had reduced its electoral support (Hamer, 2016a:9). These 
reforms indicate a slight but not clear shift to poverty targeting reflected in the means test 
(chronically ill or unemployed guardians) but provision remained familial in that the programme 
targeted no individual children but families with vulnerable children. Botswana Democratic 
Party always made programmatic responses to the social protection needs of the poor families 
(see reforms of the destitute policy and institutionalisation of drought relief, for example) as the 
‘poor constituency’ formed its strong support base. 
Despite the augmented reach to a wider range of ‘vulnerable’ children, many children continued 
to be excluded from the deserving category because the government remained anxious about 
both ‘dependency’ and ‘affordability’. The Botswana Democratic Party administration expected 
that the situation of vulnerable children would improve and the registered numbers decrease once 
their parents or caregivers were empowered through poverty eradication programmes such as 
Ipelegeng and other government funded income generating activities. With that view, against all 
evidence reported by social workers on the deteriorating situation of vulnerable children, the 






ongoing increase in the number of vulnerable children was considered temporary and did not 
warrant a stand-alone long-term policy intervention.108  
Donors played a significant role in advocating for the expansion of support to other vulnerable 
children other than orphans. Both the 2006 STPA evaluation and the 2008 Situation Analysis on 
OVCs were primarily funded by UNICEF Botswana and USAID/PEPFAR respectively. Through 
the evaluation, UNICEF, an international United Nations agency advocating for universal 
coverage of child social protection globally, successfully lobbied for a paradigm shift among 
policy makers from focusing on orphans to include other vulnerable categories. Together with 
USAID, UNICEF stimulated political will and government financial support to have expanded 
support for OVCs as government agreed that expanding the programme to other vulnerable 
children was a virtuous way of addressing the OVC problem. Government recognised the 
expansion as a way to strengthen the disintegrating family structure struggling to provide for 
children. For USAID, political and financial buy-in of the expansion was important as it was part 
of its exit strategy. At the time of the expansion the Orphan Care Programme was principally 
funded by USAID. USAID’s strategy was first to have government enrol vulnerable children on 
the tax-funded Destitute Persons Programme and later allow government to take over Orphan 
Care Programme. While the government immediately adopted the expansion recommendations, 
it only took over Orphan Care Programme funding in 2013.109   
The USAID-funded Situation Analysis on OVCs became “a precursor to the development of a 
National Policy on Orphans and Vulnerable Children” that would guide the expanded provision 
of essential services to vulnerable children. The draft policy is destined to provide an 
overarching framework to support and guide delivery of ‘comprehensive, inclusive, “age 
appropriate, integrated and quality responses to all vulnerable children” contrasting previous 
OVC responses which tended to both separately focus on orphans and other groups of vulnerable 
children and not well guided, coordinated or monitored (MLG, 2013). The policy, like 
Zimbabwe’s Harmonised Social Cash Transfer, promotes a family care approach to the care and 







“targeted interventions and services provided on the basis of assessed needs and vulnerability”, 
presenting both “government’s intention to promote and protect the rights” of Botswana’s most 
vulnerable children and its minimalist approach to social provision for families with children. 
The proposed policy has gone through two drafts (2009 and 2013) but still awaiting Cabinet 
review, perhaps, because the government would rather support OVCs caregivers through 
employment and self-employment initiatives to strategically limit the number of vulnerable 
children on government support. 
Another unemployment-related reform instituted by the Botswana Democratic Party government 
is the rebranding of the Labour Intensive Public Works Programme (LIPWP), introduced in 1978 
to 2007. LIPWP was a temporary programme implemented as a form of drought relief to provide 
income support to poor families particularly in the rural communities (Ulriksen, 2017). Although 
it does not directly target children, it is likely that some children were reached indirectly as 
children tend to be overrepresented in poor families. The programme, starting with in-kind and 
later cash payments, provided ‘subsistence level’ benefits of about P10 (about US$1) per day 
(Ntseane & Solo, 2007). LIPWP became popular to the rural poor and secured political support 
for the Botswana Democratic Party (Ulriksen, 2017; Molutsi, 1989).  
The LIPWP (now Ipelegeng) was made permanent in 2008, still targeting the poorest but no 
longer drought-related and expanded to urban areas (GoB, 2009), perhaps to curb urban 
unemployment. Despite dependency concerns about Ipelegeng, institutionalising it was the 
Botswana Democratic Party’s political decision to continue soliciting rural political support and 
to win urban voters. 
Most poor people ended up depending on the programme for their livelihoods. The total number 
of people employed increased from about 100,000 in 1992/3 to about 180,000 in 2007 (Ulriksen, 
2017:80). Ipelegeng is said to benefit over 200,000 a year but because people are employed on 
rotational basis, this might be an overestimate. Ulriksen (2017) proposes counting monthly as 
opposed to annual beneficiaries. This might have reduced the participants to about 55,000 in 
2012/3 (World Bank & BIDPA, 2013:x), representing about 3% of the population. It is not clear 
how many children indirectly benefited from the Ipelegeng but an average household has two 
children in Botswana. Hence, children double the number of participants might have been 




Both the rebranding of Ipelegeng and the expanded coverage of OVCs could have helped the 
ruling party to be reelected in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. Rebranding Ipelegeng was 
crucial in securing Botswana Democratic Party electoral support in the highly competitive 2014 
elections (Hamer, 2016a). Literature on conditional cash transfers has shown that voters reward 
presidents and ruling parties who provide cash transfers (De la O, 2015; 2013; Zucco, 2008; 
Zucco & Power, 2013; Hunter & Power, 2007). The provision of unconditional cash transfers in 
Southern Africa also secured incumbent presidents political support to win elections (Hamer, 
2016a; Seekings & Hamer, 2017; Siachiwena, 2017; 2016). 
4.2.4 Social transfer (failed)reforms during the Botswana Democratic Party’s return to 
political security, 2010-15 
 
The Botswana Democratic Party’s share of vote declined from about 68% during the first 
election in1965 to about 52% in 2004. But in 2009, the share increased to about 54% while the 
strongest opposition, the Umbrella for Democratic Change, polled about 22% (declining from 
about 26% in 2004). The slight increase in the Botswana Democratic Party’s share of vote, 
showing increased electoral support in 2009, could have fostered complacence within the party. 
The Botswana Democratic Party had no incentive to make substantial social grants reforms in 
contrast with the pressure experienced after the 1994 elections. A weak electoral threat usually 
contributes to resistance to reforms by incumbent parties like South Africa (Seekings & Nattrass, 
2015). The result of Botswana Democratic Party’s complacence was a period of ‘no reforms’ and 
rejections of proposal for new cash transfer programmes. The complacence might have costed 
the ruling party in the 2014 elections which it won but with less than half of the share of vote. 
Between 2010 and 2013, the only successful change that might have been driven by the 
Botswana Democratic Party’s familial ideology (hence conservative) is the rationalisation of the 
Orphan Care Programme food basket in 2010. Until 2010 each orphan registered under the 
Orphan Care Programme would receive his or her food ration. A household with three orphans 
would receive the same number of food baskets. Rationalisation implied that a ‘family’ food 
basket was provided based on the number of household members’. The basket, therefore, 
depended on family size rather than eligible individuals, suggesting a shift from individual to 




and age of household members. Using this formula, ‘one orphan plus two-family members are 
entitled to one food basket; one orphan plus three or four family members receive one additional 
food basket and; one extra food basket will be allocated for every two additional household 
members.’110  
Rationalisation had earlier been applied to the revised destitute programme where upon 
recognizing that destitute people shared their food rations with other household members, 
government assistance to a destitute household became proportional to the size of the family111 in 
line with the family care approach. This familialist approach was compelled by government’s 
concern about reported wastage of surplus food especially in houses with many orphans but 
received ‘more than enough’, increase in abuse (reselling) of food basket and	 financial 
sustainability of the programme. There was need to ‘rationalize and redistribute’ rations from 
recipient families perceived to be abusing food to other needy groups. Government was also 
aware of the increasing number of OVCs in Botswana but had no stand-alone programme for 
vulnerable children as they were covered under the destitute programme. Realizing that many of 
the households with orphans, and already receiving a food basket, included also other 
‘vulnerable’ children, government rationalized the food basket to allow both orphans and 
vulnerable children to benefit from the basket without having to introduce a transfer specific to 
vulnerable children.  
Rationalisation also implied a reduction in ‘destitute’ families as Orphan Care Programme 
beneficiary households would not qualify for government support under the Destitute Persons 
Programme.112 Consequently, it was effective in ensuring poor families access basic needs but 
created another problem. For families that were not considered under the destitute programme 
but had rationalized food baskets (because they had orphans), vulnerable children in such 











households’ benefited from the food component, vulnerable children in the same households fell 
short of school fees and other education related assistance only available to orphans and needy 
students or children. This exclusion error was a deliberate mechanism, on the part of 
government, to reduce the number of poor families depending on government provision. A 
government official indicated that, ‘It is working for us’. Rather than introducing an 
unconditional child grant targeting all children less than 18 years living in poor families, the 
government opted to rationalize the Orphan Care Programme food basket and that complemented 
by the already rationalized food basket for destitute persons, more poor people were already 
receiving government support. 
Rationalisation of the food basket could have been Botswana Democratic Party’s strategy to 
reject an international organisations and donor proposed ‘Child Support Grant’ similar to South 
Africa’s CSG (Turner et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2010b:98). In 2009/10 government, through 
Department of Social Services in the Ministry of Local Government,	supported by UNICEF and 
the Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme, commissioned a countrywide situation 
analysis and development of a framework for social protection led by a team of international and 
national social protection experts.113 The international consultants were led by Frank Ellis, a UK-
based social protection specialist whose earlier work in Southern Africa in 2008 (Ellis, 2012) and 
elsewhere is against targeted cash transfers. The local consultants were Dolly Ntseane, an 
academic, seasoned researcher and consultant in social policy and social work, based at the 
University of Botswana, and Tebogo Seleka, the Executive Director of Botswana’s leading 
independent development policy think tank with a history of poverty reduction strategies. The 
team identified emerging social protection needs for children and wrote a Social Development 
Policy Framework for Botswana (see reports 1 and 2).  
The purpose of the CSG ‘would be to curb the hunger, malnutrition, social exclusion and other 
forms of deprivation to which many children are vulnerable, especially in poorer families and 
most seriously in their pre-school years, with potentially lifelong consequences.’ Like in South 
Africa, the CSG ‘would involve payment of a regular monthly cash grant, (adjusted annually for 







of GDP (similar to South Africa) in 2010 (but with the anticipated cost dropping to 0.7% by 
2020 as GDP grew and poverty declined) (GoB, 2010). Anticipated to make a broader-based 
assault on poverty and “substantially limit the costs of providing emergency relief in the event of 
shocks and disasters such as drought” (Turner et al., 2011:100), the proposed CSG could be 
introduced incrementally, beginning with the youngest age group (for example, 0-6 years) and 
gradually extending it to all those under 18 years. The CSG initial transfer would be set at “P100 
per month (with subsequent annual consumer price index linking)” and means tested “through 
specifying an appropriate index-linked upper earnings limit for the primary carer and spouse, 
and/or targeting it to poorer parts of the country, in order to concentrate benefits on the most 
needy” (Turner et al, 2010a:13). The rationale for the grant was its potential to combat the 
“vulnerability and inequality that is offered by the patchwork of existing social assistance 
measures” (ibid: 11). 
Despite support from bureaucrats in the Department of Social Protection who thought the CSG 
‘would reduce the administrative burden of screening deserving children as well as reduce 
workload for overburdened social workers’,114 the Botswana Democratic Party government 
rejected the CSG proposal. Instead, it rationalised the food basket to ensure all needy families 
accessed food. The cabinet argued against the CSG, ‘not every child requires government 
assistance and universalism will cause dependency and laziness which is against government 
policy that is encouraging graduation and self-reliance through participation in government 
funded poverty eradication self-help programmes.’115  
This view seemed to be shared among political elites within the Botswana Democratic Party. 
President Ian Khama had reminded “the nation at large that …we need to rekindle our spirit of 
self-reliance” in his 2009 inauguration address to the National Assembly. Makgala (2013) argues 
that ethos of self-reliance and self-help have been part of the Batswana tradition but were being 
eroded and replaced by overdependence on the state. Khama’s speech seemed determined to 
preserve this ethos. Continuing with the current safety nets reduces over reliance on government 







government’s view of the poor, that it should only support those that are poor and not able to 
support themselves and their families through labour. Contrary to evidence from “Mexico’s 
PROGRESA programme and South Africa’s CSG” ascertaining that cash transfers “actually 
reduced dependency by making it possible for recipients to look for and find paid employment” 
(Turner et al., 2010b:71; Surender et al., 2010) the Botswana government perceived that 
introducing the CSG would mean even the ‘working poor’ families will benefit if their income 
fall below the set eligibility threshold and would discourage people from working for their 
families.116 UNICEF, RHVP and other partners had taken the opportunity to build evidence for 
the development of “A Social Development Policy Framework for Botswana” to put the CSG on 
the political agenda but lacked political support from the conservative Botswana Democratic 
Party government that preferred to continue addressing poverty through economic growth rather 
than introducing a more inclusive child grant.  
Despite the political elite’s resistance to reform social transfers, international agencies continued 
to make proposals that seemed to support the Botswana Democratic Party’s preference but they 
were rejected. In 2013 the World Bank collaborated with BIDPA to assess Botswana’s social 
protection system focusing on social assistance programmes to inform the country’s “future 
social protection and labour strategy and help achieve the goals of Vision 2016” (explained later) 
encompassing lifting “84,000 families (336,000 people) from absolute poverty by 2016” (World 
Bank & BIDPA, 2013:3). Even with the existing safety nets a large number of families were still 
living in absolute poverty, the Bank argued. The Bank also observed that these programmes were 
a significant draw on government’s budget at a time “revenues from mining are projected to 
decline” hence the need to “increase the cost effectiveness of existing programmes.” This could 
be achieved through “a better weaving of the safety net through the introduction of a last resort, 
poverty-targeted programme,” a Family Support Grant. Such a programme would eradicate 
poverty in a budget neutral way as it will be funded from 0.4-0.6% of GDP redirected from 
sponsorships and scholarships programmes that accounted for 1.4% of GDP in 2012/3. 
The proposed Family Support Grant would offer ‘a benefit of P85 (US$6) per capita per month 






absolute poverty117 that were not reached by the existing programmes in 2013.’ The grant was set 
to be implemented gradually where its design was to be developed in 2013, ‘piloting in 2014 and 
the full roll out by end of 2015.’ Three options for the Family Support Grant introduction were 
recommended: the first two options suggested ‘replacing existing Destitute Persons and Orphan 
Care programmes with the Family Support Grant that would continue to cover poor and lower-
middle income families taking care of either orphans or have destitute persons’ while a 
‘complimentary Family Support Grant’ was a third option. The last alternative entailed offering 
‘P85 (US$8)/capita/month to all families identified by the proxy-means test as the 24% poorest, 
but only to family members who are not covered by other individual, more generous 
programmes.’ Beneficiaries of Destitute Persons, Orphan Care, Old Age Pensions or Ipelegeng 
programmes will be excluded in the third option. Depending on option taken, the first alternative 
would be budget neutral while options two and three would cost 0.2 or 0.35% of GDP 
respectively. The grant was meant to target families in absolute poverty only, beneficiary 
households would be selected through proxy-means test, receive cash benefits and expected to 
adhere to conditions as government would only provide cash to “poor families contingent on 
them investing in human capital such as keeping their children in school or regularly taking them 
to health centres.”  
Although the Family Support Grant was to be a family-based poverty-targeted programme, 
resonating with the Botswana Democratic Party government’s preferences, the proposed 
implementation mechanisms contrasted Botswana Democratic Party’s preferred social assistance 
design. The Botswana Democratic Party favoured programmes that targeted the indigent and 
provide a safety net as opposed to a poverty-targeted grant. Poverty reduction, as envisioned in 
Vision 2016 and other strategic documents, should be achieved through economic growth 
facilitating market-based interventions. The targeting form, proxy means test, had already been 
rejected in 2007 when BIDPA suggested it for selected safety nets such as the Orphan Care 
Programme (Seleka et al., 2007). At that time, and in 2013, government was more inclined to 
categorical targeting that seemed more appealing to the electorate, an indirect use of social 







small component of the in-kind assistance for adult destitute persons only but government 
mistrusted beneficiaries on their abuse of such benefits. So, the World Bank’s proposal of a cash 
grant was met with obvious resistance.  
A conditional Family Support Grant also did not appeal to the Botswana Democratic Party 
administration as, historically, government did not impose conditions on social allowances. 
Moreover, if introduced, the grant was considered more ‘permanent’ than most of the safety nets, 
save for the Old Age Pension and was likely to promote rather than discourage dependency 
hence contrasting the principle of ‘self-reliance’ envisioned in the ‘national manifesto’- Vision 
2016. As the World Bank anticipated, the Botswana Democratic Party seemed to find it 
‘politically difficult’ to replace existing programmes (options 1 and 2) and concerned about 
financial sustainability (option 3) of endorsing the Family Ssupport Grant. Olobile Gaborone, 
Permanent Secretary in the Office of President and Head of the Poverty Eradication Unit 
distanced himself and government from the Family Support Grant, ‘They [donors] are just 
talking about it and courting us [government] to pilot it but I don’t see that happening. We are 
not part of it at the moment’.118 
Researchers have attributed rejections of proposals for expansion to ‘anxiety about dependence 
and preference of workfare programmes (Seekings, 2017:11). This might be true in relation to 
the general welfare programmes like the Family Support Grant and not child grants. The 
rejection of proposals for new primarily cash transfer programmes that are poverty-targeted also 
reflects the Botswana Democratic Party’s conservative ideology (familial), electoral dominance 
(albeit declining), declining electoral competition, weak civil society and inadequate 
international pressure. 
The evolution of Botswana’s CWR shows strong conservative characteristics, remaining familial 
despite proposals to reform it. Although near-cash social assistance was expanded to almost all 
children through familial provisions, the reforms demonstrate an enduring familial regime. In 
Botswana, children have a de facto right to social protection, programmes have a wider coverage 
but with a perceptible ‘benefit gap’ (low value child support) and, with the rejection of a 






4.3. Explaining Botswana’s child welfare regime 
The distinctive features of the child welfare regime – the result of the evolution discussed above, 
including the rejection of proposals to introduce a Child Support Grant – are the result of 
structural, political, cultural and ideological reasons. This mix of factors sustained the regime’s 
characteristics despite proposals to reform it. It supported a CWR that remained familial (rather 
than poverty-targeted), continued with in-kind support and wide coverage but still governed by 
administrative fiat, not legislation. 
4.3.1 'Structural' factors 
AIDS-related demographic and social changes combined with unemployment to urge the ruling 
party to institute social transfer reforms. Since the diagnosis of HIV in Botswana in 1985, the 
country maintained high prevalence rates. AIDS hindered socio-economic development, 
increased infant and adult mortality and poverty rates as some working age adults were too sick 
to work (BIDPA, 2000). The number of orphans increased dramatically. Concern over AIDS 
orphans prompted the government to prepare and adopt a National AIDS Policy (1998) to reduce 
“the impact of HIV/AIDS on society” through, among other activities, ‘provisions for orphans’, 
reviewing the Destitute Policy ‘to make special provision for children orphaned due to AIDS’ 
and “to make provision for distressed children of parents infected with HIV as well as those sick 
with AIDS” (MLG, 2006:3). The following year the STPA was formulated and the Orphan Care 
Programme was initiated to provide orphans with in-kind benefits to cover their immediate basic 
needs.   
Environmentally, Botswana has always been prone to drought hence the extensive coverage of 
social protection programmes. It became government policy to provide for the need during 
drought and non-drought years (Seekings, 2016a). According to Seekings (2016b:2) ‘drought 
shaped how the Botswana Democratic Party leadership understood not only poverty, but more 
broadly the roles of state, market and kin in meeting people’s basic needs in the new Botswana.’ 
The poor became the responsibility of the community or themselves through labour, writes 
Seekings. For a ‘population dependent largely on subsistence production’, Botswana’s ‘harsh, 
drought-prone physical environment’ (Selolwane, 2012:2) limited subsistence farming to further 




on agriculture for their livelihoods, which are based on low and erratic rainfall, poor soil, limited 
inputs, and rain-fed systems of low productivity’ (World Bank, 2013:15-6). An increase in 
population also increased demand for income support. Government responded through expansive 
food aid. In effect, drought relief expanded the child welfare regime as more children in drought-
affected families benefited from government food aid other than conventional programmes such 
as the Orphan Care Programme. 
Botswana has experienced high rates of unemployment from the 1970s subsequently increasing 
the number of poor families requiring government support. Unemployment increased from 18% 
in 2010 to 20% in 2014 (GoB & UNDP, 2014). In 2014 Afrobarometer reported that 
unemployment was considered the most important problem by 58% of the respondents119.  The 
temporary or short-term problem of deagrarianisation during drought became a long-term 
problem of unemployed adults who were unable to support themselves on the land or through the 
labour market. Hamer (2016a) shows how the government responded in part through making its 
workfare (Ipelegeng) programme permanent, rather than short-term responses to drought. 
Ipelegeng benefited more children indirectly, hence extending coverage of the child welfare 
regime. 
The 2008-9 recession resulted in an increase of people living in poverty due to job loses 
particularly in mining. In response, the government opted to provide a dual regime of social 
protection: “relatively good protection for the categories of the employed and low protection for 
the categories of the unemployed, poor and the rural citizens” (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2012). 
Low protection (parsimonious benefits and covering most but not all the poor) strategically 
discouraged dependency on state.  
Besides, like other countries in the Southern African region, the country has experienced rapid 
social changes that resulted in increasing destitute families, weakened poor families with OVCs 
mostly female and elderly headed in the mid-1990s and the late 2000s. Such family dynamics 
increased children’s vulnerability to multiple deprivations and government opted to provide 
basic essentials in the form of family-based in-kind food benefits and education assistance to a 






Esping-Andersen’s conservative regime type that is ‘committed to the preservation of traditional 
familyhood’ at a time ‘when the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted’ (Esping-
Andersen, 1990:27). Thus, structural factors, especially AIDS and unemployment, became 
important in shaping familial provision of social transfers in Botswana. Despite the changes in 
policies including shifting from orphan to OVC focus, the objective to help the family did not 
changed hence provision remained familialistic. 
4.3.2 Cultural factors  
 
Familialism in Botswana’s CWR was, in part, promoted by the national culture. The reforms of 
the Orphan Care Programme from targeting individual orphans to a family targeted food basket, 
the rationalisation of the food basket to consider all family members and the expansion of the 
food basket to other vulnerable children by targeting their families reflect the government’s 
efforts to preserve the Batswana culture of sharing and keeping the family ties. In the culture and 
tradition of Batswana, before independence in 1966, poverty and destitution were addressed 
through informal social protection arrangements encompassing family and kinship. As such, 
public policy was ‘premised on the idea – prevalent across most of Africa – that ‘traditional’ 
social arrangements addressed poverty in rural areas (Seekings, 2016b:4). The traditional 
(informal) measures were grounded on the notion of botho (also ubuntu, vumunhu, vhuthu or 
humanism in other countries), a concept linked to cooperation and working together and 
“compels individuals and families to care for the needy out of a moral obligation,” (Mupedziswa 
& Ntseane, 2011). On the basis of botho, Batswana believe “those who are privileged at one 
point may become vulnerable at another point, hence the need to support relatives, neighbours 
and community members.” As a result, the family provided needed support and care to motlhoki 
(destitute) (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2011). But such social protection initiatives have been 
daunted by the HIV and AIDS pandemic that weakened traditional support systems and family 
ties in the country since 1985 (Kessy & Tostensen, 2008:112). The provision of modest family-
based social assistance since 2002 for the Destitute Persons Programme and 2010 for the Orphan 
Care Programme became government strategies to promote the botho spirit of sharing among 
family members as well as strengthen the family’s capacity to provide. The strong emphasis on 




universal insistence on keeping orphans within the homes of their extended families, out of 
respect for Tswana traditional practice’ (Dahl, 2009:23-4) could have supported the familial 
CWR in Botswana. 
Apart from prioritizing employment-based welfare, the Botswana Democratic Party governments 
partly appreciated these traditional systems to the extent that it did not extend the formal 
interventions to all the needy children, on the basis that the family would provide. As long as a 
child has an immediate family, the responsibility of providing for that child primarily rests with 
parents even if they are poor. If government decides to assist such poor families the assistance 
should not be mistaken for an entitlement.120 This view, which appears to be shared among the 
political elites, partly explains government’s earlier focus on orphans more than other vulnerable 
children, the lack of legislative framework for the provision of social transfers and the family-
based in-kind support. Despite the apparent weakening of the family, children still largely rely on 
assistance from family and kin. State assistance is, therefore, restricted to those who need it 
most, particularly orphans, vulnerable or destitute children based in rural and remote areas. The 
role of the state is to come up with mechanisms that empower the family to be able to provide for 
its members.121 
Since the advent of AIDS Botswana has gone through rapid socio-economic, cultural and 
political changes. The United Nations Development Programme reported in its Human 
Development Report that, “the extended family can no longer cope with both the quality and 
quantity of care required by children in need of care” (UNDP, 2000).While government has 
acknowledged that these traditional institutions have transformed and have been weakened 
(MLG, 1999), policy makers still believe family and kin must be able to provide with very 
minimum government support.122 The support, extended partly through “a social safety net for 
those who find themselves in poverty for any reason” (GoB, 1997:10), contributes to building a 









seven-pillar123 long-term development strategy, envisioned “national socio-economic progress” 
for all Batswana through inclusive growth. The Vision, guided by the principles of development, 
democracy and self-reliance, underscored the need for self-reliance promoted through citizen 
empowerment programmes designed to graduate people from social safety nets. Since 1996 
when Vision 2016 was initiated, there has been a change from a ‘welfarist’ approach to emphasis 
on economic growth as a means of poverty reduction. Kerapeletswe argues that Botswana has 
been ‘too welfarist’ in its approach to poverty reduction and this has created ‘perpetual 
dependence’ on government which, she concludes, is retrogressive as it has yielded limited 
success in poverty reduction (2008:112). Consequently, child benefits have remained 
parsimonious yet the family is expected to remain ‘strong’. The frailty of such high expectations 
from family and kin on the basis of government’s employment and ‘self-employment’ based 
solutions to improving the welfare of the marginalized is that the impact of many of the 
‘empowerment’ programmes housed in the Poverty Eradication Unit in the Office of President 
are still to be realized. For the political opposition, the programmes have not done much than 
keeping people busy and earning the ruling party more political support than strengthening and 
enabling the family to provide for children.124  
4.3.3 Ideological factors  
 
Botswana’s CWR strongly reflects the Botswana Democratic Party government’s benign 
conservatism since taking power in 1966. Despite the evidence suggesting that poverty-targeted 
grants were more likely to reduce child and household poverty, the Botswana Democratic Party 
rejected the CSG and Family Support Grant proposals. Botswana Democratic Party 
administration’s strategic plans prioritised market-based poverty reduction (through labour), with 
the state providing a safety net largely through in-kind assistance to the “very poor and 
vulnerable groups in society” (Seleka el al, 2007:2). The Revised Destitute Persons Policy 










issue of providing programmes and opportunities which will enable persons to help themselves 
and not call upon government subsidies” (Kessy & Arne, 2008:109).  Similarly, the Remote Area 
Development programme was “targeted at the poorest member of remote communities, not on 
those community members who do have the means for their own sustenance” (MLG, 2009:8). 
Vision 2016 (Tesliuc et al., 2013), Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003) and National 
Development plans all promote the need to grow the economy and self-reliance with minimum 
state support.  
 
These policies reflect the norms of policy-making political elites within the ruling party. 
Botswana Democratic Party’s preference for self-help contradicts with universal cash transfers or 
the provision of general support for poor families with children proposed by international 
agencies and donors hence they were rejected. ‘The Botswana Democratic Party celebrated rural 
life, self-help and community, weaving these into a conservative ideology of social justice that 
decried excessive inequality and legitimated targeted interventions’ (Seekings, 2016a:3). The 
political ideology has perpetuated familial in-kind transfers that survived the change in national 
political leadership that preferred modest food rations to cash, perhaps on the assumption that 
children will be supported by their working parents or caregivers.  
 
The paltry and inconsistent increments of the food baskets for the Orphan Care Programme and 
Destitute Persons programme reflect the Botswana Democratic Party government’s attitude 
towards social grants: that they make people lazy. The attitude is consistent with popular 
discourse of ‘Batswana people as having an appallingly lax work ethic’ (Makgala, 2013:46). The 
attitude is reflected in the parsimonious benefits especially of individual grants. When the Old 
Age Pension was introduced in 1996, the government was very cautious to make the payment 
‘enough to meet reasonable needs’ but ‘did not want it to be so large that people would stop 
doing useful things’ (Masire, 2004:234). Later presidents, Mogae in 2006 (Makgala, 2013:56) 
and Khama in 2009 called Batswana to revive the spirit of self-reliance. Earlier in the 1999, the 
Botswana Democratic Party had underscored in its election manifesto, ‘Let us collectively create 




itsosang'.’125 The elite in Botswana were ‘opposed to cash transfers’ because ‘there is too much 
welfare’ with little impact but ‘creating dependency and laziness’.126 
4.3.4 Political factors 
Botswana did not experience significant CWR reforms during the period of Botswana 
Democratic Party’s political security (discussed in 4.2.1). Political security promoted limited 
familial provision. The conservative Botswana Democratic Party has been democratically elected 
(winning comfortably) and ruled Botswana since independence in 1966. Botswana Democratic 
Party’s election victories have been largely due to its ‘impressive record of development and 
economic growth’ (Hamer, 2016a:2). Party competition between Botswana Democratic Party 
and other parties mainly the Umbrella for Democratic Change and Botswana Congress Party in 
the 1990s caused the Botswana Democratic Party to lose its electoral base especially in the urban 
areas. The competition resulted in the Botswana Democratic Party’s political insecurity that 
urged it to make substantial social transfer reforms. Electoral competition from opposition 
parties, some branding themselves as ‘social democrats’ changed the political landscape in the 
recent past. Support for Botswana Democratic Party started waning after Seretse Khama’s death 
in 1980 and continued declining in the 1990s (see Figure 4.1). “The 1994 election gave the 
opposition Botswana National Front 37% of the vote and since then, ‘elections in Botswana have 
continued to be characterized by this heightened political competition” (ibid: 24)’. Seekings 
corroborates, ‘electoral competition particularly in the mid-1990s provided immediate political 
impetus for the expansion of public policy (2016b:24).’ Both the ruling Botswana Democratic 
Party and opposition Botswana Congress Party 1999 election manifestos advocated for Orphan 
Care Programme reforms but with different details. The Botswana Democratic Party promised an 
AIDS orphans only programme while the Botswana Congress Party would introduce ‘an orphan 
policy’ extended to both AIDS and non-AIDS orphans’. After 1994 elections, the Botswana 
Democratic Party introduced the Orphan Care Programme for all (AIDS and non-AIDS) 








Botswana Democratic Party has leveraged on the split in the opposition vote (Mokopakgosi & 
Molomo, 2004) to maintain its electoral dominance and conservative social policy ideology. 
Earlier, before the 1994 the Umbrella for Democratic Change had promised to expand social 
security (Ulriksen, 2017). After the first major competitive elections in 1994, the Botswana 
Democratic Party sought to regain its political support by engaging in programmatic social 
policy reforms. Political competition urged the Botswana Democratic Party to introduce 
programmes it was initially reluctant to introduce. The conservative reforms (as the expansion 
was limited to ‘destitute persons’ and with less generous benefits), include the introduction of the 
Old Age Pension in 1996 and the Orphan Care Programme in 1999 (introduced during an 
election year).  
Before the 2014 elections the Botswana Democratic Party had always presented itself as pro-
poor, and poor, rural voters were the bedrock of its electoral support. But from 1994 (see Figure 
4.1) the opposition has gained more support especially from the unemployed and working urban 
poor. Electoral competition, like structural changes - AIDS and later unemployment, urged the 
Botswana Democratic Party to revise the details of its pro-poor branding. The result was shifting 
its focus on orphans to other categories of vulnerable children in 2007/8 to gain electoral support 
in the 2009 elections.  
In its 1994, and later 2009 election manifesto, the opposition Botswana National Front did not 
only criticise the Botswana Democratic Party’s failure to reform social protection to address 
increasing unemployment, poverty and collapsed agriculture127 but promised to ‘provide social 
welfare for the most needy’ as a constitutional right through a ‘comprehensive social security 
legislation’. While the Botswana Democratic Party continued emphasizing cash-for-work and 
other Public Employment Programmes, in 2009 elections Botswana National Front labelled itself 
‘a party of the masses, especially for the poor, the working class and sections of the middle 
class’128 and repeated the same 1994 social security promises to challenge the ruling party’s 







the ruling Botswana Democratic Party to enroll vulnerable children (other than orphans) on the 
Destitute Persons programme. 
Nevertheless, the political opposition has not been sufficiently strong to push the ruling 
Botswana Democratic Party to transform the safety nets. Weak opposition might explain the 
Botswana Democratic Party’s rejection of poverty-targeted grants (Family Support Grant and 
CSG) and the enduring familial CWR. The Botswana Congress Party and Umbrella for 
Democratic Change supported proposals for a poverty-targeted CSG and believe Botswana 
Democratic Party’s resistance to embrace such research evidence is political as it anticipate 
resentment and loss of political support particularly from the rural people constituting a larger 
percentage of the electorate and beneficiaries of social transfers. The Botswana Democratic Party 
politicians have a tendency of influencing the registration of some rich people on social 
assistance and it's easier to manipulate categorical than means tested schemes or universal 
programmes. Categorical targeted schemes have been retained for selected categories of families 
with children as they are not discriminatory and maintain social harmony among communities.129 
Thus, the rejection of opposition and donor supported cash transfer programmes show both a 
weak opposition and failed international pressure.  
Weak donor and international influence in Botswana, unlike in Namibia, account for the 
rejection of proposals for poverty-targeted grants and the continued familial system. International 
agencies - UNICEF, USAID and to a lesser extent the World Bank - actively participated 
through financial, technical and logistical support in the various government commissioned 
studies and development of strategic policy documents but could not convince the government to 
shift to either mixed (as in Namibia) or pro-poor provision (as in South Africa). The UNICEF 










2011) recommended ‘A child support grant for Botswana?’131 The Botswana Democratic Party 
rejected the proposals, showing its ideological preferences to familial in-kind support and 
political elites’ ambivalence with cash transfers. Overall the policies, developed in partnership 
with the Department of Social Protection, were important advocacy instruments used to lobby 
government to move from orphan to OVC focus but the ultimate goal of introduction of poverty-
targeted grants has not been achieved. 
Uncoordinated and competing policy positions between donors and international agencies partly 
explain their failure to convince government to shift to poverty targeting. International donors up 
to 2013 had conflicting views about whether to continue targeting orphans only or expand to 
other vulnerable children. UNICEF advocated for universalism (all children) in contrast with 
USAID/PEPFAR which funded the Orphan Care Programme up to that year and was pro-orphan 
targeting until government takes full control of the programme. In disagreement from a child 
rights perspective, UNICEF was pushing for the inclusion of vulnerable children on the Orphan 
Care Programme hence the proposal for a CSG (Turner et al., 2010b). The two donors only 
concurred in 2014 when government finally took over the Orphan Care Programme, a time both 
played more technical than financial roles. From that year they both became enthusiastic about 
universal benefits inclusive of vulnerable children, an idea government is still considering.132 
Meanwhile, the World Bank showed no support for the CSG but advocated for a different 
intervention, the Family Support Grant. On the other hand, civil society organizations led by the 
Botswana Federation of Trade Unions proved very passive in these discussions as most of them 
were inactive, lacked coordination, lacked knowledge on child social protection and were 
preoccupied with labour-related issues.133 The absence of shared policy options and competition 
to propose different but complementary social protection instruments among donors weakened 
their power to push the Botswana Democratic Party to adopt a poverty-targeted CSG that would 










universal poverty-targeted child grant and a Basic Income Grant by donors and civil society in 
Namibia has delayed adoption of either grant as the SWAPO government is court in between 
adopting one or both (see Chapter 3).  
 
The earlier restriction and the later expansion of the food basket to orphans and ‘destitute’ 
children also reflect some elements of patronage by the ruling party. Most orphan caregivers 
were poor elderly people (Dahl, 2014:626). These poor people, as argued by other scholars with 
reference to general welfare regime programmes (Ulriksen, 2017) constituted the Botswana 
Democratic Party’s political support base. Thus, the orphan basket, like the ‘destitute basket’ for 
vulnerable children and drought-induced food aid, is a very popular programme among the rural 
poor and has promoted the familial CWR. In 2015, the poor and vulnerable were overrepresented 
in rural areas in Botswana (World Bank, 2015). This may explain the party’s dominance and the 
outright rejection of international agencies and donors’ proposals for poverty-targeted cash 
transfers.  
 
In summary, the reforms of the CWR in Botswana were programmatic in some ways since the 
government effectively responded to the effects of structural factors (health and demographic 
shocks). The limitation of the transfers initially to orphans and later to other vulnerable children, 
and the resistance to provide general support for families with children like in South Africa and 
more recently in Namibia reflects forms of patronage and ideology. Most post 1994 election 
reforms were driven by electoral competition but the form of benefits (in-kind transfers), familial 








Appendix 4.1: Existing child-focused social grants 




Destitute Persons ( include Vulnerable children i.e. 




Orphaned children School age 
children 




Poor and destitute individuals unable to work 
Eligibility 
criteria 
Child under 18 who has 
lost one (single parents) 
or two 
(married couples) 
biological or adoptive 





Presenting at clinics: 
 
Children <6 years 
 
Pregnant women 
Due to disabilities or chronic ill health, incapable of 
sustainable economic activity, has insufficient assets 
and income sources (<4 LSU or gets <P120/month 
single,<P150/month with dependants) or incapable of 
sustainable economic activity, unreliable and limited 
sources of income due to old age, disability, terminal 
illness. Permanent: completely dependent, not suitable 
for rehabilitation. 
Temporary: suffered disasters, family crises etc., 




community: referral by 
Village/Ward Social 
Welfare Committee, 
VDC or other leaders or 
concerned 
individuals for 
registration by local 
authority. Orphan or 
caregiver may also  apply 
directly 
Categorical Categorical Proxy means testing +community: referral by 
Village/Ward Social Welfare Committee, VDC or 
other leaders or concerned individuals. People	may al 
o apply directly to these committees or to S&CD 
Type of 
transfer 
Food; school fees, 
uniform and other 
education costs; clothing 




psychosocial support by 
local authority social 
workers 
None None	 Shelter; Funeral expenses ;School fees and associated 
expenses for children of destitute families, plus 
psycho-social support, mentoring, career guidance 






CHAPTER 5  	
Agrarian child welfare regimes: The case of Zimbabwe, 1980–2017 
 
  
5.1 Distinctive characteristics of Zimbabwe’s child welfare regime 
 
The child welfare regime (CWR) in Zimbabwe is distinctive because it is an agrarian social 
protection system, primarily targeting the poorest families; the low coverage and low benefits of 
direct cash transfers; and the relatively wide coverage of non-cash benefits. An agrarian CWR is 
promoted by supporting family provision through farming. The government distributes land and 
free farm inputs to peasant farmers to enhance family capacity to provide for their members 
including children. The absence of social pensions including old-age and disability grants in 
Zimbabwe — programmes that in neighbouring South Africa provide massive indirect support 
for children — contributes significantly to the low coverage of social cash transfers. The 
government of Zimbabwe strategically aims to reduce child poverty through reducing household 
poverty; hence, social cash transfers are family - rather than child-specific. Zimbabwe introduced 
cash transfers later than most other countries in Southern Africa because its poverty-reduction 
strategy was largely agrarian. Consequently, Zimbabwe is regarded as a laggard in terms of cash 
transfers in the region, but previous studies of social cash transfers in Zimbabwe often 
overlooked the non-cash components (Mtetwa & Muchacha, 2013; Seidenfeld et al., 2016; 
Siampondo, 2015), which were considered in detail in this chapter. 
 
The distinguishing characteristics of Zimbabwe’s CWR are largely the result of the partisan 
preferences of the ZANU-PF administration. Political insecurity affected the form of the 
interventions (programmatic versus discretionary) more than the fact of the interventions 
themselves. ZANU-PF promotes in-kind social transfers in the form of farm inputs and food aid 
that favour its political ends. In-kind benefits are more easily used for clientelistic purposes than 
cash transfers, especially when donors are putting in place measures to stop the political 
manipulation of cash transfers. ZANU-PF found a winning policy formula in land reform and 
food aid. The CWR resembles Zimbabwe’s general welfare regime, which, both pre- and post-




idealized understanding of agrarian society, and emergency relief in times of drought, not on the 
‘modern’ panoply of cash transfers.  
 
Zimbabwe has a child population of 6.9 million and a national population of 15.6 million (see 
Table 1.1). This chapter examines the provision of social cash transfers to poor families with 
children in Zimbabwe in the context of changing political regimes. Zimbabwe’s CWR consists of 
direct benefits, including school feeding programmes and school and medical fee waivers. 
Indirect social transfers that target poor households with children include cash transfers through 
the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer and Public Assistance programmes. Non-cash components 
include food aid, particularly during drought years, and agricultural farm inputs support. The 
CWR is distinctive in that, like welfare in general in the country, it is highly targeted at the 
poorest families with children, classically agrarian, and focused notionally on land reform, an 
idealized understanding of agrarian society, and emergency relief in times of drought, not on the 
‘modern’ panoply of cash transfers. 
 
Since 2000, Zimbabwe has been under some pressure to provide more fully for its children. 
Zimbabwe might have adopted the child-oriented cash transfer programmes or subsidies 
associated with one or other of the ‘models’ developed by its richer neighbours to the south 
(South Africa, Botswana, Namibia) or models favoured, and promoted energetically, by the 
World Bank, UNICEF, and other external agencies. Zimbabwean governments did implement 
modest reforms, especially under the Government of National Unity between 2009 and 2013. 
But ZANU-PF, which governed alone before 2009 and after 2013, and shared power in between, 
resisted cash transfer programmes, favouring instead programmes that provided (generally 
modest) benefits in kind to families, rather than for the care of individual children, and that 
(except during periods of drought and drought recovery) were highly targeted at the very poor. 
 
In some of these respects Zimbabwe’s welfare regime during this period was similar to 
Botswana’s, but there were crucial differences even between these two cases. Zimbabwe had 
neither a dedicated child grant nor old-age pension, whereas Botswana had universal cash 
transfers for orphans and the elderly. Botswana’s welfare regime was also familial, but its 




reason for these differences lay in the Zimbabwean government’s preference for an agrarian 
welfare regime — that is, one that addressed risks of poverty primarily through agricultural 
production. Zimbabwe’s constitution revealingly imposes a duty on citizens to produce for 
themselves, whilst imposing vague obligations on the state to provide for the destitute. Whereas 
South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia were essentially post-agrarian societies, Zimbabwe 
retained a plausible agrarian option. This meant that the models provided by its regional 
neighbours were deemed less appropriate, and even the models advocated by international 
agencies were considered less important than programmes to support peasant agriculture. 
 
The policy models favoured by ZANU-PF were not cash transfer programmes but farm input 
subsidy programmes. These were particularly appealing to ZANU-PF when it faced severe 
electoral challenges from the urban-based political opposition. The only major cash transfer 
programme that has been implemented — the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer — was 
introduced under the Government of National Unity. Although the post-2013 ZANU-PF 
government has not abolished it, it did rein it in, and has invested instead in small farmer 
support. An economic and fiscal crisis has constrained the scope for expensive interventions, but 
ZANU-PF’s ambivalence towards cash transfer programmes represents political choices 
informed by the nature of Zimbabwean society and politics. The expansion and contraction of 
the child welfare regime in Zimbabwe, at different moments of policy change, as discussed later, 
was characteristic of the ZANU-PF led government and the unpredictability of the reforms had 
everything to do with party politics and not funding. 
 
Whilst it is the post-agrarian societies that provide most or all of the models for cash transfer 
programmes, Zimbabwe (together with Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique) is different in that 
the agrarian society has survived: these are (outside of drought years) non-arid environments, 
with strong peasant sectors, in stark contrast to South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia. 
Moyo (2011a, 2011b, 2013:26) describes Zimbabwe as ‘a largely agrarian society’. In 
Zimbabwe, agriculture provides livelihoods to 80% of the population, accounts for 23% of 




earnings.134 Zimbabwe’s CWR does not fit easily into either Esping -Andersen’s ‘three worlds of 
welfare capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990) nor typologies of CWRs in the North (Bradshaw, 
2012; Daly & Clavero, 2002). It fits better Seekings’ classification of social provision in the 
global South. Seekings distinguishes between agrarian regimes that promote kinship support and 
strengthen ‘peasant agriculture through shaping access to land … products markets … and 
production systems’ with a primary objective to reduce poverty, and pauperist regimes that 
target ‘deserving categories of very poor people through highly targeted non-contributory social 
assistance (Seekings, 2012:18). In Zimbabwe, as in most of Africa until the late 20th century, 
states (at best) tried to build the capacity of families to produce more and be more self -reliant: 
‘The families were and are the main sources of support for the African poor, as much for the 
young unemployed of modern cities as for the orphans of the past’ (Iliffe, 1987:7). Until 
recently, social assistance in Zimbabwe remained steeped in the tradition of the Poor Laws, 
targeted at the poorest of the poor (Kaseke, 2011). This chapter discusses the distinctive 
characteristics, evolution and suggest explanations to the reforms of the agrarian CWR in 
Zimbabwe. In Chapter 6, I shall examine more fully how and why CWR in Zimbabwe is 




Social cash transfer coverage in Zimbabwe is low: transfers reach at most 24% of all children; on 
average, any given programme covers only 6% of all children. Even Zimbabwe’s flagship cash 
transfer programme, the Harmonized Cash Transfer Programme, reached less than 1% of 
children (in 25,598 households) in August 2016, down from about 2% (in 55,509 households) in 
February 2016. Coverage is lower than most other countries in Southern Africa, including its 
neighbours South Africa (95%), Botswana (85%), and Namibia (67%). 
 
Though, donor-supported in-kind benefits through food aid for poor children have been 
benefiting more children, reaching about half of all children in 2008 - an increase from 26% in 






agrarian route. The Agricultural Input Pack Support Programme has the highest coverage of the 
in-kind benefits programmes at 24% of all children. 
 
In terms of programmes’ legal status, social protection is a vague right under the constitution, but 
is not enshrined in legislation. Article 30 of the 2013 constitution provides for social welfare and 
requires the state to ‘provide social security and social care to those who are in need’. Article 
19(1) of the constitution requires the state to adopt policies and measures ‘to ensure that in 
matters relating to children, the best interests of the children concerned are paramount’. The state 
first and foremost protects children by protecting the family, i.e. by providing care and assistance 
to caregivers (Article 25(a)). In terms of food security, the state must ‘secure the establishment 
of adequate food reserves’, but Section 15(a) of the constitution provides that it is the duty of 
people (families) ‘to grow and store adequate food’; hence the strategic emphasis on social 
protection through agriculture, as will be shown later. The constitution (Article 27(1)(a)) also 
compels the state to provide ‘free and compulsory basic education for children’. 
 
Nevertheless, the Social Welfare Assistance Act [Chapter 17:06] of 1988 (amended in 2001) 
legislates the provision of Public Assistance (PA) to persons in need and their dependants 
(including any child of the applicant or beneficiary, a step-child, legally adopted child, or child 
born posthumously who is under 18 years of age). This is a very narrow definition of dependant, 
as it does not include extended kin such as grandchildren. With the exception of PA, the various 
programmes are not written into law. There is no legislation comparable with the Social 
Assistance Act in South Africa, for example. 
 
In terms of generosity of benefits, Zimbabwe’s CWR is characterized by low-value income 
support relative to the poverty line and GDP per capita (US$885 in 2015 — World Bank 2016). 
Cash transfers fall below both the Food Poverty Line — consumption expenditure necessary to 
ensure that an individual can (if all expenditure is devoted to food) consume a food basket 
representing 2,100 calories at US$30/person/month, or US$151 for an average of five persons 
per household in July 2016 — and the Total Consumption Poverty Line — the poverty level 
below which individuals are unable to purchase both non-food and food items, at 




(ZIMSTAT, 2016b:2;5). The Harmonised Social Cash Transfer offers US$10–25/month/family 
depending on family size, an amount below the Food Poverty Line and much less than the Total 
Consumption Poverty Line in 2016.135 Thus, the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer benefits 
translate to US$0.16/person/day (or US$5/person/month), an amount far much less than the 
international absolute poverty line of US$1.90/person/day. 
 
In addition to these cash transfers, poor families with children receive non-cash transfers. It is 
difficult to ascertain the monetary value of non-cash benefits given that some transfers are not 
regular (e.g. monthly), while others are just one-off grants, such as agricultural inputs. 
Nonetheless, a limited number of orphans and vulnerable children enjoy fee waivers for 
education, through the Basic Education Assistance Module, and for intermediate and tertiary 
health services, via Assisted Medical Treatment Orders. Orphans and vulnerable children also 
benefit from in-kind transfers through school and Seasonal Targeted Assistance programmes, the 
Health and Nutrition Safety Net, and the Agricultural Input Pack Support Scheme. The 
inadequacy of both cash and non-cash social transfers, together with low coverage, partly 
accounts for the fact that 78% of all children live in poverty (below the Total Consumption 
Poverty Line) in Zimbabwe (in 2016). Inadequate social transfers also contribute to general 
household poverty. The percentage of people below the Total Consumption Poverty Line 
remained at 61% between 1995 and 1999, rose to 75% in 2000, and remained at that level until 
2003 before increasing to 80% in 2013, though it fell to 72% in 2016.136 
5.1.2 Familialist targeting 
 
Zimbabwe’s CWR is located in the general agrarian regime; hence, social transfers are familialist 
— largely targeting the family. The government focuses on peasants and family, and kin are 
central to social provision. Seekings (2010: 27) describes such regimes as agrarian. Unlike most 
countries in Southern Africa, which have adopted child grants paid to caregivers of children, 
Zimbabwe has not introduced a child-specific cash grant. In his presentation at the National 







of Child Welfare and Probation Services in the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social 
Welfare, said that social transfers in Zimbabwe aim to first address household poverty by 
increasing household consumption of goods and services and indirectly to reduce child 
poverty.137 
 
As in Botswana, where there are familial safety nets, poor families with children in Zimbabwe 
receive family-based cash and in-kind benefits. But Zimbabwe is familial in a wider sense than 
Botswana. Botswana also targets families, in contrast with South Africa and Namibia, which 
provide grants for individual caregivers (often causing discord within families, as patriarchal 
relations are undermined). Botswana also provides for families in the event that a child is 
orphaned (as, in effect, do South Africa and Namibia). Zimbabwe does not even do this, or at 
least not directly. The presumption in Zimbabwe is that the extended family, in an agrarian 
society, will take care of children, even orphaned children. 
5.2 The evolution of Zimbabwe’s child welfare regime: changes and choices, 1980–2017 
State provision for poor families with children has gone through four key moments of change 
and choice between 1980 and 2017. The reforms happened as the ruling ZANU-PF’s political 
security waxed and waned. In the first phase, between 1980 and the late 1990s, when the ruling 
ZANU-PF was politically secure—with no strong opposition—the government continued to 
provide for the indigent on the basis of poor laws, particularly through Public Assistance, land 
redistribution, and food aid. 
 
In the second phase, between 2000 and 2008, after the rise of the Movement for Democratic 
Change opposition party in 1999, ZANU-PF became insecure and sought to consolidate its 
political power. ZANU-PF strengthened its land reform programme in 2000 and responded to 
the deepening economic crisis, largely due to its own economic mismanagement, by introducing 
Basic Education Assistance Module for OVCs in 2001. The government responded to recurrent 
droughts by partnering with United Nations agencies and donors to provide expansive food aid 
programmes as well as promoting temporary public works programmes as part of drought relief 






Zimbabwe’s economic crisis worsened, state capacity to provide for the poor weakened, and 
poverty escalated. In an attempt to foster self-reliance, ZANU-PF introduced a presidential farm 
input scheme for subsistence farmers, particularly in rural areas, in 2008. 
 
In the third phase, between 2009 and mid-2013, during the Government of National Unity 
between ZANU-PF and Movement for Democratic Change formations, Zimbabwe introduced its 
highly poverty-targeted cash transfer programme, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer, in 
2010/2011 — largely influenced by donors. 
 
In the post-Government of National Unity phase, from mid-2013 to the present (2017), the new 
ZANU-PF government reverted to its ambivalence towards cash transfers, significantly 
downscaling the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer in preference to Command Agriculture, 
providing inputs to support smallholder farmers, most of whom had benefited from the land 
redistribution programme. Command Agriculture complemented the existing presidential input 
scheme. These reforms sustained the familial agrarian regime, largely offering non-cash benefits 
(food aid during drought and farm inputs), and modestly increased the coverage of social cash 
transfers (most of which continued to have no statutory basis). 
5.2.1 Social cash transfers under a politically secure ZANU-PF, 1980–1999		
 
After independence in 1980, the ZANU-PF led government, like most post-colonial governments 
in Southern Africa, continued with the provision of public assistance to the indigent. ZANU-PF’s 
political security until the 2000s resulted in the party enjoying the comfort of majority support. 
After independence in 1980, ZANU-PF dominated the political space including social policy 
making. Dorman (2016:2) argues that in independent Zimbabwe, the ‘process of politically 
driven nation- and state-building institutionalized ZANU (PF)’s control of the political sphere 
and monopoly on political representation.’ Without electoral competition, ZANU-PF 
governments felt no need to expand social programmes. At independence, the ZANU-PF 
government had inherited an old-age pension scheme similar to South Africa’s, but limited to 
white citizens, and a means tested and parsimonious public assistance system along the lines of 
colonial Poor Laws. Before independence, Public Assistance had been limited to the aged, blind, 




than extend them to all Zimbabwean citizens. Continuing concerns over indigent families caring 
for children meant that the Public Assistance survived; it was even expanded to cover all 
destitute citizens and their dependants, where destitution was ‘due to old age, unemployment, 
sickness, disability, or death or desertion of a breadwinner’ (Kanyenze et al., 2011:380), but was 
limited to destitute individuals ‘who are unable to get assistance from their families’ (Kaseke, 
1988:6). Child-headed households were also targeted by Public Assistance, since they were 
considered destitute families. Children benefit indirectly from Public Assistance as ‘dependants 
of indigent persons’ (Kaseke, 2003:35).138 The adoption of Public Assistance at independence 
demonstrates the importance of colonial history in shaping social policy in Zimbabwe, as in 
much of Anglophone Africa. Poor funding, low coverage and ungenerous benefits of the 
programme post-independence reflect ZANU-PF’s political manipulation of the programme to 
keep the poor in poverty and buy their loyalty. 
 
Public Assistance has low coverage and small benefits because of poor funding, and often 
irregular and unpredictable payments. The number of beneficiaries declined from 69,308 in 1994 
to 20,562 in 1998 (Munro, 2003:14). As of 2014, beneficiary households received parsimonious 
monthly benefits of US$20/household irrespective of household size. The benefits represent 20% 
of the Total Consumption Poverty Line for a single-member household and 4% of the Total 
Consumption Poverty Line for a family of five (World Bank, 2014:11). Public Assistance 
includes Assisted Medical Treatment Orders for orphans and vulnerable children. Assisted 
Medical Treatment Orders are ‘fee waivers/vouchers issued to indigent persons to facilitate 
access to intermediate and tertiary health services, such as a provincial or national hospital or 
other specialist facility’ (Kanyenze et al., 2011:386). In 2011, Assisted Medical Treatment 
Orders benefited 25,000 individuals (inclusive of children)—up from 9,625 in 2008 (Chikova, 
2013:2; Chitambara, 2012:16). 
 
Besides Public Assistance, a key programme introduced post-independence but heightened in the 
2000 when ZANU-PF faced competitive elections is land redistribution to peasant farmers. 







to land’ and where ‘land reform programmes, and ensuing government support for small farmers, 
can provide poor families with the opportunity to produce for either their own consumption or 
for the market’ aptly describes and distinguishes Zimbabwe’s CWR. The ruling ZANU-PF party 
has sought to fight poverty through land redistribution since independence in 1980. At 
independence, a white minority continued to exploit ‘varsity’ land — individual farms averaging 
2,000 ha — for large-scale commercial farming at the expense of the peasantry. Between 1980 
and 1999, ‘Zimbabwe pursued a market-based land reform programme’ that did not result in the 
large-scale transfer of previously white-owned land to peasants (Moyo, 2013:201). Since 2000, 
ZANU-PF has redistributed previously white-owned land to small-farm families largely of rural 
origin and black commercial farmers’ (Bratton, 2014:76; Moyo, 2013:42; Scoones et al., 2011a; 
2011b). 
 
Through land reform, ZANU-PF emphasized social protection through agriculture, promoting 
family provision. Section 15(a) of the constitution provides that it is the duty of people (families) 
‘to grow and store adequate food’ (GoZ, 2013:25). Post-independence land reforms that earned 
president Mugabe popularity within Zimbabwe and internationally (Mamdani, 2008) broadened 
‘access to land and promot[ed] peasant productivity’ (Moyo, 2013:30) as well as improving 
beneficiaries’ living standards (Hanlon, 2013; Scoones et al., 2011a; 2011b). Low agricultural 
productivity has compelled ZANU-PF governments to rely heavily on food aid, largely from the 
United Nations World Food Programme, with less consideration for direct cash transfers for 
poor families with children.  
 
Despite falling aggregate agricultural production after the fast-track land reform of the 2000s, for 
some small farmers, production and living standards have improved, particularly in the 
countryside, where some formerly very poor people are now more food secure. Although land 
reform is said to have largely benefited President Mugabe’s cronies (Bond, 2005; Moyo, 
2013:37; Robertson, 2011; Scoone,s 2014:102), the government largely supports agriculture as 
the primary poverty reduction strategy. 
 
During the period of ZANU-PF’s political security, the party secured its rural political base by 




has experienced successive droughts, which have threatened agricultural productivity. Munemo 
(2012) writes that in the 1980s and 1990s President Mugabe was quick to respond to drought 
through ‘expansive relief programmes’ including employment creation programmes. These 
programmes earned Mugabe international recognition. Political insecurity subsequently 
weakened Mugabe’s commitment to such programmes, and by the mid-1990s, he had 
‘progressively moved [away] from offering the broad programmes of relief’ (Munemo, 2012:88). 
Political crisis in the late 1990s led him to revive food aid programmes as he ‘politicized’ relief 
in order to consolidate his power. As Munemo (2012:88) explains: ‘Mugabe’s adoption of 
drought relief programmes reflected his own political strength or weakness, shifting as his 
standing changed’. When Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party ‘faced insecure political environment 
[…] they responded to droughts by adopting food aid programmes for adults’; when they were 
more secure, ‘drought-relief programmes for adults shifted away from free food aid to cost-
effective programmes that avoided dependency and limited waste, such as food for work’ 
Munemo (2012:88). As discussed later, ZANU-PF continued to rely on emergency food aid in 
drought years when its political insecurity intensified in the 2000s. 
5.2.2 Social cash transfers under a politically insecure ZANU-PF, 2000–2008  
 
The rise of an effective political opposition — the Movement for Democratic Change—caused 
considerable political discomfort to ZANU-PF (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008). The labour-led 
MDC was the first opposition party to challenge ZANU-PF’s domination of post-colonial 
politics in Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos, 2000; Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004). The rise of the 
Movement for Democratic Change was in part a response to ZANU-PF’s policy reforms. The 
deteriorating economy meant that ZANU-PF had had to remove subsidies on basic social 
services (including education and health) as well as food under the 1991 Framework of 
Economic Reform Programme, drawn up as part of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme, with technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
(Britz & Tshuma, 2013:174). This had contributed to an increase in poverty from 40% in 
1990/91 to 63% in 1995/96 (CSO, 1998). Faced not only with rising poverty but also with a new 
and energetic political opposition, ZANU-PF began to consider new reforms. 
 




government resuscitated school fee waivers to OVCs through the Basic Education Assistance 
Module. Although the constitution requires the government to provide free basic education, 
ZANU-PF has not honoured such provisions but instead offered school fee waivers to a few 
OVCs. In 1995, the government had introduced a Social Dimensions of Adjustment programme 
to mitigate the effects of structural adjustment on vulnerable groups, including children (Mhone, 
1995; Mutasa, 2015). As part of this programme, the government had introduced waivers of 
school and examination fees, particularly for poor urban households (Kanyenze et al., 
2011:381). These fee waivers had been discontinued in 1998, despite the continued increase in 
child poverty, due to HIV/AIDS and drought-induced low agricultural productivity as well as 
structural adjustment. 
  
In 2001, the government and donors resuscitated the defunct fee waivers through the Basic 
Education Assistance Module. OVCs constituted 27% of the 3.6 million or so pupils in school 
too poor to pay school fees and levies (MLSS, 2012a). The Basic Education Assistance Module 
was one of government’s largest pro-poor poverty alleviation strategies, aimed at reducing 
school dropouts and ‘reach out to children who have never been to school due to economic 
hardships’ (Mutasa, 2015:155). With a pool of donor funds managed by UNICEF for primary 
students and government funding for secondary students, the programme maintained coverage of 
about 80% of needy children until 2006, but declining donor funding and government allocations 
in the face of increasing demand reduced the Basic Education Assistance Module coverage from 
2007. Over the years, the Basic Education Assistance Module received more funding than other 
cash transfers (see Figure 5.1) but less than non-cash transfers (farm inputs), partly to honour the 
right to free education enshrined in Article 27(1)(a) of the constitution and to eliminate ‘the risk 
of impairment of one’s capacity to earn income through lack of basic education’ (Chikova, 
2013:2). By 2008, the Basic Education Assistance Module was dysfunctional, without any 
government disbursements. As discussed later, donors collaborated with the Movement for 
Democratic Change-led Ministry of Education to resuscitate the Basic Education Assistance 








Figure 5.1: BEAM funding compared to other social cash transfers, 2011-2016 
	
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
ZANU-PF also sought to regain its lost political support by providing drought relief through 
public works and feeding programmes that primarily targeted the rural populace. Since the 
2001/02 drought, ZANU-PF has sought to consolidate its waning political power by offering 
relief programmes, including Community Feeding, Vulnerable Group Feeding, the School 
Feeding Programme, and public works programmes in rural areas. Recurrent drought (due to 
increasingly erratic rainfall patterns), a series of poor harvests, high unemployment, restructuring 
of the agriculture sector, and high HIV/AIDS prevalence—about 15%, the fifth highest in the 
world—have all contributed to increasing levels of vulnerability and acute food insecurity since 
2000. Drought necessitated large-scale humanitarian food relief operations in the country (WFP 
2016a, 2016b). 
 
Community Feeding (and the Health and Nutrition Safety Net) for children under five years of 
age reached 200,000 women and children in 2012/13 (World Bank, 2014:8). Beneficiary 
households received monthly cash transfers of US$8/person/month or in-kind food rations. Cash 
was limited to selected areas with better market supplies. This assistance was only for the lean 





















The Vulnerable Group Feeding programme, which largely distributes in-kind benefits, has been 
one of the programmes with the highest coverage among poor families with children. The 
Vulnerable Group Feeding programme reached 27% of all children in 2006 and 42% in 2008 as 
the economic crisis deepened and drought continued to hit hard. By 2009, almost half of 
Zimbabwe’s population depended on international food aid (Bratton, 2014:85). Although food 
aid was at times perceived as creating a dependency syndrome and was publicly downplayed by 
the ZANU-PF government, particularly between 2006 and 2008, the government’s incapacity to 
provide food aid forced it to accept food donations (WFP, 2012:16). 
 
The School Feeding Programme, also initiated and funded by the WFP in 2002 to respond to the 
2001/02 drought, provides one meal to school-going pupils in selected schools in poor 
communities. Until 2008, the School Feeding Programme (like the Vulnerable Group Feeding 
programme) remained solely a donor-funded ‘emergency’ programme under the ZANU-PF 
administration. As will be shown later, the Government of National Unity transformed the 
School Feeding Programme into a permanent nutritional intervention. 
 
In this period, the government also supported insecure rural households through public works 
programmes. In 2002, in partnership with the World Food Programme, it started implementing 
temporary programmes for the duration of the drought and recovery period. Non-Governmental 
Organizations, funded by the World Bank, World Food Programme, United States Agency for 
International Development , and the United Kingdom Department for International 
Development, now also implement short public works in selected districts. The government’s 
Drought Relief Public Works Programme (also the Food-Cash for Assets/Community Works 
Programme or Food Mitigation Programme) targets food-insecure labour-endowed and labour-
constrained households in geographically selected food-insecure districts (MLSS, 2010). To be 
eligible, the able-bodied should ‘participate in community projects for a 15-day working month’, 
while labour-constrained households receive free food (Chikova, 2013:3; Kanyenze et al., 
2011:388). Public works programmes offer parsimonious benefits (US$20/month per household 
in cash or in-kind food rations of one 50 kg bag of maize meal per family per month) for a 15-





Children in participating households benefit from public works indirectly. Kanyenze et al., 
(2011) assert that cash benefits allow beneficiaries to buy inputs or food or to pay school fees for 
their children. Participating adults (caregivers) prioritize and invest their wages in the human 
capital development of children. The World Bank reported that the 2011/12 public works project, 
the Productive Community Works programme, benefited 5,580 labour-endowed people, who 
devoted more than half of their wages to children’ s education, using the rest to buy food and 
grain (World Bank, 2014:14). Together, public works programmes covered approximately 7% of 
all children in 2016. 
 
In 2008, ZANU-PF employed the politics of patronage by introducing an Agricultural Input Pack 
Support Programme that supported its agrarian CWR and secured political support in the rural 
areas. In the early 1980s, the ZANU-PF government had encouraged peasant production through 
land redistribution, improved marketing, and credit lines. Basking in the glory of its election 
victories, ZANU-PF had abandoned these schemes in the 1990s. In the period leading to the 
2009 election, President Mugabe established the presidential Agricultural Input Pack Support 
Programme in support of the agrarian welfare regime. The programme revitalized agriculture 
following the collapse of financial schemes for farmers since the land reform programme in the 
2000s. The programme had wide coverage, second only to food aid. It promoted self-reliance 
and discouraged donor and government dependency. Mugabe said that the programme 
‘empower[s] our farmers for greater crop production’.139 Moses Moyo, ZANU-PF Umguza 
District Coordinator, said that the programme teaches people ‘not to depend on donors but to be 
self-reliant so that we work on the land so that we feed our families’.140 
 
The Input Scheme now receives a higher budget allocation than any other social programme and 
largely covers households that benefited from the land reform programme from 2000.141 The 










50 kg of topdressing ammonium nitrate fertilizer, 50 kg of lime, and, depending on rainfall 
patterns, either 10 kg of maize seed or 10 kg of millet or sorghum seed. Most children indirectly 
benefit from the scheme. Approximately half (49%) of all children benefited from the input 
scheme in 2014/15. This decreased to about a quarter (24%) in 2016/17, but it is still the social 
programme with the highest national coverage. Given that 900,000 households are considered 
poor in Zimbabwe (MPSLSW 2016: 32; ZIMSTAT 2013), the input scheme covered all poor 
households in 2013/14 and 2014/15 but coverage fell to about 89% in 2016/17. 
 
The Input Scheme, which is supposedly a government programme, has remained discretionary, 
with no clear selection criteria. It is usually implemented by the president’s office in 
collaboration with ZANU-PF councillors and traditional leaders including chiefs,142 and at times 
with the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Public Service and Social Welfare (MPSLSW), 
which is responsible for family and child welfare, is not involved in the implementation of the 
programme. Heal Zimbabwe, a Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation in Zimbabwe, 
reported the exclusion of known Movement for Democratic Change supporters and the partisan 
inclusion of ZANU-PF party loyalists. Individuals believed to have refused ‘assisted voting’—
where voters are coerced to feign illiteracy and choose ZANU-PF election agents to write voting 
preferences on ballot papers on their behalf — during elections are accused of supporting the 
political opposition and are denied the inputs.143 At some distribution points, Movement for 
Democratic Change supporters are allegedly asked to surrender party membership cards and 
regalia in order to receive the inputs.144 
 
Thus, ZANU-PF preferred food aid and land reform to direct cash, favouring programmes that 
largely benefit the rural population, from whom ZANU-PF mainly draws its support (Britz & 
Tshuma, 2013:173). Indeed, food aid intensified ZANU-PF’s patronage. During the 2000–2008 
economic crisis, for example, ‘Agricultural inputs and maize intended for food relief were sold 








while these supplies were withheld from persons suspected of opposition sympathies’ (Bratton, 
2014:86). 
5.2.3 Social cash transfers under the Government of National Unity, 2009–2013		
 
Before the Government of National Unity was formed, in 2009, Zimbabwe had experienced a 
decade of socioeconomic meltdown and political instability, and weak and deteriorating social 
services and safety nets. As has been seen, government policies had been impromptu, 
inconsistent, and unpredictable. The new government crafted sound economic policies and 
immediately implemented them to restore macro-economic stability and put the economy on a 
path to recovery. Nevertheless, the economy remained fragile, and constrained public revenues 
meant low levels of public investment in the social sectors and the persistence of poverty (GoZ, 
2013:74). 
 
Despite these financial constraints, the Government of National Unity made progress in social 
policy reforms that helped households with children better manage risks such as child poverty. 
The Government of National Unity resuscitated the defunct Basic Education Assistance Module 
programme to provide fee waivers to the increasing number of OVCs, and the Movement for 
Democratic Change-led Social Services Ministry introduced cash transfers the ZANU-PF 
government had not considered up to 2008. A key reform that partially shifted family provision 
from primarily an agrarian regime to a poverty- targeted cash based CWR was the adoption and 
expansion of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme. 
 
The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme, which targeted poor households, not children 
per se, was introduced in 2010/11— later than most of Zimbabwe’s neighbours in Southern 
Africa — amidst strong pressure from international donors and agencies. The Harmonized Social 
Cash Transfer programme modestly expanded the coverage of social cash transfers, increased the 
value families received, and partially shifted Zimbabwe’s child social protection mechanisms 
from non-cash to cash transfers. The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme provided 
benefits of between US$10 and US$25 per month, depending on household size. In districts 
where Public Assistance still existed, this was transformed into a more programmatic cash 




Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme. The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer 
programme targeted 10% of households in each district, an enormous increase over Public 
Assistance. Still, many very poor households were still excluded (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016: 
20). 
 
Eligible households were identified through a targeting census conducted by ZIMSTAT (the 
national statistical agency) to avoid ‘complications of community targeting and mitigate the 
potential for community politics’ (Seidenfeld et al., 2016:232)—i.e. partisan or government 
abuse of cash transfers. Eligible households had to be ‘food poor’ (i.e. living below the Food 
Poverty Line and unable to meet urgent, basic needs) and ‘labour constrained’ (have high 
dependency due to age, disability, or chronic sickness) (MLSS, 2012b:12–13). These households 
were targeted because they contained all the vulnerable groups, including OVCs, that urgently 
required social protection. At the time of the design of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer 
programme, 78% of households in Zimbabwe were living below the Total Consumption Poverty 
Line and more than half (55%) below the Food Poverty Line. About 20% of food-poor 
households were also labour-constrained, with approximately 750,000 children. As a child-
sensitive programme (Roelen & Sabates-Wheeler, 2012), the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer 
Phase 1, targeting 10 districts, showed that most (85%) of the targeted 10% households had 
children (85%). Forty-two percent of the beneficiary children were orphans (MLSS, 2012b: 8–9). 
 
Targeting was also a result of the convergence of donor interests and the priorities of Movement 
for Democratic Change ministers within the Government of National Unity on the provision of 
social protection to mitigate poverty and deprivation. In 2009, the Movement for Democratic 
Change Finance Minister, Tendai Biti, had identified ‘the elderly, orphans and child-headed 
families as well as the physically handicapped’ as ‘specially targeted vulnerable groups’ 
requiring immediate social protection (GoZ, 2009:26). These groups constituted about 10% of all 
households in Zimbabwe in 2009 (Schubert, 2010c:62). 
 
The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was partly based on ‘lessons learned from the past and 
ongoing cash transfer programmes implemented by Government and Non-State-Actors’ 




implemented in the past provide a strong motivation for considering potential alternatives’. 
Instead of targeting the individual, for example, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer targeted 
the household on the basis that non-state cash transfers had not benefited the most vulnerable and 
were least likely to address the causes of poverty. 
 
The familial design of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer also reflects the policy transfer 
promoted by international donors, led by UNICEF. Before introducing the Harmonized Social 
Cash Transfer in Zimbabwe, UNICEF, in consultation with a renowned German cash transfer 
expert, Bernd Schubert, and his Team Consult, had trialled a familial model targeted at poor and 
labour-constrained households in Zambia (Siachiwena, 2016) and Malawi (Hamer, 2016b). 
 
The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was test run in one district (Goromonzi) in late 2010 and 
was set to expand through a phased approach (due to human and financial capacity limitations in 
the ministries of Social Services and Finance). By late 2011, under the first ‘scale-up’ phase, the 
Harmonized Social Cash Transfer had reached 10 districts to benefit 19,827 households. By the 
end of the Government of National Unity, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer had reached 16 
districts, benefiting 39,004 households. 
 
Nonetheless, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was introduced in a complex political context 
(two wards, for example, did not initially wish to distribute cash, as some political leaders 
claimed they had not been involved in the targeting process). To mitigate the risk of political 
manipulation, an independent targeting process and methodology were defined in the 
Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Operational Manual. Donor visibility was low to minimize 
any political challenges in the first phase but improved in the second phase, when donors 
adopted a targeting strategy that minimized inclusion and exclusion errors by monitoring the 
exclusion error rate and limiting the number of households benefiting from the programme 
during the first phase of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (Department of International 
Development, 2012:5). 
 
One particular individual within government played an important part in the introduction of the 




Department of Social Services (DSS) in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services (MLSS; later 
MPSLSW), became the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer champion. Schubert describes 
Mhishi’s contribution as an ‘important buy-in’ by an influential bureaucrat who had the power 
and responsibility to sell the cash transfer programme to the government.145 Mhishi had a long 
interest in social protection146 and was quick to buy into Schubert’s idea of cash transfers. But 
Mhishi found it difficult to convince the government, which had several bureaucrats and 
politicians sceptical of cash transfers and viewed them as ‘hand-outs’ with the potential to create 
a dependency syndrome. For example, Lancaster Museka, then Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Services, appointed by the president, did not initially support the 
idea of cash transfers and preferred to continue with the Public Assistance programme.147 By 
contrast, the Movement for Democratic Change’s Paurina Mpariwa, then a minister in the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Services, was in favour of the initiative, recognizing that transfers 
were a feasible way of assisting the poor, especially children and the elderly burdened with 
providing for themselves and OVCs under their care, in an economically challenging 
environment. Grounding his recommendations on positive evidence of cash transfers in the 
region, Schubert’s UNICEF-commissioned study on Child-Sensitive Social Protection in 
Zimbabwe (2010c), and the transfer plan, Mhishi was able to convince the government148 to 
approve a pilot programme.149 The interplay of donor influence, supportive bureaucrats, and 
Government National Unity’s open-door policy to technical ideas, coupled with improved donor 
relations, shaped the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer in this period. On the other hand, 
arguments about dependency between ZANU-PF political elites show the lasting impact of the 
welfare dependency discourses in shaping welfare reforms in Zimbabwe and Africa at large 














In sum, four factors influenced the introduction and success of the Harmonized Social Cash 
Transfer during the Government National Unity, namely the dollarization of the economy, 
market liberalization, donor enthusiasm for cash transfers, and supportive political leadership. 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Services was under the Movement for Democratic Change 
portfolio and its development partners (mainly donors and civil society) worked together to 
reform the Public Assistance programme as the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer.150 In a 2015 
essay, Tendai Biti described the bad donor relations the Government National Unity inherited: 
 
At the inception of the Government National Unity, the Zimbabwean government 
had no relationship with international financial institutions. The IMF had 
suspended Zimbabwe’s voting rights in 2003, the African Development Bank had 
closed its office in Harare, and the World Bank maintained a skeletal presence. 
Zimbabwe had started defaulting on its debt obligations in 1999, and 
accumulated arrears prevented any further borrowing from IFIs and Western 
donors. It meant no access to concessional finance or to international capital 
markets (Biti, 2015). 
 
Thus, while political fragmentation may pose difficulties for scaling up programmes (Barrientos, 
2007: 9), the Zimbabwean case demonstrates how that can be an opportunity for programme 
introduction and expansion. 
 
5.2.4 Social cash transfer reforms post-Government of National Unity, 2013–2017  
Zimbabwe held ‘harmonized’ (i.e. simultaneous parliamentary and presidential) elections in July 
2013. Mugabe was re-elected president, and ZANU-PF won a parliamentary majority, which it 
had not had for the preceding four years. Initially, the government seemed to intend to pursue the 
Government National Unity’s expansion plans. It rolled out the School Feeding Programme and 






ZANU-PF-led government showed a rhetorical interest in cash transfers. The new government’s 
economic blueprint, Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-economic Transformation, 
mentions cash transfers as part of its poverty-reduction strategy. 
 
Although ZANU-PF did not abolish the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer after winning the 
2013 election, it reverted to emphasizing its agrarian components. Since mid-2013, donor 
pressure has been ineffective in urging the scaling-up of direct cash transfers in the face of 
conservatism, tight budget constraints, and the prioritization of other programmes, as well as a 
preoccupation with political issues. Consequently, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer has 
been significantly downscaled. Instead, an agricultural input programme, Command Agriculture, 
was introduced in 2016. This has modestly expanded the coverage of non-cash social transfers, 
but inputs are largely distributed on partisan lines, benefiting ZANU-PF and excluding suspected 
opposition supporters. 
 
Another reform that began during the Government National Unity but implemented by the post 
Government National Unity ZANU-PF led government is the institutionalisation of nutrition in 
schools that entailed taking full ownership of the Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 
(HGSFP). Between 2002 and 2008, the World Food Programme had solely funded the School 
Feeding Programme as part of its emergency response to food insecurity in Zimbabwe. In 2009, 
the Government National Unity took over the School Feeding Programme and made it a 
‘permanent’ programme—at least in poverty-stricken communities—but the Government 
National Unity’s efforts to expand the School Feeding Programme to all public primary schools 
were curtailed by a lack of funding and a proper model that would ensure sustainability. 
 
By the end of the Government National Unity, in mid-2013, plans to embark on a study tour to 
Brazil by the Movement for Democratic Change-led Ministries of Finance, Education, Health, 
and Social Services were at an advanced stage. In December 2013, the World Food Programme 
funded a study visit under the auspices of the Brazil Centre of Excellence Against Hunger, a 
World Food Programme /Government of Brazil initiative that helps countries to expand their 
food and nutritional security interventions, including school meal programmes, so as to improve 




Secondary Education Minister Lazarus Dokora and other officials from the ministries of 
education, agriculture, finance, health, and social welfare. Based on the Brazilian model of 
school feeding, where the government provides a budget that is decentralized to allow school 
feeding committees to take the lead in local food procurement, the Ministry of Education 
transformed the School Feeding Programme into a Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 
(HGSFP), which was launched in May 2014. Although the Home-Grown School Feeding 
Programme was designed to be fully government-funded and -implemented, it is currently co-
funded by the government and donors. In 2016, the Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 
benefited approximately 10% of all students. 
 
A major reform that supported the agrarian CWR post- Government National Unity was the 
stalling and downscaling of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer. Since mid-2013, ZANU-PF 
has continued with the Government National Unity -introduced cash transfers that it had avoided 
introducing before 2009. As will be discussed, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer has been 
downscaled drastically, reducing the coverage of the major cash transfer programme for poor 
families with OVCs. Downscaling has also reduced the amount of cash families with children 
receive. 
 
A change of governments has been associated with interest in and expansion of cash transfer 
programmes in some Southern African countries. Former Malawian President Joyce Banda 
expressed rhetorical interest in cash transfers, though without expanding the Social Cash 
Transfer programme, when she took over from Bingu Mutharika in 2012 (Hamer, 2016b). In 
Ghana, not only did the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty programme survive a change 
of government in 2008, but the incoming party expanded the programme’s coverage and 
increased the ‘proportion of government resources’ allocated to Livelihood Empowerment 
Against Poverty (Ragno et al., 2016:149). The new government in Zambia, under the presidency 
of Michael Sata from 2011 until 2014, took over financial responsibility from international 
donors and expanded Zambia’ s Social Cash Transfer programme to more than double the 
number of beneficiary households and districts (Siachiwena, 2016). Zimbabwe is an unusual 
case in that, in practice, the Mugabe administration retrenched some of its welfare programmes, 





Between November 2013 and February 2014, the government seemed to be intending to pursue 
the Government National Unity’s Harmonized Social Cash Transfer expansion plans. The 
Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was rolled out in four new districts, bringing the total number 
to 20 out of the total of 65 districts. In the rest of 2014, and during 2015 and 2016, the 
programme was not expanded to any new districts, and between February and August 2016, 
Harmonized Social Cash Transfer beneficiaries did not receive transfers. Donor funding that was 
supposed to end with the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children Phase 2 in 
September 2015 had been extended to February 2016 but dried up. Then, in August 2016, partly 
on account of the enduring economic crisis, Harmonized Social Cash Transfer districts were 
reduced from 20 to 9, cutting the number of beneficiaries by more than half (25,598). As part of 
the ‘transition’, beneficiaries in the discontinued districts received a one-off double payment in 
September/October 2016. That was the end of the ‘expansion plan’. These developments show 
that the sustainability of cash transfer programmes is doubtful when governments fail to 
implement plans to graduate from donor funding. 
 
Six main factors explain the delayed expansion and downscaling of the Harmonized Social Cash 
Transfer. First, the Government National Unity, through fiscal funding to the Ministry of Public 
Service, Labour and Social Welfare, had agreed to match donor funds 50/50 (AIR, 2014a: 4), but 
it did not honour this commitment, leaving donors to contribute over 80% of the Harmonized 
Social Cash Transfer budget since its inception. Second, despite bureaucrats within the Ministry 
of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and Ministry of Finance being supportive of the 
Harmonized Social Cash Transfer, pushing the ZANU-PF administration to prioritize social cash 
transfers, ZANU-PF ministers (first Nicholas Goche, succeeding Paurina Mpariwa, and currently 
Prisca Mupfumira) and Members of Parliament generally had a negative attitude towards the 
Harmonized Social Cash Transfer. Goche said ‘Our party has no problem when donors give poor 
people money but we have a problem with donors when they want us to give our people money. 
What people need is food, which they should grow, so why not give them food and not 






Harmonized Social Cash Transfer programme equitably. Fourth, donors and government had 
conflicting social protection priorities. Whilst donors were pushing for Harmonized Social Cash 
Transfer expansion, the government was more concerned about how to fund Basic Education 
Assistance Module following the withdrawal of the European Union and the United Kingdom 
Department of International Development, who were funding Basic Education Assistance 
Module beneficiaries in primary schools. Also, as has been seen, the government preferred farm 
subsidies to direct cash transfers, giving the Agricultural Input Scheme more budget support. 
Fifth, the government lacked fiscal space for social spending due to the deepening economic 
crisis. Finally, post- Government National Unity, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer and other 
social protection programmes were affected by a lack of consistent political and bureaucratic 
leadership in the MPSLSW. Nicholas Goche and Tongai Muzenda, who were appointed as 
Minister and Deputy, respectively, within the new ZANU-PF government in September 2013, 
were expelled from the government in December 2014 on allegations of supporting a faction led 
by Vice-President Mujuru that was plotting to oust Mugabe. They were replaced by Prisca 
Mupfumira (in December 2014) and Tapiwanashe Matangaidze (in September 2015), 
respectively. 
 
The last pro-agrarian CWR reform implemented by the ruling party after winning the 2013 
elections and possibly to secure political support by both the political elites and the small farmers 
is the	 empowerment of farmers through Command Agriculture. Despite downscaling the 
Harmonized Social Cash Transfer on ‘affordability’ grounds in the face of increasing food 
insecurity (ZIMSTAT, 2015:14; 2016), the ZANU-PF administration rolled out a US$500 
million152 small-scale farmer input support scheme, Command Agriculture, in 2015. The 
Command Agriculture programme sought to achieve household and national food security 
through enhanced maize production. Command Agriculture beneficiaries are expected to 
produce approximately 91% of Zimbabwe’s maize requirement (equivalent to 2 million tonnes). 
To be eligible for the inputs, farmers should commit a quarter of a hectare to the programme153 







land (large and small scale farmers)’.154 Justin Mupamhanga, Deputy Chief Secretary to the 
President and Cabinet, said that farmers on the programme would receive ‘production inputs like 
fertilisers, seed and agrochemicals’ in addition to irrigation and mechanized equipment.155 The 
Command Agriculture aimed to support 20,000 households, and 19,608 households156 had been 
reached by November 2016 (MoAM, 2016). 
 
The Command Agriculture programme ostensibly promotes family reliance rather than 
government or donor dependency. Together with the agricultural input package already 
discussed, Command Agriculture is therefore aligned to the ruling party’s agrarian approach to 
social protection for the poor and poor families with children. Emmerson Mnangagwa, Vice-
President, underscored that the Command Agriculture would ‘stimulate the agro-industry and 
create employment’ and potentially ‘generate income and improve livelihoods of all people.’157 
But Command Agriculture, like the presidential input scheme, provides ZANU-PF with an 
opportunity to reward those who voted it back to power in the 2013 election and ‘prepare’ them 
for the upcoming election in 2018, since the inputs are distributed on a patronage basis. The 
Command Agriculture is exclusionary and largely benefits ZANU-PF supporters, as the target 
group, small-scale farmers, constitutes the majority of beneficiaries of the land reform 
programme aligned to the ruling ZANU-PF party (Moyo, 2013; Scoones, 2014). 
 
5.3 Explaining the distinctive characteristics of Zimbabwe’s child welfare regime 
The distinguishing characteristics of Zimbabwe’s CWR are a result of a combination of 
structural, ideological, and political factors. Structural factors including HIV/AIDS, drought, 
economic downturn, and unemployment heightened household and child poverty and increased 
the number of OVCs. These changes prompted the government to modestly expand child social 









hospital fee waivers, and direct cash transfers to children in poor and labour-constrained 
households. In drought years, the government partnered with United Nation agencies to provide 
social transfers to poor families with children, the bulk of which were in-kind. The ruling 
ZANU-PF party’s preference for an agrarian route to poverty reduction was consequential in 
sustaining the familial provision of primarily non-cash social transfers pre- and post-Government 
of National Unity. Pressure to shift from in-kind to cash transfers from international donors and 
agencies during the Government of National Unity led to a change in the form of benefits from 
largely non-cash to cash transfers. The 2009 election also ushered in a shift to cash when the 
Movement for Democratic Change joined ZANU-PF in government, but winning the 2013 
election gave ZANU-PF the power to reduce direct cash in favour of non-cash transfers, and shift 
the focus back from transfers to the poor to support for small farmers. 
 
5.3.1‘Structural’ factors  
The effects of structural factors (AIDS, drought) were exacerbated by the government’s 
economic mismanagement, creating the need for policies that would mitigate the effects of 
poverty. More than half of all children (3.5 million) and almost all children (5,148,000) lived in 
poverty in 2010 and 2012, respectively (Schubert, 2010c:23; ZIMSTAT, 2012). Orphan rates 
decreased but remained high at 22% in 1994 and 15% in 2015 (CSO, 1995:12; ZIMSTAT 2016a: 
29). In 2014, Zimbabwe had the largest absolute number of orphans (Kavak, 2014:8). A high 
HIV/AIDS-related death rate weakened family support and increased the number of OVCs 
requiring state support. At the height of the 2000–2008 economic crisis, ‘national HIV 
prevalence exceeded 30%, making Zimbabwe one of Africa’s hardest-hit countries’ (Bratton, 
2014:85). In 2015, Zimbabwe had the fifth-highest prevalence (about 15%) in Sub-Saharan 
Africa after Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, and South Africa.158 The revitalization of Basic 
Education Assistance Module in 2001, for example, was prompted by the increase in children 
orphaned and made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS. Reduced numbers of caregivers, as well as 
weakened and inadequate extended family structures to provide a family safety net, combined 
with poverty to increase OVCs. During drought years, particularly in 1982/83, 1991, 2002, and 






drought-affected families. On the other hand, financial crises — especially that of 2000–2008, 
which ‘ended up in a full-blown economic crisis’ (Bratton, 2014:84) — increased household 
vulnerability to poverty.  
 
Zimbabwe, a low-income country, is the poorest (the other three are middle-income countries) of 
the four cases in this study and it was expected that political elites interviewed would voice 
affordability concerns. None of the interviewees mentioned affordability as one of the factors for 
not expanding cash transfers. Surprisingly, it is the middle-income countries where governments 
expressed concerns about the affordability of cash transfers (Seekings, 2016c and Chapter 3). 
Moreso, government’s failure to disburse funds for the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer, despite 
the rhetorical commitments, but at the same time increasing the farm input scheme budget does 
not only reflect preference for agriculture. It also suggests that funding was more of a political 
than a fiscal issue.  
 
5.3.2 Political factors  
 
Political factors including patronage politics, electoral competition, the limited power of 
international agencies and donors, and the proselytising of individuals within the government 
were consequential in promoting the enduring agrarian CWR, the modest expansion of coverage 
and shift from in-kind benefits in Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF’s agrarian approach to social protection 
largely explains the familial provision of primarily non-cash transfers in the form of food aid and 
agricultural inputs and the low coverage of cash transfers to poor households with children. As 
discussed, Zimbabwe’s CWR is located in an agrarian general welfare regime supporting 
families through the provision primarily of in-kind benefits rather than direct cash transfers. 
ZANU -PF’s emphasis on poverty reduction through land redistribution and agricultural inputs 
support for the peasant farmers (poor households) who make up a large proportion of the 
population has led to continued familial targeting. Nevertheless, agricultural support (land and 
farm inputs), ZANU-PF’s preferred form of social protection, has been discretionary, 
clientelistic, and exclusionary. Despite the government’s (and non-state actors’) drought relief 
programmes for the most drought-stricken households, cash transfers still have low coverage of 




funded and monitored, is favoured as it is much easier for ZANU-PF to patronise it. As 
discussed later, ZANU-PF turned to partisanship politics when threatened by a strong political 
opposition. 
 
Electoral competition between the ruling ZANU-PF and the MDC urged ZANU-PF to reform 
the agrarian CWR. Between 1980 and 2000 ZANU-PF was politically secure and was under no 
pressure to make substantial social policy reforms. During this period the poorest families 
received public assistance (through the Public Assistance programme) but public works and 
drought relief programmes were also effectively implemented. These programmes, and the role 
in liberating Zimbabwe which the electorate is usually reminded of during election campaigns, 
could explain the support ZANU-PF enjoyed. In the comfort of this political insecurity, ZANU-
PF discontinued fee waivers in 1998. Since the 2000 elections, ZANU-PF has been politically 
insecure as it faced strong opposition from the Movement for Democratic Change. ZANU-PF 
needed to regain its rural voters and strategically embarked on pro-agrarian reforms that reflect 
partisan politics. The reforms, resonating well with the rural poor who constituted the largest 
proportion of ZANU-PF’s support base, include land redistribution since 2000, the 
reintroduction of fee waivers (Basic Education Assistance Module) in 2001, massive drought-
related food aid since 2001 and the roll out of the agricultural input scheme to small rural 
farmers in the period leading to the widely contested 2008 elections (Britz & Tshuma, 
2013:189). For the first time in independent Zimbabwe the opposition won more parliamentary 
seats and the presidential vote (but not enough to win the election outright) (Bratton, 2014; 
Bratton & Masunungure, 2008) in the 2008 elections.  
 
In government, Movement for Democratic Change -led social services ministries (education, 
health, social services) opened doors for donors, who were enthusiastic about cash transfers. The 
participation of the Movement for Democratic Change in government led to significant policy 
reforms, including the introduction of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer, which provided 
direct cash transfers to families with children, the establishment of health and education funds, 
which expanded the coverage of Basic Education Assistance Module and Assisted Medical 
Treatment Orders, and the inaugural joint (government and donors) funding of the School 




children in poverty-stricken communities. On the other hand, ZANU-PF reconstituted itself 
during the Government of National Unity (Bratton, 2014). While budgets for other social 
protection programmes reduced, possibly responding to the poor economy, government support 
for the agricultural input scheme did not change much. In fact, the budget continued to increase 
in the period leading to the 2013 elections and after (see figure 5.1). Presidential Input Schemes, 
land redistribution and food aid continued in the rural areas. These programmes could have 
helped ZANU-PF to secure enough political support, leading to the ‘crushing defeat’ of the 
Movement for Democratic Change in the 2013 election (Bratton, 2014).  
 
After winning the 2013 elections, ZANU-PF instituted reforms that continued to support an 
agrarian CWR. As if to clear off the Movement for Democratic Change’s foot prints in the 
Government of National Unity, almost similar to the repeal of Obamacare (medical insurance 
introduced by Democrat and former United States President, Barack Obama) by President 
Trump (a Republican) in the United States,159 ZANU-PF downscaled the only major cash 
transfer programme, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer. Some scholars have claimed that 
ZANU-PF returned to political power but ‘had little to offer other than an unchecked return to 
economic folly, elite corruption, and the bitter politics of exclusion’ (Bratton 2014:2). This 
might be true particularly in the urban areas where the urban electorate is hard hit by the rising 
unemployment and poverty levels. Bratton seem to underestimate the pro-agrarian reforms 
ZANU-PF has undertaken after the elections. Command Agriculture, introduced in 2015, in 
addition to the food aid and farm inputs to the rural people, seem to be a political tool to secure 
votes by the small farmers (rural poor) and political elites targeted by these programmes. Based 
on these agriculture-based reforms, it is likely that ZANU-PF will continue to win elections, 
including the forthcoming 2018 harmonised elections. ZANU-PF’s electoral dominance, and the 
subsequent endurance of the agrarian regime, might also be aided by the weakening opposition 
that is failing to provide a formidable alternative.  
 
International agencies and donors played a central role in partially shifting from primarily 






UNICEF, piloted and expanded the coverage of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer from 1 to 
20 districts. UNICEF successfully advocated child-sensitive social protection in the form of a 
cash transfer programme (the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer) that deliberately targeted food-
poor and labour-constrained families with OVCs. Moreover, the revitalization of the defunct 
Basic Education Assistance Module programme by donors in 2009 expanded the coverage of 
social cash transfers. On the other hand, the wider coverage of food aid for poor households has 
been made possible by World Food Programme funding. The World Bank’s assessment of the 
2005–2009 economic crisis period was that ‘Donors have played a major role in financing social 
expenditures even prior to the economic crisis, and increasingly after that’ (World Bank, 
2011:9). Where donor funding was withdrawn, as with Basic Education Assistance Module 
funding for primary school pupils since 2014, or partially discontinued, as in the case of the 
Harmonized Social Cash Transfer since February 2016, social transfers coverage reduced 
drastically. 
 
Despite these modest reforms, donor pressure was inadequate to convince the government to 
transit from a primarily minimalist agrarian regime to a pro-poor CWR that provides general 
support for families with children. The United Kingdom Department for International 
Development pushed for free primary education through withdrawing Basic Education 
Assistance Module funding without success. The UNICEF-driven Harmonized Social Cash 
Transfer was almost abolished in 2013 and has not expanded. All these retrenchments contrast 
with increased government support for poor rural farmers reflecting partisan politics. 
 
Finally, certain individuals within government played significant roles in the establishment and 
reform of social cash transfer programmes. Sydney Mhishi in particular strongly advocated cash 
transfers within government. At the establishment of the Government of National Unity in 2009, 
donors were still sceptical about funding social protection through government and it was critical 
to have individuals in government that they could trust in reforming social policy. Although 
Mhishi was a ZANU-PF-appointed bureaucrat, he became the trusted individual donors needed. 
Mhishi also worked closely with Movement for Democratic Change ministers — Paurina 
Mpariwa in the MLSS, Henry Madzorera in the Ministry of Health, and David Coltart in the 




programme, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer, was introduced, marking a shift from food to 
cash transfers as well as expanding the coverage of transfers. Mhishi’s support for the expansion 
of the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer was constrained by ZANU-PF’s preference for agro-
based rather than cash-based poverty reduction mechanisms. Overall, the agrarian CWR has 
endured despite internal (within government by individuals like Mhishi and from the political 
opposition) and external (from donors and international agencies) pressures to reform it to reflect 





CHAPTER 6   
Comparing and explaining child welfare regimes in Southern Africa 
6.1 Key differences and similarities in child and child-oriented social cash transfers  
 
This chapter considers the overall pattern to variation between the four case studies detailed in 
Chapters 2-5. The chapter examines how and why child welfare regimes (CWRs) in Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are different. Despite the similarities documented in the 
previous chapters and summarised in this chapter, there are striking differences in some key 
characteristics. To understand how social grants for families with children vary (answering 
research question 2), in the next section l contrast the variation in the social cash transfer 
schemes between the four cases. In the following section l step back and consider the 
explanatory factors to this variation (answering research question 3), locating these findings in 
the broader comparative welfare regimes literature. I explore some gaps in the current study that 
suggest opportunities for further research before drawing certain conclusions. The overall 
discussion advances the comparative welfare regime methodology in a different geographical 
context compared with the usual focus on industrialised democracies. It also suggests a focus on 
an underestimated but important dimension, the targeting form.  
The discussion in Chapters 2-5 shows that all the four cases started off as familial and residual, 
with public provision focused on orphans or children living in poor, single-mother households. 
None of them followed the French model of family allowances, nor the Nordic model of direct 
public provision through public childcare. South Africa has diverged from this model 
dramatically over the last 20 years. Namibia has been slow to follow South Africa’s lead, and 
Botswana has stuck with its familial model, while Zimbabwe has an enduring agrarian and 
familial child welfare regime (CWR) similar to that of Botswana. The crucial variation – as 
measured by coverage and targeting form dimensions – has occurred over the past 20 years, as 
all four cases have diverged to a greater or lesser extent. Divergence in programmes coverage 
(the proportion of children reached by direct and indirect schemes, programmes’ legal status and 
generosity) and their targeting form (whether programmes are targeted in terms of poverty or on 






6.1.1 Coverage  
 
The four case studies are similar in that they all have non-contributory cash transfers and in-kind 
programmes aimed at children; but there are significant cross-national variations too. The CWRs 
differ in two major dimensions: coverage and targeting form. One major similarity is the 
provision of some form of social grant to families with children in all cases. The grants directly 
or indirectly benefit children. Except for Zimbabwe, the other three cases have direct child 
grants. All the countries implement varied programmes that indirectly benefit children. War 
veteran grants are provided in all cases, but vary in amounts. Three of the four countries provide 
Old Age Pensions, the exception being Zimbabwe, where the post-independence government 
abolished the system for whites, coloureds and Indians. Disability grants are offered in South 
Africa and Namibia, but not in Botswana and Zimbabwe. South Africa stands out as the only 
country with housing programmes. Community feeding programmes are implemented in all 
cases, but on different scales (more pronounced in Zimbabwe and Botswana than in Namibia and 
South Africa). A combination of these direct and indirect grants, however, varies in important 
programme aspects including coverage and generosity.  
Coverage (the proportion of children directly and indirectly reached by social grants, whether 
programmes are legislated or provided via administrative fiat; and generosity) comparisons are 
summarised in Table 6.1. Legal status, as discussed later, seems to have minimal effect on the 
type of CWR. Direct coverage excludes in-kind benefits children may receive including school 
feeding, community feeding, health and school fee waivers. Table 6.1 compares direct and 
indirect reach of social grants in the four cases. South Africa has the highest direct reach with 
68% possibly because of the expanded CSG. Namibia is second reaching 25% of all children. 
This is less than half the reach in South Africa but higher than in Botswana covering a paltry 5% 
and Zimbabwe without direct cash transfers at 0%. There are significant variations in indirect 
coverage too. Botswana covers 85% of all children, the highest reach between the cases. This is 
expected because children benefit more from in-kind than direct cash transfers in Botswana. 
South Africa is second, covering 51% of all children, Zimbabwe is third, reaching  24% of all 





Table 6.1: Comparison of programme coverage  
	
Regime type Coverage Total coverage 
Direct Indirect 
Pro-poor (South Africa) High (68%) High (51%) high 
Familial (Botswana) Low (5%) High (85%) medium 
Mixed (Namibia) Low (25%) Low (21%) low 
Agrarian (Zimbabwe) 0% Low (24%) low 
  Source: Ministries responsible for social grants   
Table 6.1 shows that the pro-poor CWR in South Africa has high total coverage because it 
benefits many poor children. Whilst it is possible to have pro-poor targeting and low coverage 
(the World Bank promotes that only very poor families should receive benefits), South Africa is 
unusual in that its means test is used primarily to exclude the rich, not to limit the benefits to the 
extremely poor. Hence, South African social grants are quasi-universal. A familial CWR in 
Botswana has medium coverage because it covers some families and excludes others. Coverage 
is low in both mixed and agrarian CWRs in Namibia and Zimbabwe, respectively, because they 
tend to exclude many poor children but reach out to a smaller number of OVCs. The categories 
of children covered in these regimes tend to represent smaller proportions of children. In 
Namibia, for example, although most orphans benefit, they are very few in number. 
It is surprising that Namibia has low total coverage in contrast with medium coverage in 
Botswana. It was expected that coverage would be higher in Namibia, in comparison with 
Botswana, because of the mixed regime encompassing pro-poor grants. Namibia’s low total 
coverage is possibly because Namibia’s primary target were broken families, with small numbers 
of orphans, until the recent introduction of the poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant, which still has 
very limited coverage.  
Generally, low-to-no coverage by child-specific grants is notable across countries, except for 




coverage (see Table 6.1). In Botswana and Namibia, unlike South Africa, the wide coverage of 
social cash transfers is not so much about the direct child grants programmes as the indirect 
benefits from the broad social protection system. While South Africa shares the same CWR 
characteristic (since coverage is further expanded by other indirect programmes) it is unusual in 
that direct child grants, particularly the CSG, are more expansive than those in other cases. 
Coverage of child grants shown, in Table 6.1, contrasts with coverage of general welfare regimes 
in the case studies. Available data, that is not updated for all the cases and may not represent 
current coverage, suggests that Botswana has the highest coverage, followed by South Africa, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, respectively (see Figure 6.1). Thus, the general coverage of social cash 
transfers (defined as percentage of population participating in cash transfers and last-resort 
programmes, noncontributory social pensions, and other cash transfer programmes including 
child, family and orphan) may not be truly representative of child welfare regimes between the 
case studies. 
Figure 6.1: Coverage of social safety nets, 2008-2013 
	
	
Source: World Development Indicators (coverage of social safety net programmes variable), 2008-2013 
A second important dimension is the generosity of social grants i.e. the combined amount of cash 
and in-kind social cash transfers a child receives from the government relative to national and 




kind benefits. Table 6.2 shows that the four countries have different poverty lines. With the 
exception of Botswana, the other three countries set their Food Poverty Line and Upper Bound 
Poverty Lines below the international extreme poverty line of US$1.90/person/day and the 
international absolute poverty line for upper middle income countries of US$5.50/person/day. 
Setting these poverty lines low at national level, as shown later, has a bearing on the generosity 
of benefits provided. 
Table 6.2: Differences in poverty lines (US$/person/day) 
	




0.84 0.58 2.16 0.97 1.90 
Lower Bound Poverty 
Line 
1.26 0.81  -  -  - 
Upper Bound Poverty 
Line /Poverty Datum 
Line/Total Consumption 
Poverty Line 
1.94 1.06 2.77 3.1            5.50* 
Source: SSA, ZIMSTAT, NSA & Statistics Botswana * World Bank upper middle income poverty line. 
 
Using the December 2017 cash transfer values (converted to US$ and adjusted to purchasing 
power parity, PPP)160, all four countries provided ungenerous benefits relative to the global 
poverty line (extreme/absolute poverty line) of US$1.90 or less/person/day. Figure 6.2 shows 
that South Africa provides a combined transfer of US$0.98/person/day (or 
US$31/person/month):  higher than all the other cases but lower than the global poverty line of 
US$1.90. Botswana provides US$0.90/person/day (US$28/person/month). Namibia transfers 
US$0.55/person/day (or US$17/person/month), much less when compared with South Africa and 












Figure 6.2: Value of monthly transfers (US$/child/day) 
	
 
Source: Author calculations using estimated value of transfer per child per month 
The value of transfers relative to these national poverty lines varies across the four cases. South 
Africa transfers US$31/person/month, which is generous relative to the Food Poverty Line 
(US$26/person/month) but ungenerous relative to the Lower Bound Poverty Line  
(US$39/person/month) and Upper Bound Poverty Line (US$60/person/month). Botswana 
transfers US$28/person/month, which is ungenerous relative to the Food Poverty Line 
(US$67/person/month) and the Poverty Datum Line (US$86/person/month). Namibia provides 
US$17/person/month which is very ungenerous relative to all the three national poverty lines: 
Food Poverty Line (US$18); Lower Bound Poverty Line (US$25); Upper Bound Poverty Line 
(US$33). Zimbabwe is the least generous country providing US$5/person/month relative to the 
Food Poverty Line (US$30/person/month) and the Total Consumption Poverty Line 
(US$90/person/month). Overall, the transfers are ungenerous relative to national poverty lines. 
There is limited comparative literature on the generosity of CWRs in Southern Africa. The 
existing literature compares general welfare provision between South Africa and Botswana and 
other countries (not necessarily included in this study) - excluding Zimbabwe and Namibia 
(Seekings, 2016c:4). Seekings concludes that South Africa provides more generous welfare, 



























concurs with these findings. This study, however, provides evidence that the CWR in Botswana 
is not as parsimonious as the general welfare regime, as argued by other scholars (Ulriksen, 
2017:85; Seekings, 2017b:8; 2016a:2). 
The last aspect of coverage is variation in legal status of programmes. Child grants in South 
Africa and Namibia are an entitlement, in contrast with those of Botswana and Zimbabwe. South 
Africa stands out because, unlike the other three cases, pre- and post-independence social grants 
have been based in legislation. Despite a similar colonial history to that of South Africa, Namibia 
was very slow to legislate social grants for children. Namibia became independent in 1990, but 
child welfare grants were legislated through the Children’s Act only in 2015. It is possible that 
colonial inheritance combined with an active and strong civil society could have promoted the 
legislation of child grants in South Africa, in contrast with the situation in Namibia, with its 
relatively weak civil society. Legal status of programmes relates to claims families with children 
in South Africa and Namibia can make to government, unlike the situation in Botswana and 
Zimbabwe. Legislated provision has, however, been important in South Africa compared with 
the other cases, since civil society and government have relied on legislation to expand social 
grants to the poor (Tshoose, 2016). 
6.1.2 Targeting form 
 
A second important variable is the targeting form (who gets what grant, where and why). 
Similarities or differences between cases are determined by the policy objective to address 
family breakdown and/or poverty. The extent to which the state prioritises each of the two 
dimensions determines the policy trajectory taken. Prioritisation also determines the category of 
children targeted by specific programmes. Namibia, for instance, has a Vulnerable Grant that is 
almost similar to the CSG in South Africa (both are poverty-targeted), but it is urban-biased. In 
other words, both family breakdown and targeting are considered in designing social grants for 
families with children in all four cases, but the varying significance placed on either or both 
factors results in the four different trajectories (models).  
 
The categories of children targeted by different programmes vary between case studies (see 




and Namibia provide similar direct grants that target specific categories of children, although 
there are remarkable differences. Both the CSG and the Vulnerable Grant in South Africa and 
Namibia are poverty-targeted, but the CSG is near-universal while the Vulnerable Grant is 
urban-biased. Also, different eligibility criteria are applied. The Vulnerable Grant was designed 
to benefit poor children of unemployed but living parents (both mother and father), whereas all 
poor children country-wide are eligible for the CSG, irrespective of the status (living or dead) of 
their parents or guardians. Botswana is different, since the major ‘child grant’ (the Orphan Care 
Programme) targets all orphans nationwide without any means test. This observation disputes 
existing claims that only ‘needy’ (income insecure) families are targeted (Ulriksen, 2017). 
Zimbabwe’s only cash transfer programme, the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer, is different 
from the other three cases in that a small proportion of families with OVCs is eligible in 
geographically-targeted poorest districts. 
All four cases implement school feeding programmes, but there are significant targeting 
differences. Both South Africa and Botswana implement school feeding programmes nationwide, 
but it is means tested in South Africa, although in practice all children in participating schools 
have access to it. South Africa’s school feeding programme is the most expansive of the four 
cases, the largest in Africa161 followed by Egypt, and the fourth globally (after India, Brazil and 
China), reaching about 9,5 million children in 2015 (World Bank, 2015:13). By contrast, only 
children in certain schools in poor communities in Namibia and Zimbabwe benefit. School 
feeding also covers primary schools only in Namibia. In Zimbabwe, the programme is limited to 
certain districts, and to certain schools within those districts. This might explain the low 
coverage in both countries when compared with the other two cases. 
School fee waivers are also provided differently. Namibia is a unique case, providing universal 
free primary and secondary education. Whereas most schools in South Africa are non-fee paying, 
and exemptions for poor students in fee-paying schools are implemented, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe are different: basic and secondary education is not free. Children from affluent 







exemptions. In this latter point, Zimbabwe is an exception:  waivers are limited to selected OVCs 
only, through the Basic Education Assistance Module. 
Zimbabwe lags behind the other three countries with the absence of indirect social grants 
including old age pensions and disability grants. These grants provide massive indirect support 
for children in South Africa and Namibia, and widen coverage significantly. In addition, while 
the other three cases provide universal free primary health care, Zimbabwe provides targeted 
health care fee waivers to a few OVCs, specifically orphans who live in government or private 
residential care.  
Community or vulnerable group-feeding programmes that indirectly benefit children are 
implemented in both Zimbabwe and Botswana. Both countries have outstanding extensive 
drought relief programmes, sometimes reaching out to more than half of the population. The 
programme is seasonal and usually donor-funded (mostly through the World Food Programme), 
but has become institutionalised as an integral part of both welfare states, unlike the situation in 
South Africa and Namibia. Such food supports the agrarian regime in Zimbabwe, where massive 
relief is provided in times of crop failure. 
In view of this variation in targeting, South Africa, as discussed, depicts a pro-poor CWR. 
Namibia places almost equal importance to family breakdown and poverty in assuming a mixed 
regime. A conservative Botswana prioritises maintenance of the family structure. Lastly, 
Zimbabwe has not reformed from an agrarian CWR:  it has an enduring agrarian society 
unmatched to any of the other three cases since pre-independence. It would appear that the 
government relies on families to provide for children (and other members) through subsistence 
farming with minimal state support. Changes in either family structure or poverty rates have not 
motivated the state to move in the direction of Botswana, South Africa or Namibia.  
 
The taxonomy constructed in this study confirms the importance of two dimensions as discussed 
in literature (Davis et al., 2016; Handa et al., 2015; Handa et al., 2012; Handa et al., 2011; ILO, 
2017; World Bank, 2015; 2017). But I further emphasise the significance of targeting form in 
distinguishing regime types that have been underestimated in existing child welfare regime 
typologies both in Southern Africa and globally (Handa et al., 2011; Bradshaw, 2012,2010;	




general regimes (Noyoo, 2017; Garcia & Moore, 2012:48; Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2010; Seekings, 
2005:16; Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
6.2 Explaining the variation in child welfare regimes in Southern Africa 
 
This section focuses on an explanation of the variation between the four child welfare regimes 
via investigation of the determinants of social grants policy choices in comparative perspective. 
Key factors, found to explain cross-national variation adequately, reflect, strongly, the interplay 
of need or 'structural' (AIDS or other medical challenges, social [such as family breakdown], 
demographic changes) factors, colonial antecedents, international influence (the power of donors 
and international agencies) and domestic politics (party politics [competition between ruling 
party and other parties, party ideology, the role of individual champions within the ruling party 
or state or civil society, the powers of ministries relative to each other] and the power of 
domestic Civil Society Organisations). These findings, consistent with previous studies primarily 
focusing on general welfare regimes in Latin America, East and South Asia and Africa (Hickey 
et al., 2018; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Rudra, 2015; Yang, 2017) extend the Power Resource 
Theory beyond developed countries, but also reveal new influential factors (within the theory) 
that have been overlooked. This is important in widening our understanding of the causes of 
variation in public policy related to social protection in the global South and the world at large. 
Literature shows the importance of these factors in the African context, particularly the fairly-
researched general welfare regime types (Ulriksen, 2017). This section builds on this literature to 
argue that one combination of factors has led to one type of regime, and a different combination 
has led to a different type of child welfare regime. The various combinations of factors explain 
the child welfare regime model explicit in each country. 
 
None of the causal links of industrial-economic growth (Wilensky, 1975), power resources 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990), state-centric (Skocpol, 1995) and cultural (van Oorschot, 2007) 
theories to variants of social policy in post-industrial states, the conventional comparative 
welfare state literature in the global North and South, fully accounts for the various CWRs in the 
different countries in Southern Africa and Africa at large.	The causal influence of the logic of 
industrial-economic growth theory (Hicks & Esping-Andersen, 2005) as advanced by 




between upper middle-income countries: South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. Similarly, 
cultural explanations proffered by cultural theorists (van Oorschot, 2007; Chamberlayne et al., 
1999) do not fully explain variation between the four cases with almost similar cultures. Policy 
convergences would be expected between the case studies, as they share cultural experiences, 
especially the idea of sharing resources among family members and between poor and rich 
members of the community: the ubuntu concept (as known in South Africa) and its botho 
equivalent practised in Botswana (see Chapter 4), or unhu in Zimbabwe. All these theories 
underestimate the role of HIV and AIDS in determining policy decisions in Southern Africa. The 
four cases have AIDS-related high OVCs populations. Families with children, in Botswana, for 
instance, experience structural poverty as a result of the death of breadwinners caused by HIV 
and AIDS. In Botswana HIV has also weakened traditional support systems, forcing the 
government to intervene with family and child-focused social assistance schemes (Leite, 2014). 
The North, Europe, for example, has not experienced HIV to same extremes as Southern Africa, 
especially Botswana, hence there is very little or no literature referring to AIDS and social policy 
in the North, whereas this is the starting point for Botswana and much of Africa. These theories 
on welfare regimes do not explain adequately the variation between case studies because 
Southern Africa presents with specific social, economic and political experiences never 
experienced in the North, namely, colonial antecedents, AIDS orphans, and international 
pressure (global developmentalism).  
 
Different sets of factors (Table 6.3) explain why the four identified CWRs vary (or are similar) 
across two dimensions: ‘coverage’ and ‘targeting form’. No one factor accounts for a CWR type 
instead a combination of factors leads to one type of CWR and a different combination leads to 










Table 6.3: Key explanatory factors to child welfare regimes  
Country Most influential factors Regime type 
South 
Africa 
• Colonial antecedents (path dependency) 
• Domestic politics - strong domestic child sector 
CSOs; role of individuals (minister of social 
development) 
• Structural factors - unemployment 
Pro-poor 
Namibia • Colonial antecedents (inherited from South African 
rule) 
• Domestic politics – one-party dominant system (lack 
of electoral competition); political elites/individuals 
within government (not) embracing proposals for 
reforms 




Botswana • Colonial antecedents - poor relief 
• Structural factors (AIDS shock - changed family 
social dynamics) 
• Domestic politics - party ideology (conservative); 
electoral competition since 1994) 
Familial  
Zimbabwe • Colonial antecedents – Public Assistance programme 
• Domestic politics - patronage politics (ruling party 
supported land reform and free agricultural inputs for 
rural farmers/voters); electoral competition since 
2000 
Agrarian 
Source: Author  
6.2.1 ‘Structural’ factors 
 
Identified structural factors have predicted the need for social grants in each of the four 
countries, to which the governments have responded variously. Since need has permeated all 
cases, it is not surprising that all four countries have social grants for families with children. 
Also, the fact that all four are concerned with addressing the effects of social change, primarily 
family breakdown and poverty whether at household or individual/child level, in some ways 
sheds light on their similarities.  
 
Need determined the choice of the CWR in some cases while not in others. Also, different 
aspects of structural factors influenced reforms which varied between the countries, leading to 




caregivers) in all four cases. AIDS was more important in reforms of the familial CWR in 
Botswana. The government of Botswana responded to the changes in family structure due to 
AIDS by extending its provision initially to orphans and their families (not orphans only), and 
later to other vulnerable children to support a familial CWR. AIDS became a political and 
valience issue in that the electorate expected the government to respond effectively. It is likely 
that poor families with children were affected most by the AIDS pandemic. The Botswana 
Democratic Party did not disappoint this poor constituency. It rolled out a nationwide response 
including specific provisions for orphans. This should have appealed to both rural and urban 
voters. This might explain the Botswana Democratic Party’s electoral dominance, albeit the 
declining share of electoral vote and the enduring familial CWR. These findings are consistent 
with existing literature on the effect of the AIDS crisis on general social policy in Botswana and 
not in comparison with other countries in Southern Africa (Mupedziswa & Ntseane, 2012; 
Selolwane, 2012:127; Nthomang, 2007). Other scholars have also demonstrated the influence of 
AIDS in other countries both in Southern Africa and other regions (Handa et al., 2015; Handa et 
al., 2012; Granvik, 2015; Garcia & Moore, 2012:37; Webb, 2011; World Bank, 2009; Pelham, 
2007; Budlender, Proudlock & Jamieson, 2008; Devereux et al., 2005) without comparing their 
findings with Botswana. This study has examined the AIDS effect in Botswana, and three other 
countries, to argue that structural factors (especially AIDS) have combined with party ideology 
and electoral competition to explain familial reforms. In Botswana, the impetus to reform the 
CWR was driven by structural shocks, but timing and targeting (familial) reflect electoral 
competition and the Botswana Democratic Party’s political ideology. 
 
 It is not clear whether AIDS was a factor in the pro-poor reforms to the CWR in South Africa. 
There seems to be no evidence to suggest that the Lund Commission’s recommendations to 
reform the CSG were influenced by the AIDS shock. What is clear is that other structural factors 
were more crucial in South Africa, especially unemployment (Gumata & Ndou, 2017; Altman et 
al., 2014; Yu, 2013a &b; Mlatsheni & Leibbrandt, 2011; Nattrass, 2002; Nattrass & Seekings, 
2001). Existing literature on the politics of child grants in South Africa underestimates the effect 
of unemployment in the reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa, possibly because children 
fall within the target group of economically inactive people (Tshoose, 2016:80). Poverty 




of unemployment-related poverty. Thus, while Botswana focused on the AIDS crisis, South 
Africa grappled with unemployment. Even though these two cases chose different social policies 
to address the variant forms of structural factors (AIDS that caused family breakdown in 
Botswana, and unemployment as a result of poverty in South Africa), the targeting choice in both 
countries reflect other political influences, especially the need to secure political support and re-
election by the respective ruling parties. While the ANC government was targeting poor families 
directly, possibly to gain electoral support from the poor caregivers (recipients of the grants) (as 
already discussed), the Botswana Democratic Party also used familial grants to secure votes from 
poor rural families targeted for the food baskets. 
 
Similarly, AIDS might not have been a major factor in the enduring agrarian CWR in Zimbabwe. 
There was no deliberate targeting of AIDS-affected households for land reform, agricultural 
input schemes, food aid or the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer programme, as these 
programmes targeted poor families and were implemented along patronage lines. Also, there 
seems to be less motivation for government to reform the agrarian regime on the basis that 
families will provide for their children and other members through subsistence agriculture. On 
the other hand, structural factors such as family breakdown partly explain the mixed (primarily 
the familial component) CWR in Namibia that targeted ‘broken’ families but shed less insight on 
the adoption of poverty-targeting. Poverty-targeting in Namibia, as discussed later, reflects the 
influence of international organisations and agencies more than structural factors. 
6.2.2 Colonial antecedents 
 
Historical factors consider whether a country inherits social grants during transition to 
democracy and whether the new government institutes major reforms to the CWR. Studies have 
argued, correctly, that most of the social grants in these four Anglophone African cases are a 
legacy of the British colonial system (Surrender, 2013; Patel; 2011; Kaseke, 2011; Levine et al., 
2011; Seekings, 2017; Selolwane, 2012). Other scholars argue that colonial heritage is important 
in explaining adoption of social security programmes outside countries in the OECD-world 
(Schmitt, 2015). Although these researches have a bias towards general welfare regimes, 
inheritance is also an important factor in explaining similarities between the CWRs investigated 




families with children. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that the four countries 
inherited one or another form of social grant at the time of independence. Most of the 
programmes inherited had an in-built poverty-targeting mechanism which did not target poor 
children explicitly. South Africa’s inherited a State Maintenance Grant, Namibia inherited South 
Africa’s system of grants, and Zimbabwe inherited a Public Assistance programme from the 
British at independence in 1980, to assist children in difficult circumstances. Botswana did not 
inherit any child grants at independence in 1966 but the destitute policy provided public 
assistance (poor relief) to families with children.  
 
It is true that South Africa has a much longer and broader history of cash transfer programmes, 
while Botswana favoured in kind benefits but colonial history does not tell us much about why 
child support has diverged since the 1990s. History sheds no light on why Zimbabwe’s new 
ZANU-PF government in 1980 abolished Old Age Pensions that had indirectly provided massive 
support to families with children in the other three countries. The past shared between the three 
might explain similarities (all having some kind of social grant for families with children), but 
not the differences that have emerged in the recent past. Pre-occupation with poverty-targeting is 
relatively recent, probably not dating as far back as the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank-supported Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and to United Nations-led Millennium 
Development Goals that sought to promote poverty-focused governments in developing 
countries in the late 1990s and 2000. The variation between the CWRs precedes these 
developments, as differences became apparent after the early 1990s when most countries in 
Southern Africa experienced unprecedented HIV prevalence rates and transitioned to democracy. 
Existing literature on the effect of colonial history overlooks this. As discussed later, other - 
factors especially domestic politics - seem more important. 
6.2.3 International pressure (global developmentalism) 
 
Despite UNICEF’s ‘global’ presence, Namibia is the only case in the present study where 
international pressure (through UNICEF influence) became an important factor. UNICEF, 
represented by Hoelscher, significantly influenced the shift from familial to pro-poor targeting. 
This success, however, reflects other factors, notably domestic politics which will be discussed 




These findings support previous political economy research in Southern Africa, as well as 
Africa, at large, that demonstrates the influence of international organisations on OVC cash 
transfers (Wanyama & McCord, 2017; von Gliszczynski & Leisering, 2016; von Gliszczynski, 
2015; Granvik, 2015). Other scholars have also shown the influence, in some cases negative, on 
general welfare regime cash transfers (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016; Grebe & Mubiru, 2014; 
Hickey & Seekings, 2017; Hickey et al., 2009; Devereux, 2010; Pruce & Hickey, 2017). Despite 
limited success in the other three cases, overlooked in existing theories (Beland, Morgan & 
Howard, 2015; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Wilesky, 1975; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Skocpol, 
1995; van Oorschot, 2007), international organisations and agencies, in this case UNICEF, 
remain important in explaining variation between CWRs in Southern Africa. UNICEF influence 
portrays international organisations not only as donors but also purveyors of social protection 
ideas. Case studies in this thesis, consistent with political economy literature in the global South, 
extend Esping-Andersen’s Power Resource Theory that emphasises the influence of political 
actors in shaping regime types but show the political power of actors previously overlooked in 
the North. 
 
There is limited evidence to suggest that UNICEF was an important factor in reforming the pro-
poor CWR in South Africa. In Botswana it was UNICEF that was influential in putting social 
protection for families with children on the agenda, and policy documents tended to incline 
towards donor preferences. For example, UNICEF was particularly instrumental in lobbying for 
a separate department of social protection which the Botswana government introduced in 2014. 
But the Botswana Democratic Party rejected proposals for a CSG-like child grant (Ellis et al., 
2011). This technical influence does not explain the reforms of the familial CWR, as it did not 
lead to actual reforms of the programmes. Similarly, the introduction and expansion of the 
Harmonized Social Cash Transfer in Zimbabwe were UNICEF-driven. Despite UNICEF’s 
financial and technical support, the ruling ZANU-PF party has not adopted the programme and 
has not expanded it. Even the successful introduction of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
itself was not as much about donor influence as it was about domestic politics (the open door 
policy of the Movement for Democratic Change-led ministry of social welfare) (Chinyoka & 
Seekings, 2016). The impetus to introduce social transfers might come from donors (Devereux & 




motivation for expansion rests with political elites. The Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
programme case partially supports the view that donors use ‘funding modalities to support the 
extension of social protection’ (Barrientos et al., 2010:5), but government failure to implement 
the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer nationwide disputes the claim. The failure reflects 
domestic politics (patronage). 
Overall, limited success in other three cases in this thesis illustrates the limits of United Nations 
agencies and international donors in influencing reforms in the different CWRs. These findings 
concur with other studies that have demonstrated the significance or limitations of these 
organisations in social policy reforms but with a focus on general welfare regimes (Grebe, 2014, 
Hickey et al., 2009; Kabandula & Seekings, 2016). The findings support the argument that the 
limited coverage of cash transfers reflects politics, specifically political elites’ reluctance to 
accept social protection policies, as well as international organisations’ failure to advocate 
successfully for adoption and expansion of cash transfers (Hickey, 2008; Hickey et al., 2009; 
Cliffe, 2006). 
 
These findings demonstrate that international organisations and United Nations agencies, like 
UNICEF, are political actors central in shaping child welfare regimes. The influence of these 
organisations and agencies is underestimated in the Western application of the Power Resource 
Theory in explaining variation in welfare regimes. Proponents of the Power Resource Theory do 
not even make reference to the influence of international organisations such as the World Bank 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999; Korpi, 1983). By contrast, this study, focusing on Southern 
Africa, identifies an influential group of political actors underestimated within the Power 
Resource Theory, as applied in industrialised capitalist democracies, but important in Africa. 
 
6.2.4 Domestic politics 
	
Factors discussed, thus far, have been important in explaining the variation between the CWRs, 
but they reflect domestic politics, especially party politics (party ideology, partisanship, 
electoral/political competition, change of governments and individuals within government). Two 




Organisations – were more important. Domestic politics, as discussed later, constrained the 
influence of international organisations. Political elites rejected proposals for reforms in all 
countries, except for Namibia, and partially in Zimbabwe. UNICEF’s success in Namibia, too, 
reflects domestic politics. The electoral incentive for political elites, within SWAPO, to support 
the introduction of a poverty-targeted grant, as proposed by UNICEF, was the grant’s potential to 
appeal to urban voters ahead of the 2015 elections. 
 
These findings confirm the role of politics as espoused in the Power Resource Theory. The 
Power Resource Theory argues that the extent to which political elites ‘incorporated or excluded 
organisations and political parties representing urban labour and the rural poor’ in different 
contexts help explain divergences in welfare regimes (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008: 2). In other 
words, political elites use their power resource to shape policy. Political elites, as will be 
discussed later, were key in shaping child social provision in Southern Africa. The four distinct 
child welfare regimes in this study reflect the different policy choices undertaken by political 
elites. 
 
6.2.4.1 Party politics 
In all four cases, party politics combine with other factors to influence familial, pro-poor, mixed 
and agrarian reforms. In South Africa, as in all the other cases except for Zimbabwe, path 
dependence primarily explains inheritance of CWR programmes in 1994 but reveals very little 
about recent reforms, especially since 1998. Other factors have become more important. First, 
researchers agree that a strong child sector civil society was influential in advocating for reforms. 
Second, individuals mattered the most in CSG reforms (Seekings, 2016c). But the claimed 
success of Civil Society Organisations and individuals is not independent of the influence of 
party politics in final policy decisions to effect pro-poor reforms. Domestic politics, in the form 
of party politics, appear to be a more important factor.  
Civil Society Organisations in South Africa utilised an opportunity presented by the power shift 
from the right to the left wing within the ANC (Proudlock, 2011) to campaign for the expansion 
of the CSG. Inspite of this, influence of Civil Society Organisations is limited to advocacy alone. 
Only the ANC could make the final policy decisions. The new populist Zuma dispensation that 




Civil Society Organisations’ recommendations, as it was a way of ‘rebranding’ the party. Most 
importantly, Seekings (2016c) correctly claims that Skweyiya was an important individual, 
although Seekings does not relate this individual to the party he represented. As a minister, 
Skweyiya was a political appointee who represented his party, the ANC. In African politics 
ministers rarely act outside cabinet. The electorate would not only recognise him as an individual 
but would identify him with the ruling party. The CSG reforms associated with Skweyiya might 
have contributed to identification of the ANC with the grants than it had previously, possibly 
explaining the ANC’s electoral dominance in the 2004 elections (ANC winning about 70% share 
of the vote) and subsequent elections, albeit declining. 
Political ideology is another component of party politics that became important, especially in 
explaining the reforms in the familial CWR in Botswana. Although not as conservative as 
countries in continental Europe that rely on male breadwinners (Esping-Andersen, 1990), 
Botswana has had an enduring familial CWR, arguably dating back to independence. Successive 
Botswana Democratic Party presidents have resisted international pressure to shift to poverty-
targeting and expand social transfers. This argument concurs with Ulriksen’s (2017) claim that 
the ruling Botswana Democratic Party deliberately provides minimal transfers as a strategy to 
buy political support from the poor. Electoral competition, as discussed, compelled the Botswana 
Democratic Party to reconsider its ideology and rebrand itself by reforming Ipelegeng (Hamer, 
2016a). Despite these changes, the CWR remained familialistic in reflecting the Botswana 
Democratic Party’s ideology. None of the reforms in the other three cases is as strongly 
attributed to ideological factors as it is in Botswana.  
Previous studies attribute the conservative general welfare regime in Botswana to structural 
(particularly drought and economic) and political (ideological and electoral competition) factors 
(Seekings, 2017:3; 2016a &b; Hamer, 2016a; Ulriksen, 2017; 2011; Selolwane, 2012). Some 
scholars emphasise the importance of individual factors such as drought, politics, culture or 
interests of political elites (Seekings, 2016a; Ulriksen, 2017; 2010; 2011; Mpedziswa & Ntseane, 
2011). These factors, as discussed, explain the CWR partially. Ulriksen’s (2017) contention that 
the Botswana Democratic Party has remained minimalist to secure political support from the 
rural poor, for instance, helps to explain why there is no general support for poor families with 




the Botswana Democratic Party’s programmatic reforms as a possible tool to win urban voters, 
since the programme has been extended to urban areas. Furthermore, reforms ensured indirect 
support for children in new participating families in urban areas. Previous studies have also 
underestimated some aspects of structural factors, specifically AIDS and the resultant social 
change, that explain best the reforms of the CWR in Botswana. This study emphasises the ‘AIDS 
effect’ on welfare reforms in Botswana. Individual factors may explain the general welfare 
regime but do so inadequately for the CWR. Instead, the combined three important factors, as 
already discussed, appear to explain the reforms of the familial CWR sufficiently. 
Comparatively, a combination of these factors is less useful in explaining the other three cases. 
Patronage politics, rather than party ideology, largely explain the enduring agrarian CWR in 
Zimbabwe in contrast with the other cases. The ruling ZANU-PF engaged in land and farm input 
redistribution to support farming, especially subsistence agriculture for the rural population that 
forms its main political support base. Unlike SWAPO in Namibia which has always been 
confident of winning elections, ZANU-PF has used patronage, when under threat of losing 
elections to the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, since the 2000s. In other words, 
as discussed later, reforms in the agrarian CWR have been consequential in thwarting political 
competition. Patronage may explain both ZANU-PF’s continuing stay in power and the 
sustenance of the agrarian regime. Other scholars have attributed the enduring general agrarian 
welfare regime in Zimbabwe to the politics of patronage (Moyo, 2013; Scoones, 2014), without 
assessing its effect on the CWR in Zimbabwe and other countries. Comparatively, this study 
argues that partisan politics (combined with political competition) have been more influential in 
Zimbabwe, while not as strong in the other three CWRs. 
Electoral competition (combined with structural factors) was another important factor in the 
reforms of the familial CWR in Botswana. Structural factors - health shocks in the form of AIDS 
- were an important factor, but the option to introduce an Orphan Care Programme targeted at 
AIDS-affected families also reflects elements of domestic politics in the form of electoral 
competition. Preceding the adoption of the Short-Term Plan of Action which ushered in the 
Orphan Care Programme, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party had faced its first strong 
election challenge in the 1994 elections. To regain waning political support lost to the opposition 




itself through programmatic reforms, including the Ipelegeng public works programme (Hamer, 
2016a), and expanding the ‘destitute’ benefits to vulnerable children other than orphans. Earlier, 
the Botswana Democratic Party had introduced an Old Age Pension in 1996 to secure political 
support from the rural poor (Ulriksen, 2017). Despite electoral competition, the continued 
familial regime reflects the Botswana Democratic Party’s dominance, conservative ideology, a 
weak civil society and weak international influence. Electoral competition is predominant in 
explaining the reforms of the familial CWR, both for direct and indirect programmes that affect 
children’s wellbeing.  
Electoral competition (combined with patronage) is also of prime consideration in the reforms of 
the agrarian CWR in Zimbabwe. The ruling ZANU-PF, as with the Botswana Democratic Party 
in Botswana, faced strong opposition that threatened its dominance. The MDC gained much of 
the urban vote but also made significant progress in securing rural support in the 2000 elections. 
ZANU-PF, in response, sought to gain its rural support base through the land reform programme 
that resonated well with the poor rural voters, mainly the peasant farmers. It is likely that ZANU-
PF used land reform as a political tool to consolidate political power and justify its dominance. 
Land reform, as discussed, would indirectly support families in providing for themselves. 
Children would benefit indirectly from both land and farm inputs distributed to households, 
possibly explaining the absence of cash transfer programmes which might target children, as in 
the other three cases. It appears that electoral competition intensified in the early 1990s and early 
2000s in Botswana and Zimbabwe (1994 in Botswana and 2000 in Zimbabwe), urging the 
incumbent and dominant parties to employ substantial welfare policy reforms to secure political 
legitimacy. Thus, electoral competition (and patronage) was consequential in reforms of the 
agrarian CWR, in the same way that it was with the general agrarian welfare regime. This 
analysis of the CWR provides new evidence supporting the description and explanations of 
Zimbabwean welfare policies as agrarian and enduring, as well as explanations to ZANU-PF’s 
dominance (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016; Britz & Tshuma, 2013; Moyo, 2013; Scoones, 2014).  
By contrast, electoral competition had little influence in the reforms of the CWRs in the 
remaining two cases. In Namibia, for example, SWAPO might have introduced the Vulnerable 




opposition. This illustrates that ruling parties do not only make reforms when threatened to lose 
elections, but also merely to win elections even in the absence of strong opposition. 
Individuals within government and civil society matter (whether for or against reforms) in 
explaining variation between the CWRs. In South Africa, the Minister of Social Development, 
Zola Skweyiya, presided over the expansion of the CSG as he believed in its importance in 
reducing poverty (Seekings, 2016c:14). The former Namibian Prime Minister, Angula, belittled 
the importance of social protection to all families with children and did not support the 
expansion of Child Welfare Grants. Angula became an obstacle to the Child Welfare Grants 
reforms in Namibia’s mixed CWR. In contrast with the ambivalence expressed by influential 
political elites like Angula, the role played by Hoelscher, a civil society/UN agency 
representative, was important in the major reforms in Namibia’s mixed CWR. Hoelscher pushed 
substantially for poverty targeting, an important aspect of the mixed regime.  In Zimbabwe, the 
influence of Mhishi was remarkable in the partial shift from being primarily an agrarian CWR to 
embracing the new wave of cash transfers during the Government of National Unity (Chinyoka 
& Seekings, 2016). Individuals, therefore, made differences in South Africa, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, but not in Botswana. The individuals’ influence, however, was constrained by 
domestic political factors, particularly party politics. 
6.2.4.2 Domestic Civil Society Organisations 
 
The reforms of the pro-poor CWR in South Africa are largely a ‘product of domestic civil 
society activism’ (Devereux & White, 2010:69) by comparison with the other three cases. South 
Africa is unique in that the Civil Society Organisations, especially the child sector Civil Society 
Organisations, have been well coordinated and particularly active in the policy-making process. 
Civil Society Organisations that criticised an orphan grant, effectively fighting narrow targeting, 
and pushed for the age and means test reforms of the CSG, include the Black Sash, Child 
Support Advocacy Group, Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Alliance of 
Children’s Entitlement to Social Security (ACESS) and the Children’s Institute at the University 
of Cape Town. When the ANC-led government was concerned about ‘affordability’ at the time 
of designing the CSG, the Civil Society Organisations criticised and denounced the Lund 




spending’ (Seekings, 2016c:6; 9). Findings in this study confirm earlier emphasis on the 
importance of Civil Society Organisations in child welfare reforms in South Africa (Lund, 2008; 
Proudlock, 2011; Seekings, 2016c). This study further shows that, as discussed, Civil Society 
Organisations’ power to advocate successfully for pro-poor reforms also reflects domestic 
politics. 
Furthermore, the analysis of Civil Society Organisations in existing literature in South Africa 
underestimates the support of external actors to these advocacy efforts, especially the role of 
UNICEF. UNICEF formed powerful alliances with domestic Civil Society Organisations to press 
for reforms. UNICEF might not have been particularly visible in South Africa, but its role 
(financial and technical) is recognised in the reports written by the Civil Society Organisations. 
The Children’s Institute, for example, acknowledges financial support from UNICEF in most of 
its reports. Many studies that built evidence to resist the introduction of an orphan grant bear the 
UNICEF imprint. This demonstrates UNICEF’s ‘invisible’ participation in advocating for pro-
poor reforms, promoting the rights discourse and universalism. It is difficult to establish 
UNICEF’s financial investment in these studies, but the number of publications suggests huge 
funding. Such funding might have been consequential in strengthening the more coordinated 
Civil Society Organisations in South Africa in ways that are not matched in other cases.  
While the Power Resource Theory emphasised alliances between classes such as farmer 
organisations and the working class (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 2006), this study, consistent 
with previous researches (but focused on general welfare regimes in the global South), 
establishes the alliance between global and domestic actors. In Namibia, UNICEF 
representatives worked closely with bureaucrats while domestic Civil Society Organisations in 
South Africa appear to forge alliances with UNICEF. The poor and unemployed and peasants 
form large groups in Southern Africa but they appear to lack political power to influence policies 
in all four countries in this study. Instead, donors and domestic Civil Society Organisations 
appear to press for expansion of social cash transfers that also promote their poverty alleviation 
agenda. This is an important observation that shows challenges of applying the Power Resource 
Theory outside the global North. The observation also reveals the existence of important political 
actors underestimated in the North. Researchers need to pay particular attention to the role of 




The power of Civil Society Organisations in South Africa, when compared with other cases, may 
also reflect additional factors. It is likely that, based on their professional background, key 
people involved in policy-making process, specifically the Lund Committee which advised the 
ANC on reforming the CSG, appreciated ideas and evidence from actors other than government. 
Seekings (2016c:5) reveals that ‘academic and Non-Government Organisations experts’ 
comprised the Lund Committee. These experts ‘broadly concurred on the importance of public 
expenditure in providing a foundation for the alleviation of poverty’, and hence were likely to 
support the Civil Society Organisations. Such a strong mix of Civil Society Organisations and 
‘government advisers’ is non-existent in any of the other three countries. Furthermore, personal 
relationships between some Civil Society Organisations members and the powerful minister 
Skweyiya might have helped strengthen Civil Society Organisations’ advocacy. Skweyiya was 
from Simon’s Town in the Western Cape, the province that housed the key child sector Civil 
Society Organisations (IDASA, the Children’s Institute, CASE and Black Sash). Although he 
had lived in exile for several decades before returning to South Africa in the early 1990s, he 
helped to set the Centre for Development Studies at the University of the Western Cape, where 
he would have had the opportunity to forge relationships with researchers and academics such as 
Deborah Budlender and Francie Lund. Although Skweyiya’s ties with key figures in these 
organisations are not clear, it is likely that he could have ‘collaborated’ with these Civil Society 
Organisations leaders to press for the CSG reforms.  
The other three cases are in sharp contrast with Civil Society Organisations in South Africa. 
Civil Society Organisations in these three countries are weak, and hence have next to no 
influence on CWRs reforms. There is no active child sector Civil Society Organisations as in 
South Africa, and the media and the church are silent on issues of social protection for children. 
In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF controls the media and civil society, dismissing the later as ‘foreign-
funded’ (Dorman, 2016:2). Dorman argues that ‘organized socialgroups, such as Non-
Governmental Organisations, trade unions and churches’ in Zimbabwe were important in 
pushing ZANU-PF to make economic and political reforms (2016:8), but these groups were 
ineffective in the reforms of the agrarian CWR. In Botswana, Trade Unions such as the 
Botswana Federation of Trade Unions write position papers on social policy without articulating 
child welfare issues. Literature suggests that, up to the 1990s, Botswana lacked powerful interest 




1996). According to Nthomang (Bangura, 2007), ‘Botswana’s unions are very weak and are not 
affiliated to any of the political parties. In addition, the government has prevented public sector 
employees from joining or forming unions.’ This weak civil society, combined with the 
‘unorganised poor’ (Selolwane, 2012:200), specifically the rural poor, appears to have persisted 
to the present.  
Similarly, Civil Society Organisations in Namibia and Zimbabwe are silent and ‘toothless’ in 
advocating and lobbying for reforms of social grants including those for families with children. 
Namibia’s umbrella civil society board, Namibia Non-Governmental Organisations Forum, has 
not been active since the 1990s due to lack of coordination and funds; and started to reconstitute 
itself only in 2015 when it initially received government and donor funding. When it 
reconstituted, its focus was on work-related social insurance programmes with very little push 
for social assistance, and none for social grants for children. In Zimbabwe, the National 
Association of Non-Governmental Organisations represents the interests of civil society, but its 
influence is minimised by the political situation in the country where policy-making is 
dominated by the ruling ZANU-PF party, i.e. for the Government of National Unity period 
(2009-2013) when relations between the state and civil society were better, and allowed the 
voice of non-state actors. In effect, child grant reforms are less pronounced in any of the cases 
other than in South Africa. The Power Resource Theory does not mention domestic civil society 
organisations as important actors but the new insight in this study is that Civil Society 
Organisations are central in the politics of social protection reforms in the global South including 
in certain country case studies, as discussed, in this thesis. 
Overall, domestic politics seem to be a cross-cutting factor that has influenced reforms in all of 
the CWRs. International organisations' power to influence CWR reforms, assuredly, were 
constrained by domestic politics. Proposals to reform the familial CWR in Botswana through the 
introduction of poverty-targeted grants did not succeed. Unlike in Namibia, where political elites 
embraced the poverty-targeted Vulnerable Grant, in Botswana the World Bank’s proposed 
Family Support Grant or Basic Income Grant and the UNICEF proposed ‘Child Support Grant’ 
were rejected by the conservative ruling Botswana Democratic Party. UNICEF, by funding most 
of the studies that were used by Civil Society Organisation to advocate for the reforms of the 




The ANC resisted the proposal for the universal CSG, preferring to expand access of the 
poverty-targeted CSG. Similarly, international pressure from UNICEF and other United Nations 
agencies and international organisations was insufficient to influence reforms of the agrarian 
regime in Zimbabwe. Despite UNICEF’s funding of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
programme, the government of Zimbabwe did not expand the programme to support the 
proposed shift from an agrarian to a pro-poor CWR, which would have provided cash transfers to 
poor households in all districts. This failure provides further evidence to confirm the general 
observation in welfare policy literature (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016; Hickey et al., 2009) that 
international organisations have failed to persuade some political elites to expand cash transfers. 
Ultimately, the choice for a CWR reflects more political than other influences. 
The role of political elites in shaping policy in this study is consistent with the Power Resource 
Theory’s emphasises that political elites would support reforms if they promote their interests. In 
this thesis child focused civil society organizations promoted reforms because they promoted the 
social protection interests of their constituency i.e. children's social protection rights. Similarly, 
political elites like politicians co-opted civil society organisations in policy-making, for example, 
in the case of South Africa during Zuma presidency when child reforms promoted their leftist 
ideology. In cases where political elites' interests diverged with those of United Nations 
agencies reforms did not happen. UNICEF's advocacy for a CSG-like child grant in Botswana or 
UNICEF's push for the adoption of cash transfers as the primary poverty reduction tool in 
Zimbabwe are good examples. The strength of this thesis is in underscoring the political elites-
United Nations or international agencies power relations underestimated in the Western 
application of the Power Resource Theory. 
6.2.5 Level of democracy 
 
Another important factor which could contribute to explaining differences in coverage between 
the CWRs is the level of democracy. There appears to be a positive relationship between 
coverage and the level of democracy. South Africa, as discussed, has the highest level of 
democracy, Botswana is second, Namibia is third, and Zimbabwe is not even classified as a 
democracy but an anocracy. These democracy levels correspond to expansiveness of the CWRs. 




Namibia. The lowest number of children covered is in Zimbabwe. Of the four cases, countries 
with high levels of democracy are likely to have more redistributive CWRs. Research into the 
relationship between level of democracy and types of welfare regimes in Southern Africa is 
scarce. This analysis sheds light on one aspect (programmes coverage) of variation between 
CWRs and the level of democracy, taking into account other underlying factors, notably 
domestic politics. 
6.3 Further research 
 
This thesis aims to promote our thinking about characterising and explaining CWRs in the global 
South, particularly in Southern Africa. The researcher believes this to be the first scholarly 
attempt to document CWRs in the Southern African region, and possibly in Africa at large. A 
taxonomy of CWRs was constructed using four cases only. This thesis is, therefore, not 
exhaustive as it does not examine adequately the variance that could exist in different countries 
in West, East and North Africa; neither does the study consider all countries in Southern Africa. 
Further research would be likely to reveal new explanations due to the differences in political, 
religious, economic, historic and social experiences. Such comparisons have been beyond the 
scope of this research due to financial and time constraints. A more comprehensive study would 
require extensive time, financial and human resources beyond this thesis and the capacity of the 
researcher. 
Furthermore, this study revealed that some CWRs in Francophone Africa had adopted a 
‘workerist’ CWR model resembling those in France (and other industrialised democracies). Such 
a model is different from the CWRs discussed in this study, focusing on Anglophone Africa. It is 
anticipated that there is further substantial variation between CWRs within Francophone Africa 
alone. An opportunity exists to investigate whether explanations discussed in this thesis account 
fully for the variation between CWRs within Francophone Africa, and between Francophone 
Africa and Anglophone Africa. It is likely that CWRs in Francophone Africa might require a 
new set of explanations as a result of historical, political, socio-economic and cultural 




Qualitative data collected through in-person interviews with purposively selected policy-makers 
helped the researcher to gain insight into valuable historical and current social policy reforms. 
The combination of in-depth interviews and document analysis provided adequate data for 
meaningful analysis in this thesis. Without time constraints, and notwithstanding the negligible 
value of full researcher participation in policy-making processes, including engagement in 
anthropological data collection instruments such as participant observation, comparative CWR 
research could benefit from such epistemology.  
6.4 Conclusions 
This thesis explored comparative variation between Child Welfare Regimes and the possible 
causes of variation in Southern Africa. In developing an alternative empirical operationalisation 
of child welfare regimes variation, the study concludes that states provide social grants for 
families with children in different ways. The major finding is that CWRs in South Africa, 
Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe all started as familial and minimalist, with state provision 
focused on orphans or children living in poor, single-mother households. But, since the 1990s, 
state provision has diverged across two dimensions: coverage (proportion of children reached, 
legal status and generosity of benefits) and targeting form. Targeting varies across two aspects: 
whether social grants are poverty-targeted or targeted on the basis of ‘family breakdown’. In 
view of these two dimensions, a taxonomy of four distinct CWRs was constructed: a pro-poor in 
South Africa, a familial in Botswana, a mixed (familial-poverty) in Namibia, and an agrarian in 
Zimbabwe.  
Building upon theories of welfare state development, this thesis argues that the different ways in 
which domestic politics respond to international pressure, structural factors and colonial 
antecedents largely account for the four different trajectories the countries assumed. Findings in 
this study suggest that the political economy narrative proves amazingly influential in making 
sense of differences between child welfare regimes. The overall argument advanced is that 
different combinations of factors explain the model in each country and the variation between 
them but that politics is a crucial determinant of the choice for a regime type. Ruling parties do 
not reform CWRs only when they are threatened to lose elections, but implement reforms to win 
elections even in the absence of strong political competition. The desire to secure political 




under study, hence ruling parties in Southern Africa, as in Latin America (De la O, 2015; 2013), 
opt to introduce or reform cash transfer programmes in ways that favour the incumbent. Winning 
elections and political legitimacy are generally factors which motivate incumbent parties to 
reform social transfers for families with children, despite the lack of strong electoral competition, 
with or without structural challenges, international or Civil Society Organisations pressure. The 
South African and Namibian cases demonstrate the absence of electoral pressure, although 
reforms occurred. Comparatively, reforms in Botswana and Zimbabwe were responses to 
political competition. In both periods of political insecurity and security, reforms happened in all 
four cases because the incumbents needed to secure votes.  
Various political actors (Civil Society Organisations, international agencies and donors, political 
elites, individuals) played different roles in shaping CWRs. Theoretically, therefore, the analysis 
in this thesis falls broadly within the Power Resource Theory. Power Resource Theory 
predominates in the global North where these actors were overlooked, leading to the conclusion 
that existing theoretical explanations to the causes of variation in CWRs do not account 
adequately for variation in provision of social grants for families with children in Southern 
Africa. This thesis has advanced the Power Resource Theory to Southern Africa, but identified 
new and important (although overlooked alternative) explanations within this theory. Whereas 
the Power Resource Theory emphasised the power resource of interest groups particularly linked 
to political mobilisation (Esping-Andersen, 1990), this thesis emphasised the power resource of a 
different set of interest groups, including domestic Civil Society Organisations, international 
organisations and agencies and bureaucrats. The power of certain ministries, such as Ministries 
of Finance relative to other ministries, was also important in this study although underestimated 
in the application of the Power Resource Theory in the West.  
The Power Resource Theory emphasised coalitions between different actors i.e. political elites, 
the middle class, labour movements, social movements and farmer organisations, in welfare state 
expansion. Power coalitions are apparent in case studies in this thesis, albeit different actors 
because of the non-contributory nature of social protection. Except for political elites, actors 
identified by the Power Resource Theory in the global North, including some of actors identified 
in East Asia (Rudra, 2008) or Latin America (Huber & Stephens, 2012), were less important in 




Instead, different actors – transnational actors (specifically UNICEF and ILO), domestic Civil 
Society Organisations, individuals within governments or Non-Governmental Organisations, the 
power of ministries relative to each other - are important, as discussed, in this study. Bureaucrats, 
for example, such as Sioka and directors in the Ministry of Gender and Child Welfare in 
Namibia, coalesced with UNICEF (representing United Nations agencies) or the ILO 
(representing international organizations) to advocate successfully for a poverty-targeted grant. 
While confirming broadly the relevance of coalitions espoused in the Power Resource Theory, as 
applied in Western cases, this thesis advances the theory to identify new actors - international 
organisations and United Nations agencies - that promote, actively, child social protection 
reforms in the global South. These findings are consistent with previous research that emphasise 
the importance of such actors in explaining variation between general welfare regimes (Brooks, 
2015; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Hickey et al., 2018; Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012; Uriksen, 2010) 
and individual country welfare reforms of child grants (Seekings, 2017b).  
This thesis is an attempt to answer the question faced by social policy comparativists (How and 
why social provision for families with children vary?) to make three important contributions to 
the fast-growing literature that examines the politics of cash transfers in Southern Africa and 
elsewhere. First, theoretically, the thesis has extended the Power Resource Theory to semi-
industrialised and still heavily agrarian societies. Findings in this study suggest that the Power 
Resource Theory remains valid in explaining variation between child welfare regimes beyond 
capitalist democracies in the North and more industrialising regions i.e. Latin America and East 
and South Asia in the global South. The different combinations of explanatory factors that 
appear central in the empirical cases provide new evidence and support existing theoretical 
explanations to variation in public policy. The study brings new perspectives by analysing how 
and why social provision varies for families with children which tend to be under-theorised. 
Second, the study has generated new empirical evidence, providing detailed analysis of the 
political economy of evolution of child welfare regimes within and across four countries in 
Southern Africa, an under-researched  region as far as child welfare regimes are concerned. The 
importance of political economy in understanding differences in child welfare reforms 
underscored in this investigation is consistent with previous researches that, however, focused on 




for families with children in the four case study countries. The study has shown that the choice of 
programmes, form of targeting and the reach of social transfers, within and across countries, is 
not determined by one factor but a combination of considerations. Furthermore, while 
governments appear to provide social cash transfers for families with children primarily to 
reduce child poverty, the policy decision on which category of children gets what form of social 
assistance (form of targeting) is not solely an outcome of the need to address child poverty. 
Other factors, specifically the perceived breakdown of families, are significant considerations. 
Ultimately, the reach (coverage) and targeting form of social cash transfers are outcomes of 
complex political processes in each country, hence the variation in child welfare regimes. The 
shift from familial targeting to poverty-targeting in all countries, albeit slow in some countries 
such as Zimbabwe and Botswana perhaps because of weak political interests in favour of broad-
based and generous child welfare policies, suggests the possibility of adoption of pro-poor child 
welfare regimes in future. 
Third, this thesis appears to be the first major attempt to construct a taxonomy of child welfare 
regimes in Southern Africa. Despite the existence of substantial research on CWRs focusing on 
the global North, the taxonomy constructed in this study is important in widening our knowledge 
of the less understood field of regime types in Southern Africa. The four regime types identified 
in the taxonomy constructed present comparative social policy researchers with an opportunity 
for further interrogation into CWRs in Southern Africa and elsewhere. This is an important 
contribution to existing knowledge on empirical classification and alternative explanations to the 
constructed taxonomy from a Southern African perspective. The study has suggested two 
dimensions i.e. coverage and targeting form that are vital in constructing a taxonomy of child 
welfare regimes. The thesis has challenged previous research on taxonomies of CWRs to set up a 
future comparative research agenda in the global South. Given that the thesis used only four case 
studies to explore new possible determinants of CWRs variation, the extent to which the possible 
causes of variation analysed in this study may account for cross-national differences in the rest of 
Africa remains unknown. The potential value of this four-case comparative study is that the 
cases represent distinct regime types that could be found elsewhere; in other words if more 




In addition, this thesis advances the comparative methodology that predominates the global 
North and primarily extended to general welfare regime researches in the global South. Despite 
extensive comparative social policy studies in the North and an increasingly new focus on 
general welfare regimes in the global South, comparative studies of child welfare regimes from a 
Southern Africa perspective remain sparse. This study is important in filling the limited 
comparative research gap in the fast-growing field of child social protection as well as 
contributing to the growing literature on comparative political economy of social cash transfers 
in industrialising societies.  
Findings in this study have some theoretical implications to the broader understanding of 
differences in welfare states. The Power Resource Theory underscores the importance of 
political institutions as simple arenas for conflict among social classes or as useful political tools 
for the parties involved in this struggle. Political institutions, in this regard, lack independent 
explanatory power to explain variation in welfare states (Korpi, 2001). Findings in this research 
support this claim to show that political institutions, such as government ministries or domestic 
Civil Society Organisations, impact on, but hardly explain independently, the expansion of social 
provision for families with children. The power of ministries of finance relative to ministries 
responsible for social grants, as discussed, has an enduring effect on targeting and the reach of 
social cash transfers. The power of finance ministries is, however, constrained by political elites, 
for example. Findings in this study, thus, agree that political institutions are important and 
support earlier assertions (Korpi, 2001) that institutional factors lack independent power to 
explain differences in welfare regimes. None of the individual actors (within the Power Resource 
Theory) or individual factors could explain variation between the CWRs in this study, yet one 
combination of factors leads to one type of regime and a different combination of factors leads to 
a different CWR. 
Whereas the Power Resource Theory affirms the importance of strong labour movements in 
welfare expansion in the global North (Korpi, 2001; Korpi & Palme, 2003), there seems to be no 
strong labour movements, such as trade unions, that advocate for the expansion of social 
assistance, particularly social cash transfers, in Southern Africa. This study accentuates that 
political institutions such as labour movements have limited power to promote the expansion of 




Congress of South African Trade Unions in South Africa, Botswana Federation of Trade Union 
in Botswana, Zimbabwe Congress of trade Unions in Zimbabwe and the National Union of 
Namibian Workers in Namibia, but they primarily represent work-related social insurance 
programmes with limited interest in social cash transfers. This study does not rebut the Power 
Resources Theory but complements it by affirming, as in previous studies on general welfare 
regimes in the global South (Brooks, 2015; Hickey et al., 2018), that other political actors i.e. 
Civil Society Organisations (e.g. Black Sash in South Africa) and transnational actors (e.g. 
UNICEF in Namibia), rather than labour movements, are more important in shaping social 
policy in Africa. This study finds strong evidence to suggest that the effect of these political 
actors is mediated by domestic politics. Findings in this study, thus, advance the Power 
Resources Theory, as applied to general welfare regimes in the global South, but further 
challenge the theory’s relevance in explaining variation in child welfare regimes in Southern 
Africa, specifically. Without disputing the Power Resources Theory, this research downplays the 
role of labour movements in the expansion of social grants for families with children. Instead, 
this thesis, provides new evidence to the limits of labour movements in influencing welfare 
reforms in the developing world, consistent with previous research (Rudra, 2015), while 
emphasising the explanatory power of domestic politics.  
Previous researches in the global North assert the importance of the Power Resource Theory in 
understanding differences in welfare state development. The researches underscore the 
significance of working class mobilization in expansion of welfare programmes (Huber & 
Stephens, 2001). The Power Resource Theory, as discussed, emphasises the ‘distributional 
struggles between competing interest groups’, with a focus on ‘the political power wielded by 
the major classes and the ensuing class conflicts and compromises characteristic of capitalist 
democracies’ (Hickey et al., 2018:5). The political power approach has been applied in the 
global South to understand differences in expansion of general welfare regimes, with limited 
focus on child welfare regimes. This thesis assesses the relevance of the Power Resource Theory 
in explaining variation between child welfare regimes in Southern Africa. Variation between 
child welfare regimes in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe does not reflect 
working class mobilisation but is traced to the historical and contemporary differences in 
political economy i.e. a variant of the Power Resources Theory. The emphasis on political 




South, specifically in East Asia, Latin America and Africa (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Hickey 
et al., 2018; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Lavers & Hickey, 2016; Rudra, 2015). Findings in this 
thesis, therefore, contribute to the theoretical understanding of welfare regimes by extending the 
political economy to research on child welfare regimes in Southern Africa from a comparative 
perspective. The Power Resource Theory, however, cannot be applied to Africa without 
modifications because much of Africa is semi-industrialised and still heavily agrarian. 
Ultimately, this thesis accentuates the relevance of political economy in explaining variation in 





Appendix 6.1: List of Key informants  
Name Institution Designation 
BOTSWANA 
1 Olebile M Gaborone  Office of the President Permanent Secretary Poverty 
Eradication 
2 Dr Ernest N Makwaje Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning 
Director Macroeconomic Policy 
3 Gomotsanang Nchadi 
Manne 
Mininstry of Local Government- Department 
of Social Protection 
OVC Coordinator- Legislation 
and Policy Officer 
4 Papadi Evelyn 
Nguvauva 
Min of Local Government- Department of 
Social Protection 
Commissioner of Social 
Benefits 
5 Angelinah Montshiwa Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and 
HIV/AIDS  
Programmes Manager 
6 Felistus Motimedi Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and 
HIV/AIDS  
Programmes Manager 
7 Mpho Sebako Ark and Mark Trust     Programme Officer 
8 Tsepiso Sekopo Ark and Mark Trust     Programme Officer 
9 Paul SS Shumba Independent   Former Advisor to President ; 
Consultant and Former Senior 
Management & Implementation 
Specialist and Team Leader, 
NACA  
10 Dr Kesitegile 
Gobotswang 
Botswana Congress Party Vice President 
11 Boyse Otlhomile SOS Children's Villages Programme Director 
12 Dithapelo Keorapetse Botswana Congress Party  Member of Parliament, Phikwe 
13 Duma Gideon Boko Social Democratic Botswana National Front 
& Umbrella for Democratic Change  
President 
14 Ndaba Goalathe Umbrella for Democratic Change  Deputy President 
15 Moeti Mohwasa Umbrella for Democratic Change  spokesperson 




17 Dr Tebogo Bruce 
Sekela 
Botswana Institute for Development Policy 
Analysis  
Executive director 
18 Kaboyakgosi, Gape  Botswana Institute for Development Policy 
Analysis 
Senior Researcher 
19 Prof Keitseope 
Nthomang 
UB Social Work Department HoD Social Work Department 
20 Prof Rodreck 
Mupedziswa 
UB Social Work Department Senior Lecturer  
ZIMBABWE 
21 Paurina Mpariwa Parliament/ Movement for Democratic 
Change 
Former Minister of Labour and 
Social Services  
22 Lucia Matibenga Parliament/ Movement for Democratic 
Change 
Former Minister of Public 
Service 
23  Ngoni Masoka Government A/Chief of Policy, Planning 
&PVO Administration 
MPSLSW 
24 Togarepi Chinake Government Director Social Services (Family 
and Child Welfare) MPSLSW 
25 Joyce Jiri Government Acting Deputy Director 
Vulnerable Groups Families & 
Social Protection Services 
MPSLSW 
26 Agnes Mutowo Government Acting Deputy Director BEAM 
MPSLSW 
27 Pamhidzayi Berejena 
Mhongera 
Ministry of Labour and Social Services Technical Advisor: Social Cash 
Transfers MPSLSW 
28 Lovemore T Dumba Ministry of Labour and Social Services National NAP Coordinator 
MPSLSW 
29 Laxon Chinhego Government  A/Deputy Director of Policy, 
Planning & PVO Administration 
MPSLSW 
30 David Coltart Movement for Democratic Change   Former Minister of Education 
31 Dr. Henry Madzorera Movement for Democratic Change  Former Minister of Health 
32 Gwati Gwati Government Policy Planning & Donor 




33 Tendai Biti Ministry of Labour and Social Services Former Minister of Finance 
34 Victor Makovere Action Aid International  PRP Project Officer 
35 Angeline Matereke Save the Children Technical Manager-Child Rights 
Governance 
36 Leon Muwoni UNICEF Child Protection Specialist 
37 Dr. Chrystelle Tsafack  UNICEF Social Policy Specialist 
38 Sam Coope United Kingdom Department of International 
Development 
Social Development Advisor 
39 Herbert Matsikwa World Food Programme Programmes Manager 
40 Sherita Manyika World Food Programme Programme Assistant 
41 Constance Oka Food and Agriculture Organisation  Livelihoods Officer 
42 Ruth Wutete World Bank  Public Information Assistant 
43 Adonis Faifi HelpAge Zimbabwe Programs Manager 
44 Dr. Cephas Zinhumwe National Association of Non-Governmental 
Organisations  
Chief Executive Officer 
45 Leonard  Mandishara National Association of Non-Governmental 
Organisations 
Programmes Director 
46 Albert Jaure World Vision International (Zimbabwe) ADP Area Manager-Harare 
47 Dr. Billy Mukamuri  Centre for Applied Social Sciences Director 
48 Prof Edwell Kaseke Impact Research International UNICEF Consultant 
49 James Matiza National Social Security Agency  Chief Executive Officer 
50 Dr. Bernd Schubert  UNICEF UNICEF Consultant 
51 Dr. Prosper 
Chitambara 
Labour & Economic Development Research 
Institute of Zimbabwe 
Development Economist 
52 Naome Chakanya Labour & Economic Development Research 
Institute of Zimbabwe 
Economist 
53 Chido Mutambara Mercy Corps Programme M &E Coordinator 




55 Ophilia Zava  Government Deputy Director, Infant 
Education 
56 Amarakoon Bandara UNDP Economic Advisor 
57 Charles Chingosho  Government Director community 
Development MWGCD 
58 Violet Mushandinga Government Programme Officer Vulnerable 
Groups 
59 James Chawarika Government Senior Programme 
Administrator MWGCD 
60 Sydney Mhishi Government Principal Director MPSLSW 
61 Adolphus Chinomwe ILO Senior Programme Officer 
62 Prof Sudhanshu Handa UNICEF UNICEF Consultant 
63 Noma Nkomani Deloitte Managing Assistant 
NAMIBIA 
64  Helena Andjamba MGECW Director, Child Welfare Services 
65 Iben Nashandi Government PS min of poverty; former 
deputy PS MoFinance 
66 Evia Scihepo Lifeline/Childline Programme Manager 
67 Nahas Angula SWAPO Former prime minister 
68 France Kaudinge SWAPO Director of Admin 
69 Melanie Tjituka 
Tjikusere 
SWAPO National Youth Council 
Committee member 
70 Eric Luff SWAPO Special Advisor to the 
Presidents 
71 Albert Biwa Government Acting Permanent Secretary 
MoPESW 
72 Elma Dienda DTA Secretary general, MP 
73 Benson Katjirijova DTA Youth League Secretary-
General  




Zatjirua Protection  
75 Julia Shipena Red Cross OVC Programme Manager 
76 Fabian S Mubiana UNDP National Poverty Reduction 
Advisor &M&E Focal Point 
Learning Manager 
77  Mahongora Kavihuha Trade Union Congress of Namibia Secretary General 
78 Dr. Michael Akuupa Labour Resource and Research Institute  Director 
79 Laura Cronje Church Alliance for Orphans  Director 
80 Herbert Jauch Co-author of Basic Income Grant Reports/ 
Metal & Allied Namibian Workers Union 
  Labour Specialist/ Education 
Coordinator 
81 Ivin Lombardt Namibian Association of Non-Governmental 
Organisations Forum  
Director 
82 Toni Hancox Legal Assistance Centre Director  
83 Dirk Haarman Basic Income Grant Coalition Basic Income Grant Secretariat 
84 Agnes Mukubonda Government Programme Manager, School 
Feeding Programme, Min of 
Educ, Arts &Culture  
85 John Muniaro Trade Union  Secretary General NUNW 
86 Letisia Alfeus INGO  Programme Manager UNFPA 
87 Gerson Uaripi 
Tjihenuna  
Academic former Cabinet Under Secretary: 
Policy Analysis & Coordination  
88 Heiner Naumann NGO Resident representative 
89 Dr Blessing 
Chiripanhura 
UNAM Researcher/Lecturer 
90 Petra Hoelscher UNICEF former Chief of Social Policy 
(2010-4) 
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